You are here: / Contribution and Indemnification Unavailable in Breach of Contract Action;...

Search Results

/ ,

Contribution and Indemnification Unavailable in Breach of Contract Action; Notice of Claim Requirement Under Education Law Never Triggered by Denial of Payment

In a complicated breach of contract action arising out of construction projects for defendant school district, the Second Department determined contribution and indemnification were unavailable for purely economic loss from breach of contractual obligations (CPLR 1401, 1403, 3019).  In addition, the Second Department determined that the need to file a notice of claim pursuant to Education Law 3813 was never triggered by a denial of payment.  On the notice of claim issue, the Second Department wrote:

Education Law § 3813(1) requires a party to serve a notice of claim upon a school district within three months after the accrual of such claim as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action …. Claims arising out of a breach of contract accrue when “payment for the amount claimed was denied” (Education Law § 3813[1]). A denial of payment is only deemed to occur “upon an explicit refusal to pay” or when a party should have viewed its claim as having been constructively rejected …. Where no express or constructive denial of payment has been made, the obligation to serve a notice of claim is not triggered…. Here, the District failed to demonstrate that it expressly or constructively denied payment to PGA for its continued work on the projects. Thus, the District did not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment …based upon PGA’s failure to serve a notice of claim in accordance with Education Law § 3813(1)… .  Capstone Enters of Port Chester, Inc v Board of Educ Irvington Union Free Sch Dist, 2013 NY Slip Op 03448, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

/ ,

Action for Fraud Cannot Be Based on Same Facts as Breach of Contract; Fraud Must Be Pled in Detail

After noting that a cause of action for fraud does not lie when it is based on the same allegations stated in a breach of contract cause of action, the Second Department explained the pleading requirements in a fraud action, including the need for “detail,” as follows:

A cause of action to recover damages for fraud requires allegations of (1) a false representation of fact, (2) knowledge of the falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damages…. Moreover, CPLR 3016(b) requires that the circumstances underlying a cause of action based on fraud be stated “in detail” (CPLR 3016[b];…). Here, the allegations of fraud against the remaining defendants either were bare and conclusory or do not rise to the level of fraud. Consequently, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the separate motions of the remaining defendants which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the third cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them. Genovese v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 03453, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

/ , ,

Bank Account in Name “Ann … or Thomas…” Could Be Turned Over to Pay Debt Owed by Thomas 

In finding that the funds held in a bank account in the name of “Ann Sledjeski or Thomas Sledjeski” should have been turned over to pay Thomas Sledjeski’s debt, the Second Department wrote:

The Supreme Court should have granted the unopposed petition pursuant to CPLR 5225(b) to direct Hudson City Savings Bank to turn over the funds of an account it held in the name of “Ann Sledjeski or Thomas Sledjeski,” to partially satisfy a judgment entered in favor of the petitioner and against Thomas C. Sledjeski. ” [T]he opening of a joint bank account creates a rebuttable presumption that each named tenant is possessed of the whole of the account so as to make the account vulnerable to levy of a money judgment by the judgment creditor of one of the joint tenants'” (…see Banking Law § 675[b]). Therefore, the petitioner was not required to establish that the judgment debtor was the sole contributor of funds to the account. Moreover, since none of the respondents appeared or answered the proceeding, they failed to rebut the presumption …  Matter of JRP Old Riverhead, Ltd v Hudson City Sav Bank, 2013 NY Slip Op 03484, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

/ ,

Statutorily-Mandated Venue Is Not Jurisdictional and Is Waivable

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, the Second Department discussed, in great detail, the relevant statutes and case law concerning the venue provisions in the CPLR and venue as mandated in the New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation (NYCHHC) Act. The Second Department determined NYCHHC Act’s statutorily-mandated venue is not jurisdictional and can be waived:

In sum, since the NYCHHC chose to waive the venue provision contained in section 7401(3) of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Act for actions brought against it upon the consolidation of the plaintiffs’ two actions, and absent a showing of any special circumstances demonstrating that venue be placed in Bronx County [the statutorily-mandated venue], we conclude that the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in placing venue in Westchester County, where the first of the related actions was commenced. Wager v Pelham Union Free Sch Dist, 2013 NY Slip Op 03475, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

/

Criteria for Motion to Amend a Complaint and for the “Relation Back” Doctrine Explained

In affirming the denial of a motion to amend a complaint the Second Department described the law concerning amendment (CPLR 305) and “relation back” (CPLR 203):

CPLR 305(c) authorizes the court, in its discretion, to “allow any summons or proof of service of a summons to be amended, if a substantial right of a party against whom the summons issued is not prejudiced” (CPLR 305[c]). Where the motion is to cure “a misnomer in the description of a party defendant,” it should be granted even after the statute of limitations has run where “(1) there is evidence that the correct defendant (misnamed in the original process) has in fact been properly served, and (2) the correct defendant would not be prejudiced by granting the amendment sought”…. CPLR 305(c) does not apply in this case, where the plaintiff’s mistake in failing to commence the action against Keyspan-Ravenswood within the statute of limitations period had nothing to do with the misnomer… . * * *

As codified in CPLR 203(c), “what is commonly referred to as the relation back doctrine allows a claim asserted against a defendant in an amended filing to relate back to claims previously asserted against a codefendant for Statute of Limitations purposes where the two defendants are united in interest’ (CPLR 203[b])” ….. For the rule allowing relation back to the original date of filing under CPLR 203(c) to apply, a plaintiff is required to prove that: “(1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, (2) the new party is united in interest with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that the new party will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits by the delayed, otherwise stale, commencement, and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against that party as well” … .  Sally v Keyspan Energy Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 03469, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

 

/ ,

Hybrid Article 78 and Declaratory Judgment Proceeding Requires Separate Treatment of Both

In a hybrid proceeding— an Article 78 proceeding to review a Town Board’s stop work order for a quarry acting without a permit, and a related declaratory judgment action—the Second Department determined Supreme Court could not dismiss the declaratory judgment action as if it were part of the Article 78 proceeding.  The two actions must be treated as separate proceedings:

…[I]n the absence of a dispositive motion addressed to the causes of action which sought declaratory relief, the Supreme Court improperly, in effect, dismissed those causes of action …. In a hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules apply to those causes of action which are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, and those which seek declaratory relief, on the other hand (see id. at 1008). “The Supreme Court may not employ the summary procedure applicable to a CPLR article 78 cause of action to dispose of causes of action to recover damages or seeking a declaratory judgment”…. “Thus, where no party makes a request for a summary determination of the causes of action which seek damages or declaratory relief, it is error for the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of those causes of action”…. Here, since no party made such a motion, the Supreme Court should not have summarily disposed of the causes of action which sought declaratory relief, and the matter must be remitted … .  Matter of Lake St Granite Quarry, Inc v Town/Village of Harrison, 2013 NY Slip Op 03487, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

/ ,

Two Options to Recover on Note and Mortgage; One in Law (Note); One in Equity (Foreclosure)

In finding that CPLR 5236(b) did not apply in the case, the Second Department described the two options a mortgagee has with respect to recovery based on a note and mortgage:

CPLR 5236(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[r]eal property mortgaged shall not be sold pursuant to an execution issued upon a judgment recovered for all or part of the mortgage debt.” Typically, a mortgagee has the choice of “two remedies: one at law in a suit on the debt as evidenced by the note, the other in equity to foreclose the mortgage” …. A mortgagee who elects to proceed on the note becomes “subject to the statutory restrictions which direct that when a judgment is recovered for all or part of the mortgage debt, the execution shall direct that no part of the mortgage[d] property shall be levied upon or sold thereunder” (Goddard v Johnson, 96 Misc 2d 230, 231). Matter of Ivy Hill Commodities Corp v Beekharry, 2013 NY Slip Op 03483, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

/ ,

Discovery Demands Overbroad

In affirming Supreme Court’s determination that petitioner’s discovery demands in a property tax assessment matter were overbroad, the Second Department wrote:

…[T]he document demands, even limited to those concerning tax years 2008/2009, 2010/2011, and 2011/2012, were of an overbroad and burdensome nature. Although CPLR 3101(a) provides for “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,” unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the Supreme Court’s broad discretion… . While documents related to the actions of the Board of Assessment Review for the Town of Babylon are relevant to this hybrid proceeding and action alleging statutory and constitutional violations, the Supreme Court properly determined that the “sweeping demands” of the notice of discovery and inspection were overbroad and burdensome …. “Where discovery demands are overbroad, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the entire demand rather than to prune it'” … .  In the Matter of Greenfield v Board of Assessment Review…, 2013 NY Slip Op 03480, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

/ ,

Lateness Not a Barrier to Motion to Amend Pleadings/Addition of Wrongful Death Cause of Action Allowed; No Prejudice to Defendant

The Second Department upheld Supreme Court’s grant of a motion to amend a complaint to add a cause of action for wrongful death “long after the action ha[d] been certified for trial…”.  The Second Department explained:

Although the plaintiff delayed in making the motion, ” [m]ere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment. It must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side'”…. Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, they did not demonstrate that they would be significantly prejudiced by the amendment. In light of the medical records of the plaintiff’s decedent, which documented multiple hospital admissions and her declining medical condition following the subject accident, along with the decedent’s deposition testimony regarding the aggravation of pre-existing medical conditions, the defendants cannot, under the circumstances of this case, claim to have been surprised by the amendment … . Moreover, the plaintiff offered a reasonable excuse for the delay, and to avoid any possible prejudice to the defendants, the Supreme Court granted them time to obtain further discovery … . Henry v MTA, 2013 NY Slip Op 03457, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

/ ,

Criteria for Motion to Amend Pleadings/Motion for Additional Depositions

In this Labor Law action, the Second Department explained the factors to be considered in a motion to amend the pleadings, and the factors to be considered in a motion for additional depositions:

Applications for leave to amend pleadings should be freely granted except when the delay in seeking leave to amend would directly cause undue prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, or when the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see CPLR 3025[b];…). The sufficiency or underlying merit of the proposed amendment is to be examined no further ….  * * *

The moving party that is seeking additional depositions has the burden of demonstrating “(1) that the representatives already deposed had insufficient knowledge, or were otherwise inadequate, and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the persons sought for depositions possess information which is material and necessary to the prosecution of the case” …. Whether the defendant had the authority to supervise the means and methods of the work is material and relevant to the issue of liability in this case …. Gomez v State of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 03455, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy