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/ Unemployment Insurance

Copy Writer and Editor Was an Employee

The Third Department determined claimant copy writer and editor was an employee of Fox Mobile Distribution and was therefore entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Here, the record contains substantial evidence that Fox exercised the requisite control over claimant’s work product to establish her status as its employee. Claimant was paid at a set hourly wage, entitled to reimbursement for approved travel and expenses and provided a cellular phone to test Fox’s products … . The project team leaders — who were employees — educated her regarding the product, delegated specific writing or editing tasks, provided direction and set completion deadlines. Claimant regularly reviewed her work progress with the project manager, received ongoing feedback and made necessary revisions and adjustments … . She was also required to come to Fox’s office for meetings and reviews of her copy. The fact that the parties’ agreement designated claimant as a contractor is not dispositive … . Matter of Eckert (Fox Mobile Distrib. LLC–Commissioner of Labor), 2015 NY Slip Op 08489, 3rd Dept 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Unemployment Insurance

Massage Therapist Was Employee

The Third Department determined claimant massage therapist was an employee of Addison Street Spa and was therefore entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Here, there is evidence in the record that Addison set the prices for the massages and the percentage of which claimant was paid, scheduled its clients pursuant to claimant’s weekly schedule, collected the fees from the clients and fielded any complaints. Addison required claimant to sign an agreement that she would not solicit, divert or take away any of Addison’s clients during the term of the agreement and for one year after claimant stopped providing massages at the spa. Addison provided the room, equipment and supplies and required claimant to arrive 30 minutes before the scheduled massage time and to maintain professional attire… . Matter of Fatone (Addison St. Spa, LLC–Commissioner of Labor), 2015 NY Slip Op 08488, 3rd Dept 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Unemployment Insurance

Musician Was Employee

The Third Department determined claimant, a musician who accompanied the Young People’s Chorus of New York (YPCNY) was an employee of YPCNY and therefore was entitled to unemployment benefits:

Here, YPCNY provided claimant with the date, time and place for the concerts, the rehearsal times and the music to be performed. Claimant was paid a set rate of between $250 and $600 per concert and YPCNY paid his travel expenses. YPCNY would inform claimant of the required dress code for the concerts and claimant was required to inform YPCNY if he was going to be late or absent. YPCNY’s president was the musical conductor at the concerts and was responsible for handling complaints about the musicians. While there is other evidence in the record that would support a different result, the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence supporting the Board’s decision that YPCNY exercised sufficient control over the services provided by the musicians to establish an employment relationship … . Matter of North (Young People’s Chorus of N.Y.–Commissioner of Labor), 2015 NY Slip Op 08486, 3rd Dept 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Unemployment Insurance

Pyrotechnician Was Not an Employee

The Third Department determined a pyrotechnician who worked for a company (PEI) which puts on fireworks displays was not an employee and was not, therefore, entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Here, claimant did not submit a resume or employment application and did not undergo a job interview, but was retained by PEI through his contact with a lead technician and worked on PEI’s displays intermittently over a five-year period. PEI relied on lead technicians, who were independent contractors, to oversee the production of the fireworks displays and they directed and supervised the pyrotechnicians involved in a particular project. Claimant’s duties as a pyrotechnician included picking up the fireworks supplies, setting up the displays, igniting the fireworks, breaking down the displays and cleaning up. PEI did not attend the fireworks displays, but limited its activities to securing the sponsors, designing the shows and providing the fireworks and other necessary equipment. The lead technicians negotiated the price for production services with PEI and submitted invoices instructing PEI how much to pay the pyrotechnicans involved. PEI solicited assignments one at a time and the lead technicians and pyrotechnicians were free to refuse assignments and work for competitors. Although PEI offered to provide training, it was training that was required by regulatory agencies and could be obtained elsewhere. Furthermore, the lead technicians and pyrotechnicans did not wear clothing or other attire identifying them with PEI, but instead wore T-shirts designating them as “staff” that were required by law. Under the circumstances presented, the indicia of control necessary to establish the existence of an employment relationship between PEI and the pyrotechnicans, like claimant, is clearly lacking .. . .  Matter of Franco (Pyro Eng’g Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2015 NY Slip Op 08483, 3rd Dept 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Unemployment Insurance

Reporter Was Employee

The Third Department determined claimant, a reporter who worked for a company which produces news reports and shows for television (Everest), was an employee entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

The record establishes that claimant routinely worked Tuesday through Thursday each week. On these days, Everest would inform claimant in the morning of what her reporting assignment was for that day and whether any story idea she suggested had been approved by Everest. If she refused to perform any of the approved story ideas, she would not work or be paid on that day. Claimant was then required to submit her finished report by a specific time … . Everest provided claimant with support staff to assist in her work, including a videographer, and provided her with camera equipment, access to its electronic news database and graphics and background videos, and a computer for editing purposes … . Everett also reviewed and edited claimant’s work product and could direct her to make revisions or to add graphics to her video reports … . Claimant was also free to use her own video camera operator, but Everest reimbursed claimant for that cost … and retained ownership of claimant’s stories and reports. Although there was also evidence in the record that could have supported a contrary conclusion, the foregoing amply furnished indicia of control over claimant’s activities sufficient to support the Board’s conclusion of an employer-employee relationship… . Matter of Redwoodturral (Everest Prod. Corp.–Commissioner of Labor, 2015 NY Slip Op 08482, 3rd Dept 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Implicitly Consented to a Mistrial on Two of Three Counts by Requesting a Partial Verdict

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the defendant, by requesting a partial verdict on the count on which the jury had reached a verdict, had consented to a mistrial on the two remaining counts and, therefore, had waived double jeopardy protection for those two counts:

After one juror was found unable to serve, defendant refused to substitute an alternate juror and requested a partial verdict on the one count on which the jury had indicated it had reached a verdict. The Appellate Division granted the [defendant’s] petition [prohibiting retrial] on the basis that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial and did not address the issue of consent. Because defendant implicitly consented to a mistrial on two of three counts by requesting a partial verdict and by saying nothing about the court’s plans for retrial … , we need not reach the issue of manifest necessity. Matter of Gentil v Margulis, 2015 NY Slip Op 08455, CtApp 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Unemployment Insurance

Truck Driver Was Employee

The Third Department determined claimant truck driver was an employee of RB Humphreys and was therefore entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Here, claimant entered a lease purchase agreement for use of a truck owned by RB Humphreys. RB Humphreys retained exclusive use of the vehicle while under lease and did not relinquish the title until the full purchase price was paid. RB Humphreys set the pay rate for claimant, who, absent negligence on his part, was paid regardless of whether the customer ultimately paid RB Humphreys. Although claimant could refuse assignments, testimony established that his lease purchase agreement would be terminated if an assignment was not accepted within a certain period of time. Furthermore, pursuant to the service contract with RB Humphreys, claimant was subject to a one-year noncompete clause following the cessation of their relationship. Matter of Wilder (RB Humphreys Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2015 NY Slip Op 08487, 3rd Dept 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Criminal Law

Use of Stolen New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) Key to Allow Persons to Enter the Subway System for a Small Fee Deprived the NYCTA of Its Property and Therefore Constituted Petit Larceny

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a dissent, determined the misdemeanor information adequately alleged petit larceny based upon the defendant’s use of a stolen New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) key to allow two people to enter the subway system in return for a small fee. The issue was whether the information alleged that the NYCTA was the “owner” of the fees paid to the defendant. The case turned on distinguishing People v Hightower (18 NY3d 249) where the court held the use of a legally purchased MetroCard to swipe persons through a subway turnstile (for a fee) did not constitute petit larceny because the NYCTA did not own the card and therefore no property was taken from the NYCTA. The fact that the NYCTA key was stolen was the distinguishing factor. The dissent, however, did not see the distinction. The majority wrote:

… [T]he information adequately alleged all the elements of a larceny in setting forth defendant’s unauthorized use of the illegally-obtained key to allow the undercover officers to enter through the emergency exit gate in exchange for money, thereby depriving the NYCTA, as the owner, of its property. People v Matthew P., 2015 NY Slip Op 08454, CtApp 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Workers' Compensation

Employer Was Not Prejudiced by Claimant’s Failure to Give Timely Notice of the Accident, Claim Allowed

The Third Department determined the claimant’s failure to provide timely notice of the accident did not bar his claim:

Failure to provide timely written notice of an accident to an employer pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 18 generally bars the claim “unless the Board excuses that failure on the ground that notice could not be given, the employer or its agent had knowledge of the accident, or the employer was not prejudiced” … . Here, although claimant did not provide written notice of the January 2, 2012 accident to the employer, he filed his claim for benefits based upon that accident with the Workers’ Compensation Board on January 31, 2012. On February 6, 2012, the Board provided its Notice of Case Assembly to the employer, which informed the employer of the claim, the date of the accident and that claimant was alleging injuries to his head, neck and back. Notably, the record reflects that claimant received prompt medical attention, including MRIs of his lumbar and cervical spine in February 2012. Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the decision of the Board that the short delay between the expiration of the 30-day notice period and the employer receiving notice of the claim did not prejudice the employer so as to prevent it from properly investigating the claim … . Matter of Lopadchak v R.W. Express LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 08490, 3rd Dept 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
/ Attorneys, Criminal Law

Enhanced Sentencing for Second Child Sexual Assault Felony Offenders Is Required by Penal Law 70.07; Language in Criminal Procedure Law 400.19 Can Not Be Interpreted to Mean the People Can Decide Not to Seek the Enhanced Sentence

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, in affirming defendant’s conviction and sentencing, discussed ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, and statutory interpretation issues. The ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct discussions are fact-specific and not summarized here. With respect to the statutory interpretation issue, the defendant argued he should not have been sentenced as a second child sexual assault felony offender because the People were required to file a predicate statement (notifying him an enhanced sentence would be sought) prior to trial and did not do so. The court determined the statutory language indicating the predicate statement “may” be filed any time before trial (in Criminal Procedure Law [CPL] 400.19) did not preclude the People from filing the statement after trial started, and did not indicate the People had the discretion not to seek an enhanced sentence:

The explicit language in section one [of Penal Law 70.07] states that a person convicted of a felony offense for sexual assault against a child, who has a predicate felony conviction for child sexual assault, “must be sentenced” in accordance with Penal Law § 70.07 sentencing provisions. The applicable time for invoking the procedures contained in CPL 400.19 does not change the import of the mandatory language in Penal Law § 70.07, which subjects this category of offenders to legislatively promulgated enhanced sentences. Furthermore, the specific language in CPL 400.19 (2) upon which defendant relies merely permits filing of the statement before commencement of a trial. It does not prohibit filing afterwards, and before sentencing. As courts have concluded, “may” does not mean “must” … . Notwithstanding defendant’s requests that we read the statute otherwise, this Court is without authority to read mandatory language into a statute where it is otherwise absent … . People v Wragg, 2015 NY Slip Op 08453, CtApp 11-19-15

 

November 19, 2015
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