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QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL CASE; APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED; EXTENSIVE THREE-JUDGE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, determined plaintiff in this Labor Law 240(1) ladder-fall case should not have been awarded summary judgment. Plaintiff used an A-frame ladder in a closed position because of limited space. While rerouting pipes in the ceiling, plaintiff received an electric shock and fell to the floor. The majority found questions of fact were raised about whether the ladder failed to protect plaintiff and whether other safety devices should have been provided:

An “accident alone” is insufficient to establish a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) or causation … . Moreover, Labor Law § 240 (1) is designed to protect against “harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person” … . We agree with the dissent below that plaintiff was not entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim … . Indeed, questions of fact exist as to whether “the ladder failed to provide proper protection,” whether “plaintiff should have been provided with additional safety devices,” and whether the ladder’s purported inadequacy or the absence of additional safety devices was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s accident … . Cutaia v Board of Mgrs. of the 160/170 Varick St. Condominium, 2022 NY Slip Op 02834, CtApp 4-28-22

Practice Point: Here plaintiff was apparently electrocuted while standing on a closed A-frame ladder and fell to the floor. The happening of the accident alone did not establish that the ladder failed to protect plaintiff or that other safety equipment should have been provided to plaintiff. Therefore plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. There was a three-judge dissenting opinion.

 

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THE BANK DID NOT OFFER A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO TAKE PROCEEDINGS FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN A YEAR AND DID NOT SUBMIT AN ADEQUATE LOST NOTE AFFIDAVIT; THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE ACTION IS DEEMED ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action did not submit sufficient evidence to support a late motion for default judgment against the borrower. The bank did not offer a reasonable excuse for failure to take proceedings for a default judgment within a year, and did not submit a sufficient lost note affidavit. The Second Department deemed the action abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its failure to take proceedings for the entry of a judgment within one year after the action was released from the foreclosure settlement part … .

Further, a plaintiff moving for leave to enter default judgment against a defendant must submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the claim, and proof of the defendant’s failure to answer or appear … . Pursuant to UCC 3-804, “[t]he owner of an instrument which is lost, whether by destruction, theft or otherwise, may maintain an action in his [or her] own name and recover from any party liable thereon upon due proof of his [or her] ownership, the facts which prevent his [or her] production of the instrument and its terms.” Here, the plaintiff failed to set forth the facts that prevented the production of the original note … . The lost note affidavit submitted by the plaintiff in support of its motion, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment did not identify who conducted the search for the lost note or explain when or how the note was lost … . LaSalle Bank N.A. v Carlton, 2022 NY Slip Op 02785, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: If the bank does not present an adequate excuse for failing to take proceedings for a default judgment in a foreclosure action within one year, the action will be deemed abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215.

 

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IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CASE, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE LADDER WAS UNSECURED AND SHIFTED; DEFENDANT ALLEGED PLAINTIFF TOLD HIS SUPERVISOR HE LOST HIS BALANCE AND JUMPED FROM THE LADDER, RAISING A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS WERE THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined conflicting facts precluded summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1) ladder-fall case. Plaintiff alleged the ladder was unsecured and shifted when he attempted to descend. The defendant alleged plaintiff told his supervisor he lost his balance and jumped off the ladder which raised a question whether plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident:

… [T]he defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the ladder shifted to the right and backwards, as the plaintiff testified, or whether the plaintiff’s own actions were the sole proximate cause of the subject accident. The defendants submitted an affidavit from the plaintiff’s supervisor, who averred that the plaintiff had told him, just after the accident occurred while he was still on the roof, that he had lost his balance as he descended the ladder and jumped off the ladder. The different versions of the accident given by the plaintiff create triable issues of fact that required denial of the motion, including a triable issue of fact as to the plaintiff’s credibility … . Jurski v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 02783, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: Evidence that plaintiff told his supervisor he lost his balance and jumped from the ladder created a triable issue of fact about whether plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident in this Labor Law 240(1) action.

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THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY THE BANK TO PROVE STANDING TO FORECLOSE LAID AN ADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR THE RELEVANT BUSINESS RECORDS BUT THE RECORDS THEMSELVES WERE NOT SUBMITTED, RENDERING THE AFFIDAVIT HEARSAY; THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISION OF THE MORTGAGE, A CONDITION PRECEDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court determined the evidence that the bank had standing to bring the foreclosure action was insufficient and the bank did not demonstrate compliance with the notice provision of the mortgage, a condition precedent. Although the affidavit submitted by the bank laid a sufficient foundation for the business records described in the affidavit, the records themselves were not submitted:

Although the foundation for the admission of a business record may be provided by the testimony of the custodian, “it is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted” … . “Without submission of the business records, a witness’s testimony as to the contents of the records is inadmissable hearsay” … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Boursiquot, 2022 NY Slip Op 02782, Second Dept 4-27-22

Similar issue (failure to submit records referenced in affidavits) and result in U.S. Bank N.A. v Tesoriero, 2022 NY Slip Op 02830, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: Even if an affidavit lays a proper foundation for business records, the affidavit is inadmissible hearsay if the records themselves are not also submitted.

 

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THE RIGHT LANE WAS FOR RIGHT TURNS ONLY; THE MIDDLE LANE WAS FOR EITHER GOING STRAIGHT OR TURNING RIGHT; HERE THE DRIVER IN THE FAR RIGHT LANE DID NOT TURN RIGHT AND STRUCK THE CAR IN THE MIDDLE LANE WHICH WAS MAKING A RIGHT TURN; THE DRIVER IN THE MIDDLE LANE WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this traffic accident case, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant Rubio should not have been granted and defendant Rubio’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff was a passenger in a taxi driven by defendant Muy-Angamarca. Muy-Angamarca was in the far right lane, which was for right turns only. Rubio was in the middle lane which could be used to go straight or turn right. When Rubio attempted the right turn, Muy-Angamarco continued straight and struck Rubio’s car:

… [T]he Rubio defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the sole proximate cause of the accident was Muy-Angamarca’s vehicle continuing straight through the intersection in disregard of a traffic sign directing that his lane was for right turns only … . Based upon Muy-Angamarca’s disregard of the traffic sign, he was in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and thus, he was negligent as a matter of law (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110[a] …). Rubio was entitled to assume that Muy-Angamarca would obey the traffic sign requiring Muy-Angamarca to turn right … . Indeed, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that he observed that Rubio had signaled before making a legal right turn from the middle lane, that Muy-Angamarca “started to accelerate” toward the intersection while Rubio’s vehicle was turning, and that he did not believe Rubio was at fault in the happening of the accident. Ellsworth v Rubio, 2022 NY Slip Op 02781, Second Dept 4-27-22

 

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VAGUE, CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS WILL NOT SUPPORT A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff did not state a cause of action for constructive discharge from his employment as a civil engineer for the City of New York:

The plaintiff was employed by the New York City Department of Transportation (hereinafter DOT) as an assistant civil engineer from 1997 until 2014, when he resigned. He commenced this action in 2017 alleging, inter alia, that he had been constructively discharged because he had reported other employees’ misconduct … . * * *

“An employee is constructively discharged when her or his employer, rather than discharging the plaintiff directly, deliberately created working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have felt compelled to resign” … .  Here, affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting the facts as alleged to be true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference … , the complaint fails to state a cause of action alleging constructive discharge, as the allegations are either vague and conclusory … , or pertain to events that occurred after the plaintiff resigned. Dhar v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 02779, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: Vague and conclusory allegations will not support a cause of action for constructive discharge, i.e., working conditions which are intolerable, “forcing” plaintiff to resign.

 

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THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT DID NOT INCLUDE THE CLOSING DATE OR THE MORTGAGE TERMS; THE CONTRACT WAS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE PURSUANT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the seller was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the action for specific performance of the real estate purchase contract, because the contract did not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds:

Under the statute of frauds, a contract for the sale of real property must be evidenced by a writing (see General Obligations Law § 5-703[1]). The writing must “identify the parties, describe the subject matter, be signed by the party to be charged, and state all of the essential terms of an agreement” … . “In a real estate transaction, the essential terms of a contract typically include the purchase price, the time and terms of payment, the required financing, the closing date, the quality of title to be conveyed, the risk of loss during the sale period, and adjustments for taxes and utilities” … . “‘[T]he writing must set forth the entire contract with reasonable certainty so that the substance thereof appears from the writing alone . . . If the contract is incomplete and it is necessary to resort to parol evidence to ascertain what was agreed to, the remedy of specific performance is not available'” … . …

In addition to the document not specifying the closing date, the evidence established that the parties never agreed with respect to the mortgage terms. At his deposition, the plaintiff testified that he was purchasing the property “subject” to the existing mortgage and that he had the “option” of obtaining a purchase money mortgage. The document, however, did not state whether the plaintiff was purchasing the property subject to the existing mortgage, obtaining a purchase money mortgage, or obtaining his own mortgage. The failure to include such terms makes the purported real estate contract unenforceable … . Cohen v Holder, 2022 NY Slip Op 02778, Second Dept 4-27-22​

Practice Point: A real estate purchase contract which does not include all the material terms is not enforceable pursuant to the Statute of Frauds. Here the contract did not include the closing date or the mortgage terms. It was deemed unenforceable and the action for specific performance was dismissed.

 

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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1303, INCLUDING THE REQUIRED TYPE SIZE; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1303:

“RPAPL 1303 requires that a notice titled ‘Help for Homeowners in Foreclosure’ be delivered to the mortgagor along with the summons and complaint in residential foreclosure actions involving owner-occupied, one- to four-family dwellings” … . “The statute mandates that the notice be in bold, 14-point type and printed on colored paper that is other than the color of the summons and complaint, and that the title of the notice be in bold, 20-point type” … .

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it provided notice in compliance with RPAPL 1303. The plaintiff’s submissions did not demonstrate that the notice served upon the defendant complied with the type-size requirements in RPAPL 1303 … . Bank of Am., N.A. v Keefer, 2022 NY Slip Op 02776, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: In foreclosure actions, the bank must demonstrate strict compliance with the notice provisions of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. Here the bank did not demonstrate compliance with RPAPL 1303, included the required type size.

 

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THE 2022 CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE SENATE REDISTRICTING MAPS DECLARED VOID BECAUSE THEY WERE DRAWN WITH AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PARTISAN INTENT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals declared the 2022 congressional and state senate redistricting maps void, finding they were drawn with “an unconstitutional partisan intent.” “Opinion by Chief Judge DiFiore. Judges Garcia, Singas and Cannataro concur. Judge Troutman dissents in part in an opinion, in which Judge Wilson concurs in part in a dissenting opinion, in which Judge Rivera concurs in part. Judge Rivera dissents in a separate dissenting opinion, in which Judge Wilson concurs:”

In 2014, the People of the State of New York amended the State Constitution to adopt historic reforms of the redistricting process by requiring, in a carefully structured process, the creation of electoral maps by an Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) and by declaring unconstitutional certain undemocratic practices such as partisan and racial gerrymandering. No one disputes that this year, during the first redistricting cycle to follow adoption of the 2014 amendments, the IRC and the legislature failed to follow the procedure commanded by the State Constitution. A stalemate within the IRC resulted in a breakdown in the mandatory process for submission of electoral maps to the legislature. The legislature responded by creating and enacting maps in a nontransparent manner controlled exclusively by the dominant political party — doing exactly what they would have done had the 2014 constitutional reforms never been passed. On these appeals, the primary questions before us are whether this failure to follow the prescribed constitutional procedure warrants invalidation of the legislature’s congressional and state senate maps and whether there is record support for the determination of both courts below that the district lines for congressional [*2]races were drawn with an unconstitutional partisan intent. We answer both questions in the affirmative and therefore declare the congressional and senate maps void. As a result, judicial oversight is required to facilitate the expeditious creation of constitutionally conforming maps for use in the 2022 election and to safeguard the constitutionally protected right of New Yorkers to a fair election. Matter of Harkenrider v Hochul, 2022 NY Slip Op 02833, CtApp 4-27-22

Practice Point: The Fourth Department’s determination the 2022 redistricting maps unconstitutionally favored democrats was here upheld by a divided Court of Appeals.

 

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THERE WAS NO OBJECTIVE SUPPORT FOR PLAINTIFF BUS PASSENGER’S CLAIM THE MOVEMENT OF THE BUS WHICH CAUSED HER TO FALL WAS “UNUSUAL AND VIOLENT” (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant bus company’s, MTA’s, motion to dismiss the complaint in this bus-passenger injury case should have been granted:

To establish a prima facie case of negligence against a common carrier for injuries sustained by a passenger as a result of the movement of the vehicle, a plaintiff must establish that the movement consisted of a jerk or lurch that was “‘unusual and violent'” … . “Moreover, a plaintiff may not satisfy that burden of proof merely by characterizing the stop as unusual and violent” … . There must be “objective evidence of the force of the stop sufficient to establish an inference that the stop was extraordinary and violent, of a different class than the jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel and, therefore, attributable to the negligence of defendant” … . “In seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint, however, common carriers have the burden of establishing, prima facie, that the movement of the vehicle was not unusual and violent” … .

… MTA established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. MTA demonstrated, by submitting the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, that the movement of the bus was not unusual and violent or of a “different class than the jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel” … . The nature of the incident, according to the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, was that she was caused to fall as the bus stopped at the intersection. According to the plaintiff, who did not provide an estimate as to how fast the bus was traveling prior to stopping at the intersection, she was the only passenger on the bus who fell, although there was another passenger standing within two feet of her at the time. The plaintiff testified that she landed on the floor near where she was standing prior to falling down. This is not, in itself, sufficient to provide the objective support necessary to demonstrate that the movement of the bus was unusual and violent, and of a different class than the jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel … . Orji v MTA Bus Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 02811, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a bus passenger’s allegation his or her injury was caused by an “unusual and violent” movement of the bus must have some sort of “objective support,” which was absent in this case.

 

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