You are here: / PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER AN ACCOUNT STATED THEORY IN...

Search Results

/ ,

SUIT ALLEGING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALE OF AN ASSET OWNED NEARLY ENTIRELY BY BANKRUPT LEHMAN BROTHERS DISMISSED.

The First Department dismissed a complaint alleging, inter alia, breach of a limited partnership agreement and breach of fiduciary duty in connection of the sale of a fund (Archstone) nearly entirely owned by bankrupt Lehman Brothers. Plaintiff, who had purchased a 1% interest in the fund for $20 million, alleged the sale will generate enough to pay only the preferred interests and will “wipe out” the minority interests (including plaintiff). Plaintiff further alleged the sale was motivated by Lehman's desire to pay creditors relating to its 2008 bankruptcy. In dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, the court explained the analytical criteria, including an “entire fairness” analysis:

Even under the heightened entire fairness standard advocated by plaintiff, the claim is insufficient. An “entire fairness” analysis focuses on two entwined considerations: fair dealing and fair price … . Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating the absence of fairness, or that it did not “receive the substantial equivalent in value of what [it] had before” … . Conclusory assertions that amounts paid were “unfair” are insufficient … . Plaintiff concedes that the $16 billion transaction price attained Archstone's current value at the time of the transaction. Plaintiff also admits that the transaction “represented a premium of approximately 15% over the implied purchase price of Lehman's combined acquisitions of the interests of the other [s]ponsor [b]anks' interests earlier in 2012.” Plaintiff identifies no alternative transactions, let alone one that would have achieved more value for the Fund. Fiduciaries are “not required to abandon [a] transaction simply because a better deal might have become available in the future” … . Cambridge Capital Real Estate Invs., LLC v Archstone Enter. LP, 2016 NY Slip Op 02017, 1st Dept 3-22-16

PARTNERSHIP LAW (BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION BY MINORITY INTEREST HOLDER DISMISSED)/FIDUCIARY DUTY, BREACH OF (PARTNERSHIP LAW, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION BY MINORITY INTEREST HOLDER DISMISSED)

/ ,

HEARSAY OFFERED IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY CONSIDERED.

The First Department determined defendants, including defendant SSA, had made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment in this slip and fall case, but the plaintiff raised a question of fact whether an identified defect in the sidewalk caused her fall. The court noted that hearsay evidence supplied in opposition to the motion was properly considered because it was not the only evidence submitted in opposition. The case is a rare example of each side submitting evidence of all the required “slip and fall” elements:

Defendants made a prima showing of their entitlement to summary judgment, by submitting deposition testimony and an affidavit from SSA's managing member stating that SSA never did any work on the sidewalk where plaintiff fell, that he never received complaints about the sidewalk or curb prior to plaintiff's accident, and that he never observed the alleged hazardous curb and sidewalk condition while making his regular, twice-weekly inspections of the strip mall … .

In opposition, plaintiff raised triable issues of fact. Plaintiff testified that she fell when her left foot stepped into a hole-like depression in the curb/sidewalk, and she marked photographs to show where she fell. Plaintiff also submitted her daughter's affidavit, wherein she averred that after receiving a call about her mother's fall, she responded quickly to the scene of the accident and found her mother on the sidewalk. According to the daughter, her mother pointed to a broken and cracked curb/sidewalk condition and stated that the defective condition caused her to fall. This hearsay statement may be relied upon to defeat summary judgment where, as here, it is not the only evidence submitted in opposition to the motion … . The daughter added that the photographs taken of the sidewalk/curb seven months after the accident, and the area of the photographs her mother marked, accurately depicted the broken condition of the curb/sidewalk as it appeared on the date of the accident. The photographs show a broken curb/sidewalk. Taken together, the evidence raises triable issues of fact whether the broken sidewalk/curb caused plaintiff's fall, and whether the defective condition existed for a sufficient period of time prior to the accident for defendants to have discovered and remedied it … . Uncyk v Cedarhurst Prop. Mgt., LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 02037, 1st Dept 3-22-16

NEGLIGENCE (HEARSAY OFFERED IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY CONSIDERED)/EVIDENCE (HEARSAY OFFERED IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY CONSIDERED) HEARSAY (HEARSAY OFFERED IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY CONSIDERED)/SLIP AND FALL (ALL REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLIP AND FALL ADDRESSED BY BOTH SIDES IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION)

/

PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT INTERPRETED TO WAIVE TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE DESPITE ABSENCE OF THE PRECISE TERM.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the prenuptial agreement waived both parties' entitlement to temporary maintenance during the divorce proceedings. The majority gleaned the intent to waive temporary maintenance from various provisions of the agreement, even though the terms “temporary maintenance” and “interim spousal support” were not used. The dissent argued that the waiver of “maintenance” in the agreement should not be interpreted to waive “temporary maintenance:”

Although the dissent acknowledges that “no particular catechism is required to waive temporary maintenance claims,” it nevertheless finds the agreement ambiguous and suggests that the parties may only have intended to waive a final award of maintenance. No fair reading of the agreement supports that conclusion. When read as a whole, the agreement contains no ambiguity as to whether the parties intended to waive temporary maintenance. As noted, the agreement waives “any and all” maintenance claims, “now and in the future.” Contrary to the dissent's view, there is nothing imprecise about the phrase “any and all.” Indeed, this Court has repeatedly found the use of that phrase to be “clear”… . Further, although minimized by the dissent, the agreement explicitly states that the parties are “fully capable of being self supporting,” which is another indicia that neither intended to seek any kind of maintenance. Anonymous v Anonymous, 2016 NY Slip Op 02016, 1st Dept 3-22-16

FAMILY LAW (PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT INTERPRETED TO WAIVE TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE DESPITE ABSENCE OF PRECISE TERM)/MAINTENANCE (PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT INTERPRETED TO WAIVE TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE DESPITE ABSENCE OF PRECISE TERM)/PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT (PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT INTERPRETED TO WAIVE TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE DESPITE ABSENCE OF PRECISE TERM)

/ ,

OMISSIONS FROM COMPLAINT SUPPLIED BY AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the omissions from the complaint against defendant insurance company were remedied by an affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss:

A complaint must “be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions” that form the basis of the complaint and “the material elements of each cause of action” (CPLR 3013). The factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, and afforded “every possible favorable inference” … . “[A] court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint and the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one … . When such affidavits are considered, dismissal should not result unless “a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it” … .

Here, the complaint standing alone failed to apprise defendant insurance companies of basic pertinent information to put them on notice of the claims against them, such as the patients treated and the insurance policies issued by defendant, under which plaintiff submitted claims for treatment rendered. However, in opposition to defendant insurance companies' motion to dismiss, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from its principal with an exhibit attached providing such information. Thus, the complaint and affidavit submitted in opposition sufficiently apprise defendant insurance companies of the “transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions” that form the basis of the complaint (CPLR 3013). High Definition MRI, P.C. v Travelers Cos., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 02027, 1st Dept 3-22-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (OMISSIONS FROM COMPLAINT SUPPLIED BY AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/COMPLAINTS (OMISSIONS FROM COMPLAINT SUPPLIED BY AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

/ ,

INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL; PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY.

The Fourth Department reversed Family Court's finding respondent had willfully violated a court order because of an insufficient waiver of the right to counsel. The court noted that a prior decision requiring preservation of the right-to-counsel issue should no longer be followed:

Although the Support Magistrate properly advised respondent that he had the right to counsel (see Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [vi]), we agree with respondent that the Support Magistrate failed to make a ” searching inquiry' ” to ensure that his waiver of the right to counsel was a knowing, voluntary and intelligent choice, and thus that he was denied his right to counsel … . We therefore reverse the order and remit the matter to Family Court for a new hearing. To the extent that our decision in Matter of Huard v Lugo (81 AD3d 1265… requires preservation of a contention that the Support Magistrate erred in allowing the respondent to proceed pro se at a fact-finding hearing, that decision is no longer to be followed. Matter of Girard v Neville, 2016 NY Slip Op 01947, 4th Dept 3-18-16

FAMILY LAW (INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (FAMILY LAW, INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)

/ ,

EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN A SEQRA REVIEW; PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND A NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS WERE ISSUED.

The Fourth Department determined two village officials did not have a conflict of interest which would preclude their participation in a State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) review of a development project. The two had expressed opposition to the project before and after their elections, but expression of opinion does not create a conflict of interest. The Fourth Department upheld the annulment of resolutions which stated the proposed project would adversely affect the environment. The planning board had previously found no adverse impact (a negative declaration) and had issued permits. The board did not have the authority to rescind the negative declaration at that point:

… [T]he Board lacked authority to rescind its negative declaration under the circumstances of this case. Here, the Board was authorized to rescind its negative declaration “prior to its decision to undertake, fund, or approve an action,” and the Board made its decision to approve the action, i.e., the Project, when it issued the requisite special permits … . Matter of Pittsford Canalside Props., LLC v Village of Pittsford, 2016 NY Slip Op 01929, 4th Dept 3-18-16

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN SEQRA REVIEW)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS ISSUED)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN SEQRA REVIEW)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS ISSUED)

/ ,

JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department reversed defendant's assault and manslaughter convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the jury should have been charged on the “deadly force” justification defense. There was evidence defendant acted to defend her brother who was struck with a champagne bottle. The assault with the bottle could constitute deadly force, justifying the use of deadly force in defense:

… [T]he court erred in denying her request to charge the jury on justification using deadly physical force in defense of a third party for the assault count. There was a reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, that the first victim was using deadly physical force by striking defendant's brother in the head with a champagne bottle when defendant assaulted her … . We further agree with defendant that the error in failing to give the justification charge on the assault count requires reversal of the manslaughter count as well. Although the court instructed the jury on justification for that count, there was a “significant factual relationship” between the two counts … , particularly on the issue whether defendant was the initial aggressor (see Penal Law § 35.15 [1] [b]). We therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial on both … . People v James, 2016 NY Slip Op 01946, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/EVIDENCE (ASSAULT WITH A CHAMPAGNE BOTTLE CONSTITUTED USE OF DEADLY FORCE, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE)/JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

/ ,

GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE OF STOLEN PROPERTY INSUFFICIENT.

The Fourth Department, in the interest of justice, reduced defendant's grand larceny to petit larceny because of insufficient proof of the value of the stolen property:

The value of stolen property is “the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime” (Penal Law § 155.20 [1]). It is well settled that “a victim must provide a basis of knowledge for his [or her] statement of value before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value” … . Furthermore, “[c]onclusory statements and rough estimates of value are not sufficient” to establish the value of the property … . “Although a victim is competent to supply evidence of original cost' . . . , evidence of the original purchase price, without more, will not satisfy the People's burden' ” … .

Here, the victim testified that several specific items were taken, but the only evidence of the value of those items was the victim's testimony regarding the purchase price of some of them, and her hearsay testimony regarding a purported expert's appraisal of some of the property, which was based solely on her description of certain jewelry to the purported expert. Based on the evidence of value in the record, we cannot conclude “that the jury ha[d] a reasonable basis for inferring, rather than speculating, that the value of the property exceeded the statutory threshold” of $3,000 … . People v Slack, 2016 NY Slip Op 01930, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)/EVIDENCE (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)/GRAND LARCENY (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)

/

PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff in a breach of contract action should have been allowed to amend its ad damnum clause:

… Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend the ad damnum clause from $77,585.50 to $111,331.13, and we therefore modify the order by granting the motion. It is axiomatic that ” [l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit' ” … . * * *

… “[I]n the absence of prejudice . . . , a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, whether made before or after the trial, should generally be granted” … . Putrelo Constr. Co. v Town of Marcy, 2016 NY Slip Op 01949, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMENDMENT OF AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)/AD DAMNUM CLAUSE (AMENDMENT OF AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy