You are here: / SECURITIES TRADER IS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS...

Search Results

/

SECURITIES TRADER IS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant, a securities trader who worked for Quad Capital, LLC, was an employee entitled to unemployment benefits:

The record establishes that claimant submitted a resume and was interviewed by a managing partner at Quad Capital. After certain criteria, such as a trading license, fingerprints and background check were completed, claimant entered into an Ordinary Member Agreement and was given a trader handbook. The record also establishes that, despite being designated by the contract as a member of the limited liability company, claimant did not make a monetary investment in the company, was paid based upon the net profit only from his portfolio, did not have any managerial duties, did not make any financial or managerial decisions and was not liable for any losses from the company — unlike managing members of Quad Capital. Further, claimant had regularly-scheduled work hours in Quad Capital’s office and was required to notify his manager if he would be absent. Claimant was expected to attend morning meetings, his work was regularly reviewed and monitored by a manger and he was subject to a dress code for which a fine would be imposed if violated. Matter of Giampa (Quad Capital, LLC–Commissioner of Labor), 2020 NY Slip Op 01877, Third Dept 3-16-20

 

/

THE CARRIER’S FAILURE TO INDICATE WHEN IT OBJECTED TO THE RULING OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW JUDGE JUSTIFIED THE DENIAL OF THE CARRIER’S APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Workers’ Compensation Board did not abuse its discretion when it denied the carrier’s application for review because question 15 on the application form did not indicate when the relevant objection to the Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) was made:

When the carrier filed its application for Board review … , question number 15 on that form, as well as the accompanying instructions in effect at that time, requested that it “[s]pecify the objection or exception interposed to the ruling and when the objection or exception was interposed as required by 12 NYCRR 300.13 (b) (2) (ii).” In response to question number 15, the carrier stated, “Please note the carrier’s objection to not finding a transfer of liability to the Special Funds Conservation Committee pursuant to [Workers’ Compensation Law §] 25-a.” The Board found that the carrier’s response was incomplete because there were “several hearings [that] had taken place prior to the hearing [on] July 3, 2018,” and the carrier’s response to question number 15 did “not include the date of the hearing at which the exception to the WCLJ’s ruling was interposed, as required.” Both the regulation itself and the instructions in effect at the time that the carrier filed its application for Board review unambiguously required the carrier to “specify the objection or exception that was interposed to the [WCLJ’s] ruling, and when the objection or exception was interposed” … . As such, a complete response to question number 15 required the carrier to specify the nature of its objections or exceptions and indicate when such objections or exceptions were interposed. Although the carrier satisfied the first prong of the regulation by articulating specific objections to the WCLJ’s rulings, it failed to satisfy the temporal element of the regulation by indicating when such objections were made. Accordingly, under the circumstances presented here, in which the carrier failed to provide the requisite temporal element in its response to question number 15, we find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the carrier’s application for Board review … . Matter of Barrera v Corinthian Cast Stone, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 01880, Third Dept 3-16-20

Similar issue and result in Matter of Currie v Rist Transp. Ltd., 2020 NY Slip Op 01874, Third Dept 3-16-20

Similar issue and result in Matter of Perry v All Am. Sch. Bus Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 01869, Third Dept 3-16-20

/ , ,

WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID; THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DWI ARREST EVEN THOUGH NO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS WERE CONDUCTED; BETTER PRACTICE WOULD BE FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO PLACE THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S GUILT ON THE RECORD AT THE TIME OF AN ALFORD PLEA (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, affirming defendant’s DWI conviction by guilty plea, determined the waiver of appeal was insufficient. The Third Department noted that the better practice would have been to place the evidence of defendant’s guilt on the record at the time of the Alford plea, and found the arresting officer had probable cause without conducting field sobriety tests. With regard to the waiver of appeal, the court wrote:

During the brief colloquy with defendant, County Court did not sufficiently distinguish the waiver of the right to appeal from the trial-related rights that defendant was forfeiting by virtue of his guilty plea, and the record does not reflect that defendant executed a written waiver. Additionally, in response to County Court’s inquiry regarding defendant’s willingness to waive his right to appeal, defendant replied, “Yes, if that’s what I gotta do, yes. If that’s what you’re making me do, I’ll do it.” Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. People v Crandall, 2020 NY Slip Op 01857, Third Dept 3-16-20

 

/

CLAIMANT’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS SUPPORTED THE DENIAL OF CLAIMANT’S APPLICATION FOR BOARD REVIEW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant’s failure to comply with the formatting requirements supported the denial of claimant’s application for Board review:

The Board’s instructions for the RB-89 form regarding question number 13 required that claimant specify the date and document ID numbers of “the transcripts, documents, reports, exhibits, and other evidence in the Board’s file that are relevant to the issues and grounds being raised for review.” In response, claimant answered, “[a]ll hearings, transcripts and documents in [the Board] file are pertinent to the outstanding issue.” By merely referencing the entire Board case file in response to question number 13, claimant failed to comply with the prescribed formatting and completion requirements … . Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying claimant’s application for Board review, and its decision will not be disturbed … . Matter of Hirschbeck v Office of the Commr. of Major League Baseball, 2020 NY Slip Op 01870, Third Dept 3-16-20

 

/ ,

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION ON A GROUND (STANDING) NOT RAISED BY A PARTY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed causes of action for lack of standing when that issue was not raised by the parties:

We thus conclude that the court erred in sua sponte reaching the issue of standing with respect to the second and third causes of action … . Standing “is an aspect of justiciability which, when challenged, must be considered at the outset of any litigation” … . Inasmuch as the … respondents’ cross motion with respect to the second and third causes of action was not based on petitioners’ alleged lack of standing, there was no basis for the court to reach that issue.  Matter of Barbeau v Village of LeRoy, 2020 NY Slip Op 01732, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

/ , ,

JUDGE WHO WAS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY WHEN DEFENDANT WAS INDICTED WAS DISQUALIFIED FROM HEARING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court’s summary denial of defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction, determined the judge, who was the District Attorney when defendant was indicted, was disqualified from handling the motion:

The Judge who denied defendant’s motion had been the Niagara County District Attorney when defendant was indicted in 2007 on the charges that resulted in the judgment now sought to be vacated and, in fact, had signed the indictment. Thus, we conclude that the Judge was disqualified from entertaining the motion pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14, which provides in relevant part that “[a] judge shall not sit as such in, or take any part in the decision of, an action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding to which he [or she] is a party, or in which he [or she] has been attorney or counsel” (emphasis added). Inasmuch as “this statutory disqualification deprived the court of jurisdiction,” the order on appeal is void … . We therefore reverse the order and remit the matter to County Court for further proceedings on the motion before a different judge … . People v Simcoe, 2020 NY Slip Op 01729, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

/

TRAFFIC STOP WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED A TRAFFIC VIOLATION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Administrative Law Judge, determined defendant’s driver’s license should not have been revoked. The record lacked substantial evidence that the police officer had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a traffic violation when he made the traffic stop which resulted in defendant’s refusing to submit to a chemical test:

A police officer initially stopped petitioner on a suspected violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 (1) (a), i.e., leaving the scene of an accident that caused property damage without reporting it. The officer observed petitioner approximately one mile from the accident site driving a white pickup truck, which matched the description of the vehicle involved in the accident. The officer effected a stop of the truck by activating the patrol vehicle’s lights and ultimately took petitioner into custody after petitioner exhibited signs and made statements that indicated he was intoxicated. Petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test, and thus his driver’s license was temporarily suspended. A refusal revocation hearing was thereafter held pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) (c). The Administrative Law Judge revoked petitioner’s license after concluding, inter alia, that the traffic stop was legal. In affirming that determination on petitioner’s administrative appeal, respondent concluded that the stop was lawful because the officer “had a reasonable basis for stopping” petitioner.

We agree with petitioner that respondent reviewed the determination under an incorrect legal standard inasmuch as “the Court of Appeals has made it abundantly clear’ . . . that police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when there exists at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime’ . . . [,] or where the police have probable cause to believe that the driver . . . has committed a traffic violation’ ” … . We further agree with petitioner that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination that the officer had the requisite probable cause at the time of the stop … . Matter of Deraway v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 2020 NY Slip Op 01727, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

/ ,

TEACHER’S LAWSUIT AGAINST STUDENTS ALLEGED INTENTIONAL, NOT NEGLIGENT, CONDUCT AND WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-teacher’s suit against two students alleged intentional conduct (battery), not negligent conduct, and was therefore time-barred. Plaintiff was pushed into a locker by the students who were fighting each other. Although the students did not intend to touch the teacher, the doctrine of transferred intent applied:

Defendant met her initial burden by establishing that plaintiff was injured as a result of intentional conduct that constituted a battery and not negligent conduct … . “A valid claim for battery exists where a person intentionally touches another without that person’s consent” … . ” The intent required for battery is intent to cause a bodily contact that a reasonable person would find offensive’; there is no requirement that the contact be intended to cause harm’ ” … . The deposition testimony of plaintiff and defendants submitted in support of the motion established that defendants intentionally caused offensive bodily contact with each other by engaging in a physical fight … . Although defendants did not intend to make physical contact with or to injure plaintiff, the contact that resulted in plaintiff’s injuries was nevertheless intentional under the doctrine of “transferred intent” … . …

Defendant thus established that this action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts … .  Kessel v Adams, 2020 NY Slip Op 01758, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

/ ,

CONTRARY TO SUPREME COURT’S RULING, THE PURCHASE CONTRACT DID NOT INCLUDE A CLAUSE LIMITING PLAINTIFF’S REMEDY FOR A BREACH TO RETAINING THE DEPOSIT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the purchase contract did not have a limitation of remedies clause restricting plaintiff’s damages for a breach to retaining the deposit:

A limitation of remedies “will not be implied and to be enforceable must be clearly, explicitly and unambiguously expressed in a contract”… . Indeed, “[s]uch clauses are . . . strictly construed against the party seeking to avoid liability” (id. at 219), and ” a provision must be included in the agreement limiting a party’s remedies to those specified in the contract in order for courts to find that th[o]se remedies are exclusive’ ” … . Here, nothing in the contract stated that plaintiff’s contractual right to retain the deposit upon defendant’s breach was plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy for such a breach. The court thus erred in granting the cross motion on that ground … . Lundy Dev. & Prop. Mgt., LLC v Cor Real Prop. Co., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 01751, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

/ ,

DEFENDANT, WHO CO-OWNED THE PROPERTY FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE HAZARDOUS LEAD PAINT CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this lead-paint exposure case should have been granted. Defendant was a co-owner of the subject property but he was able to demonstrate his connection to the property was such that he did not have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous lead paint condition:

… [D]efendant owned the subject property, as a tenant in common, with his father during the period of plaintiffs’ tenancy from 1992 to 1994. In support of his motions, defendant submitted his affidavit, wherein he averred, among other things, that he was a co-owner of the property “on paper only,” that his father handled all day-to-day maintenance of the property, and that defendant never entered plaintiffs’ apartments or hired anyone to make repairs thereto during plaintiffs’ tenancy. Defendant further averred that he did not have a key to the apartments and that he never spoke to or received complaints from plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ mother. Defendant’s submissions also established that he had no knowledge of inspections for or the existence of lead paint at the property during plaintiffs’ tenancy and that he was unaware that the property was constructed at a time before lead paint was banned, that paint was peeling at the property, that lead paint posed a danger to young children, and that young children lived on the property.

Regardless of whether defendant’s father had actual or constructive notice through his own involvement with the property, that notice cannot be imputed to defendant absent evidence of defendant’s own actual or constructive notice … . McDowell v Maldovan, 2020 NY Slip Op 01748, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy