You are here: / Arbitrator’s Rulings Largely Unreviewable

Search Results

/ , , ,

Arbitrator’s Rulings Largely Unreviewable

An arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement was vacated by the trial court.  The Fourth Department reversed and confirmed the arbitration award.  The decision includes a substantive discussion of the criteria that must be met before an arbitration award can be disturbed by a court.   “[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable…”.  An arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract may be set aside “only if the [arbitrator] gave a completely irrational construction to the provisions in dispute and, in effect, made a new contract for the parties…”.  Matter of the Arbitration between Professional, Clerical, Technical, Employees Association and Board of Education for Buffalo City School District, 1317, CA 12-01143 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

 

 

/

Liability for Providing Alcohol to Under-Age Purchaser Only Triggered by Injury Caused by the Purchaser.

There is no common-law cause of action for the negligent provision of alcohol.  Under General Obligations Law section 11-100, liability for furnishing alcohol is triggered only if the person who unlawfully received the alcohol causes injury.  In this case, a clerk in a convenience store sold alcohol to a 17-year-old with a fake ID who then shared the alcohol with friends.  One of the friends became intoxicated and had an automobile accident, injuring the plaintiff. Because it was not the purchaser of the alcohol who caused the accident, General Obligations Law section 11-100 did not apply.  Gutierrez vs. Devine, 1489, CA 12-01209 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

 

/ ,

19-Year Preindictment Delay Okay; Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Probative of Motive, Intent and Identity; Admissions Are Direct, Not Circumstantial, Evidence

A 19-year preindictment delay did not violate defendant’s speedy trial and due process rights. The charge was murder. The defendant was at liberty until indicted. The People established good cause for the delay in that the case was not ready to bring to a grand jury until the statements of three witnesses and DNA test results were obtained. The Fourth Department held that there was no need for a Singer hearing to determine the reason for the delay because there was no issue of fact with respect to the cause of the delay and the record provided County Court with a sufficient basis to determine whether the delay was justified. The admission of prior incidents of domestic violence against the victim (defendant’s wife) was proper because the evidence was probative of defendant’s motive, intent and identity. The defendant was not entitled to a circumstantial evidence charge because the admissions he made about killing his wife constituted direct evidence. People v Rogers, 1425, KA 11-00012 4th Dept. 2-1-13

 

 

/ , ,

A Shooting Victim’s Negligence and Public Nuisance Actions Against the Manufacturer, Distributor and Resellers of Firearms Is Allowed to Go Forward.

Back in October, 2012, in a full-fedged opinion by Justice Peradotto, the Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court’s dismissal of a complaint brought by a shooting victim which alleged negligence, public nuisance and intentional-violation-of-gun-laws causes of action against the manufacturer, distributor and resellers of firearms.  (Williams v Beemiller, Inc., et al, 100 AD3d 143).

Reargument was subsequently granted.  After reargument, the Fourth Department amended its October opinion by adding a new section.  Excerpts from the new section follow:

With respect to the common-law negligence cause of action, although “ ‘ [a] defendant generally has no duty to control the conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from harming others’ “ …, “[a] duty may arise … where there is a relationship…between defendant and a third-person’s actions “ … .  In Hamilton [v Berretta USA Corp., 96 NY2d 222], the Court of Appeals determined that no such relationship existed because the plaintiffs were unable to draw any connection between specific gun manufacturers and the criminal wrongdoers … . Here, by contrast, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants sold the specific gun used to shoot plaintiff to an unlawful straw purchaser for trafficking into the criminal market, and that defendants were aware that the straw purchaser was acting as a conduit to the criminal market. Thus, unlike in Hamilton, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that defendants “were a direct link in the causal chain that resulted in plaintiffs’ injuries, and that defendants were realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs” … .

Further [an] intervening criminal act does not necessarily sever the causal connection between the alleged negligence of defendants and plaintiff’s injury … . Rather, “liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant[s’] negligence” … .  Here, plaintiffs allege that defendants… knowingly participated in the sale of 140 handguns, including 87 handguns in a single transaction, to [a] gun trafficking ring.  We conclude that those allegations are sufficient to raise a question of fact whether it was reasonably foreseeable that supplying large quantities of guns for resale to the criminal market would result in the shooting of an innocent victim ….

We likewise conclude that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action for public nuisance … . [P]laintiffs allege that defendants violated federal and state laws by selling guns to a straw purchaser, who funneled the guns into the criminal gun market, thereby posing danger to the general public, and that plaintiff was injured by one of those guns. Thus, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants engaged in unlawful conduct that endangered the lives of “a considerable number of persons” … and that plaintiff “ ‘ suffered special injury beyond that suffered by the community at large’ “ … .Williams v Beemiller, Inc., Motion No. 938/12, CA 11-02092 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

 

/ ,

Knowledge of Dangerous Condition May Make Owner Liable Even Where Owner Exercises No Supervisory Control Over Contractor’s Operation.

The Fourth Department held: “ ‘It is settled law that where the alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from the contractor’s methods and the owner exercises no supervisory control over the operation, no liability attached to the owner under the common law or under section 200 of the Labor Law …’.  Defendant, however, may be liable for common-law negligence or the violation of Labor Law [section] 200 if it ‘had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition on the premises which caused the … plaintiff’s injuries, regardless of whether [it] supervised [plaintiff’s] work’ …”.  Ferguson vs Hanson Aggregates New York, Inc. 1460 CA 12-00596 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

 

/ ,

“Open and Obvious” Nature of Defect Does Not Negate Duty to Keep Premises Safe.

Plaintiff brought a Labor Law and common law negligence action based upon the allegation that a 1 1/2 inch depression in a marble step at the Buffalo City Hall caused him to slip.  At the time of the accident, plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor which had been hired by defendant company.  The defendant company claimed on appeal that its duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition was obviated by the open and obvious defect in the stair.  The Fourth Department noted that the fact that the defect was “open and obvious” speaks only to plaintiff’s comparative negligence, and does not negate the defendant’s duty to keep the premises reasonably safe.  The Fourth Department went on to hold that the defendant company “failed to establish as a matter of law that the hazard posed by the stair was open and obvious and that they had no duty to warn plaintiff of that tripping hazard.”  Landahl v City of Buffalo and U & S Services, Inc., 1333, CA 12-01208 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

 

/ , , ,

Single Policy Limit Held to Apply to Successive Tenants in Lead-Paint-Tainted Apartment.

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Smith, the Fourth Department discussed the liability-limits of an insurance carrier for injuries caused to children by lead paint in the insured apartment.  The policy, which had a $500,000 limit, included the following sentence:  “All bodily injury and property damage resulting from one accidental loss or from continuous or repeated exposure to the same general conditions is considered the result of one accidental loss.”  Children in one family who lived in the apartment suffered injury from lead paint and the carrier paid out $350,000.  Subsequently children in another family who moved into the same apartment suffered injury from lead paint.  The question before the Court was whether the liability to the second family was capped at $150,000 because the total liability of the carrier could not exceed $500,000, or whether the injury to the second family triggered another $500,000 in policy coverage.  The Fourth Department determined the carrier was liable for a total of $500,000 for the injuries to both families and the second family could recover no more than $150,000.   Nesmith, et al v Allstate Insurance Company, 1252, CA 12-00182 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

 

/ ,

Right to Counsel.

In a proceeding pursuant to part three, article six of the Family Court Act to allow a mother visitation with her child in her home, the Fourth Department determined the grandmother, who had primary physical custody of the child, should have been advised of her right to assigned counsel (Family Court Act section 262 (a)(iii)).  The court’s failure to so advise her constituted reversible error.  Matter of Wright vs Walker, 11, CA-12-00962 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

 

/ ,

No “Reasonable Suspicion,” Defendant Should Not Have Been Stopped and Detained.

A new trial was ordered and the defendant’s motion to suppress identification evidence was granted by the Second Department.  A police radio broadcast described a robbery in progress by two males wearing black jackets, one wearing blue jeans, the other wearing black jeans. The complainant described the robbers only as “wearing dark clothing,” one taller than the other, and one with a hood.  The Court held that these descriptions were not sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant, who was dressed in a dark gray and dark green camouflage jacket and was standing alone 20 blocks from the crime scene.  People v Polhill, 2010-01680, Ind. No. 943/09 Second Dept. 1-30-13

DeBour, street stops

/ ,

Queens County District Attorney’s Standard “Preamble” to the Miranda Warnings Struck Down.

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Skelos, the Second Department struck down a so-called “program” which had been put in place by the Queens County District Attorney’s Office.  Pursuant to the “program,” a “preamble” was read to the defendant just before the Miranda warnings were given.  The Second Department determined the preamble rendered the Miranda warnings ineffective.  The Court noted that the defendant was told of his privilege against self-incrimination only after being told (in the preamble) that this was his “only opportunity” to refute what others have said, to correct any misperceptions, and to try to help himself.  The preamble suggested that the prosecutor would not investigate his version of events if he declined to speak with the prosecutor at that time.  Conversely the preamble suggested that, if the defendant agreed to be interviewed, the prosecutor would assist him with such an investigation.  This suggestion, the Second Department held, “is contrary to the very purpose of the warning that anything a suspect says can be used against him … . In essence, the preamble suggests that invoking [the right to remain silent] will bear adverse, and irrevocable, consequences.”  People v Dunbar, 2010-04786, Ind. No. 1217/09 Second Dept. 1-30-13

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy