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IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REOPEN THE INQUEST ON DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined it was an abuse of discretion to deny plaintiff’s motion to reopen the inquest on damages. Although the motion was untimely, there was no prejudice to the defendants:

… [T]he Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was, in effect, to reopen the inquest in order to permit the plaintiff to submit what the court had indicated was crucial evidence … . Moreover, there was no evidence that the defendants would be prejudiced … . Although the plaintiff’s motion was not made in a timely fashion, a factor which ordinarily weighs against granting such relief … , the record here reflects that the delay may have been due in part to the plaintiff’s confusion regarding the court’s directive as to how to proceed … . Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v Islam, 2023 NY Slip Op 05119, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff sought to reopen the inquest on damages to present crucial evidence which had been requested by the judge. Although the request was untimely, there was no prejudice to the defendants. It was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion.

 

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THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SORA RISK-LEVEL HEARING; RISK-ASSESSMENT REVERSED; ALTHOUGH NOT PRESERVED, THE ISSUE WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the SORA risk assessment, determined the People did not demonstrate defendant had waived his due process right to be present at the hearing. Although the error was not preserved, the Second Department considered the appeal in the interest of justice:

A sex offender facing risk level classification under SORA has a due process right to be present at the SORA hearing … . “To establish whether a defendant, by failing to appear at a SORA hearing, has waived the right to be present, evidence must be shown that the defendant was advised of the hearing date, of the right to be present at the hearing, and that the hearing would be conducted in his or her absence” … . Reliable hearsay evidence, such as an affidavit, is admissible to establish waiver … . Here, the record is silent as to whether the defendant received notice of the SORA hearing and there was no evidence, hearsay or otherwise, that the defendant expressed a desire to forego his presence at the hearing. People v Perez, 2023 NY Slip Op 05161, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Although a defendant can waive the due process right to be present at the SORA risk-assessment hearing, and the waiver can be proved by hearsay, here there was no evidence of a waiver and the risk assessment was reversed.

Practice Point: At issue here was defendant’s constitutional right to be present at the SORA risk-assessment hearing. Although the issue (his absence from the hearing) was not preserved, the appellate court considered the appeal in the interest of justice.

 

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DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID; HER SENTENCE WAS FURTHER REDUCED PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined defendant’s appeal-waiver was invalid and further reduced her sentence pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act:

The County Court did not discuss the appeal waiver with the defendant until after the defendant had already admitted her guilt as part of the plea agreement … . Further, when the court raised the issue of the appeal waiver, the defendant, who had no known prior contact with the criminal justice system, advised the court that she had not discussed the waiver with her attorney, which required a pause in the proceedings to give her an opportunity to do so. These circumstances, including the defendant’s experience and background, demonstrate that the purported waiver of the right to appeal was invalid … .

Pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (L 2019, ch 31, § 1; L 2019, ch 55, § 1, part WW, § 1 [eff May 14, 2019]; hereinafter the DVSJA), courts may “impose reduced alternative, less severe, sentences in certain cases involving defendants who are victims of domestic violence” … . Here, while the County Court granted the defendant’s application for an alternative sentence under the DVSJA, we find that the sentence imposed should be reduced to the extent indicated herein … . People v Heft, 2023 NY Slip Op 05148, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Defendant’s appeal waiver was deemed invalid, in part because she had not discussed the waiver with her attorney and had no prior contact with the criminal justice system.

Practice Point: Here County Court had reduced defendant’s sentence pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act and the Second Department reduced it further.

 

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THE FACT THAT THE HOME WAS ILLUMINATED WHEN THE PROCESS SERVER ATTEMPTED SERVICE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS EVADING SERVICE; THE PROCESS SERVER DID NOT ATTEMPT SERVICE AT DEFENDANT’S PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT; THE “NAIL AND MAIL” SERVICE WAS INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the “nail and mail” service of process was invalid because the process server’s affidavit did not demonstrate “due diligence” in attempting other methods of personal service:

“Service of process must be made in strict compliance with [the] statutory ‘methods for effecting personal service upon a natural person’ pursuant to CPLR 308” … . Here, the plaintiff purportedly served the defendant by the “affix and mail” method pursuant to CPLR 308(4). Service pursuant to CPLR 308(4) may be used only where service pursuant to CPLR 308(1) or (2) cannot be made with “due diligence” … . “The due diligence requirement of CPLR 308(4) must be strictly observed, given the reduced likelihood that a summons served pursuant to that section will be received” … .

Here, … the process server made prior attempts at personal delivery of the summons and complaint at the defendant’s residence at different times of the day between Thursday, December 21, 2017, and Friday, December 29, 2017. Although one of those times was on December 23, 2017, a Saturday, the attempts at service occurred at the height of the holiday season, when the defendant may have had reasons not to be home … . The process server noted that holiday lights were on in the windows of the residence on December 23, 2017, and that both floors of the residence were illuminated on December 26, 2017. Nevertheless, considering the holiday season, the process server’s observations were not a sufficient basis to believe that the defendant was evading service. Moreover, the process server stated that he was “unable” to speak to a neighbor regarding the defendant’s whereabouts.

In addition, in the year prior to the commencement of this action, the defendant was granted a loan modification, and as part of his application for a loan modification, the defendant was required to and did, in fact, disclose his employer and address of employment to the plaintiff. No attempts were made to serve the defendant at his place of employment. Bank of Am., N.A. v Fischer, 2023 NY Slip Op 05112, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Here the process server’s affidavit did not demonstrate “due diligence” in attempting service at defendant’s home and there was no attempt to serve defendant at his place of employment. The “nail and mail” service was deemed invalid.

 

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IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, THE DRIVER OF THE REAR VEHICLE ALLEGED THE OTHER VEHICLE CHANGED LANES ABRUPTLY AND CAME TO A STOP IN FRONT OF HIM; THAT CONSTITUTED A NON-NEGLIGENT EXPLANATION WHICH RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this rear-end traffic accident case, determined defendant raised a question of fact about a non-negligent explanation for his striking the car in front:

At his deposition, Guo Lin Wu [the driver of the United vehicle] testified that the Castillo/Lopez vehicle changed lanes abruptly in front of the United vehicle and then came to a sudden stop. Guo Lin Wu’s deposition testimony, if true, would constitute a nonnegligent explanation for his actions, and would establish that Castillo’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident … . The differing versions of events raised issues of credibility to be resolved by the factfinder … . Balanta v Guo Lin Wu, 2023 NY Slip Op 05111, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Ordinarily a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle warrants summary judgment in favor of the stopped vehicle. Here the driver of the rear vehicle raised a question of fact by alleging the other vehicle changed lanes abruptly and stopped in front of him.

 

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THE MAJORITY DETERMINED MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS WERE PROPERLY TERMINATED; MOTHER AND THE DISSENT ARGUED THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES DISCOURAGED HER FROM COMMUNICATING WITH IT WELL BEFORE THE ABANDONMENT PERIOD (SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE FILING OF THE TERMINATION PETITION) AND THE JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY PROHIBITED HER FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE FROM BEFORE THE ABANDONMENT PERIOD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive and comprehensive dissent, determined Family Court properly terminated mother’s parental rights. The question whether a parent has abandoned a child focuses on the six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. Mother argued that the Department of Social Services had discouraged her from communicating with the department and the court had cut off her parental access well before the statutory abandonment period. The dissent agreed with mother’s arguments and supported a new fact-finding hearing:

… [T]he mother failed to demonstrate that the petitioner prevented or discouraged her from communicating with it or with the child, or that she was otherwise unable to do so … . The mother’s contention that the petitioner prevented her from communicating with the child by suspending her parental access is without merit, as it was the Family Court that suspended the mother’s parental access with the child, not the petitioner. Further, the mother was still obligated to maintain contact with the petitioner, which had legal custody of the child, even though the court had suspended her parental access … . * * *

From the dissent:

In this proceeding to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment, the mother, who had been precluded from visiting with the subject child, asserted that her conduct during the statutory abandonment period did not evince an intent to abandon the child because the petitioner had prevented and discouraged her from maintaining contact with the child and with the petitioner. The Family Court erroneously ruled that the mother could not present evidence regarding events that occurred prior to the statutory abandonment period and erroneously precluded the mother from eliciting such evidence on cross-examination of the petitioner’s witnesses and during her own testimony. The court’s incorrect ruling infringed upon the mother’s right to present evidence regarding the central issue in the proceeding. Matter of Abel J.R. (Estilia R.), 2023 NY Slip Op 05139, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: To demonstrate abandonment of a child, the proof focuses on the six months before the petition to terminate parental rights was filed. Here mother and the dissent argued the Department of Social Services discouraged her from communicating with it about the child well before the six-month abandonment period. Mother and the dissent argued the Family Court judge erred by limiting proof from prior to the abandonment period. The majority noted mother was allowed to present pre-abandonment-period evidence and that evidence did not negate the proof of abandonment.

 

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PLAINTIFF BUS PASSENGER WAS INJURED WHEN THE BUS DRIVER TOOK ACTION IN AN EMERGENCY; DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-bus-passenger’s injuries resulted from the bus driver’s reaction to an emergency:

In this action for personal injuries arising from a fall on a public bus, defendants established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that their bus driver was presented with an emergency situation that was not of his own making when a vehicle abruptly swerved into his lane without signaling, and that he took reasonable action by braking to avoid a collision … .

In opposition, plaintiff failed to submit any evidence tending to show that the bus driver created the emergency or could have avoided a collision by taking a different action other than applying the brakes … . Plaintiff’s claim that an issue of fact is raised by conflicting testimony over whether the driver braked abruptly or gradually is unavailing. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the driver was required to take immediate action to avoid striking the vehicle and that braking with sufficient force to prevent an accident was a reasonable response to the emergency … . Febres v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 2023 NY Slip Op 05095, First Dept 10-10-23

Practice Point: Defendants demonstrated the bus driver took justifiable action in an emergency. Plaintiff, a bus passenger, was injured by the movement of the bus. Defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

 

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THE SCAFFOLD COLLAPSED ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; THE HEARSAY SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION DID NOT DEFEAT THE MOTION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this scaffold-collapse case. Plaintiff alleged he was told to assemble use the scaffold despite mismatched parts. The defendants relied on hearsay statements attributed to Sabato, plaintiff’s supervisor, to the effect that Sabato told plaintiff to wait until the correct scaffold parts were supplied. Hearsay alone will not defeat a summary judgment motion:

… [T]estimony establishing that a safety device collapsed is sufficient for a prima facie showing on liability … . * * *

Because defendants’ submissions in opposition rely entirely on Sabato’s inadmissible hearsay statements, they are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s conduct — namely, using a scaffold that he was allegedly instructed not to use – may be the sole proximate cause for his accident and therefore warrant a denial of plaintiff’s motion … . Garcia v 122-130 E. 23rd St. LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05096, First Dept 10-10-23

Practice Point: The collapse of a scaffold warrants summary judgment on a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Hearsay alone offered in opposition will not defeat the motion.

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO DEFENDANT ON DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA; THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MOTION AFTER NEW COUNSEL IS ASSIGNED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department sent the matter back for a ruling on defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant’s attorney took a position adverse to the defendant’s by telling the judge the motion would not succeed. New counsel must be assigned:

Before sentencing, defendant made a written pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting, among other things, deficiencies in defense counsel’s performance with respect to the plea. The court assigned defendant new counsel, and the People opposed defendant’s motion. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the court asked counsel if he was seeking an adjournment to supplement defendant’s pro se motion, and counsel responded: “No, I am not, and I am not adopting it because I read the People’s [opposition] and reviewed the case law on this issue and it really doesn’t seem to be worthy of asking for my client to take his plea back.” Under the circumstances, counsel took a position adverse to defendant, requiring assignment of new counsel on the motion … . People v Rivera-Santana, 2023 NY Slip Op 05101, First Dept 19-10-23

Practice Point: Here defense counsel told the judge defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea was weak, thereby taking a position adverse to defendant’s. The First Department sent the matter back for assignment of new counsel and consideration of the motion.

 

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PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE SCAFFOLD FROM WHICH HE FELL DID NOT HAVE GUARDRAILS; HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this scaffold-fall case was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff demonstrated the scaffold lacked guardrails. That was enough:

Plaintiff … established prima facie that defendant violated Labor Law § 240(1) and that the violation proximately caused his injuries, as his uncontroverted affidavit demonstrated that the scaffold supplied to him for the work he was performing lacked guardrails and that no other protective devices were provided to protect him from falling. The motion was not premature as defendants failed to show what discovery was needed or what any additional discovery could be expected to reveal (see CPLR 3212 [f] …). Velasquez v 94 E. 208 St. Partners LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05110, First Dept 10-10-23

Practice Point: Here, falling from a scaffold with no guardrails warranted summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

 

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