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MOTHER FAILED TO FIRST USE LESS DRASTIC CHILD-SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, MOTION TO HOLD FATHER IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROPERLY DENIED.

The Third Department determined mother’s motion to hold father in civil contempt for alleged failure to pay child support and related expenses was properly denied. Mother did not first attempt to enforce the relevant provisions of the stipulation with a less drastic mechanism:

In matrimonial actions, Domestic Relations Law § 245 grants the court authority to punish a party for civil contempt pursuant to Judiciary Law § 756 where the party defaults “in paying any sum of money” required by a judgment or order, “and it appears presumptively, to the satisfaction of the court, that payment cannot be enforced” pursuant to the enforcement mechanisms provided in Domestic Relations Law §§ 243 and 244 and CPLR 5241 and 5242. “A civil contempt motion in a [matrimonial] action should be denied where the movant fails to make a showing pursuant to section 245 that resort to other, less drastic enforcement mechanisms had been exhausted or would be ineffectual'” … . Here, the mother did not attempt to utilize any less drastic enforcement mechanism before moving to hold the father in contempt, and failed to demonstrate that resort to a less drastic enforcement mechanism would be ineffectual. Contrary to the mother’s contention, the fact that the child care, medical care, and extracurricular activity expenses she sought payment of were not for a sum certain did not prevent her from seeking to fix any arrears due for those expenses and enforcing the father’s payment obligations through less drastic means. Rhodes v Rhodes, 2016 NY Slip Op 01657, 2nd Dept 3-9-16

FAMILY LAW (CHILD SUPPORT, MOTHER FAILED TO FIRST USE LESS DRASTIC ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, MOTION TO HOLD FATHER IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROPERLY DENIED)/CHILD SUPPORT (MOTHER FAILED TO FIRST USE LESS DRASTIC ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, MOTION TO HOLD FATHER IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROPERLY DENIED/CONTEMPT, CIVIL (CHILD SUPPORT, MOTHER FAILED TO FIRST USE LESS DRASTIC ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, MOTION TO HOLD FATHER IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROPERLY DENIED)

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PETITIONER ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE CONSTRUCTION OF ASPHALT PLANT NEAR A STATE PARK.

The Second Department, affirming Supreme Court, determined the petitioner did not have standing to challenge the construction of a temporary asphalt plant near a state forest. The conclusory allegations of pollution of the park by a member of petitioner-organization were not enough:

 

” [I]n land use matters . . . the plaintiff, for standing purposes, must show that it would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large'” … . Whether an organization or association has standing involves the application of the three-pronged test set forth in Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk (77 NY2d at 775). As pertinent to this appeal, the first prong of that test requires that the organization or association demonstrate that “one or more of its members would have standing to sue” as an individual (id.). An individual has standing where he or she “would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large” (id. at 774) and “the in-fact injury of which [he or she] complains . . . falls within the zone of interests,’ or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted” (id. at 773, …). Here, the petitioner submitted an affidavit from one of its members asserting that he frequently used the area of Stewart State Forest that was closest to the temporary asphalt plant. However, his allegations that the operation of the plant polluted the natural resources of the forest were conclusory and speculative, and therefore, insufficient to establish standing… . Matter of Stewart Park & Reserve Coalition, Inc. v Town of New Windsor Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2016 NY Slip Op 01685, 2nd Dept 3-9-16

 

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (PETITIONER ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE CONSTRUCTION OF ASPHALT PLANT)/LAND USE (PETITIONER ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE CONSTRUCTION OF ASPHALT PLANT)/STANDING (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, LAND USE, PETITIONER ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE CONSTRUCTION OF ASPHALT PLANT)

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COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PUBLICATION IN A DEFAMATIOIN ACTION; MOTION TO SET ASIDE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined defendants' oral motion to set aside the verdict in a defamation case should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged statements made by defendants (husband and wife) caused specified pecuniary loss. Because the defendants are spouses, communication between them did not constitute publication. The plaintiff was unable to demonstrate any statements made to third parties caused special harm:

“A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 or 4404 may be granted only when the trial court determines that, upon the evidence presented, there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusion reached by the jury upon the evidence presented at trial, and no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party” … . “In considering such a motion, the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant” … .

Applying this standard here, we conclude that there was no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could have led the jury to find that the plaintiff established his cause of action alleging defamation. “The elements of a cause of action [to recover damages] for defamation are a false statement, published without privilege or authorization to a third party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se” … . Here, because it is undisputed that the defendants are spouses, the communications between the defendants do not constitute publication … . … [T]o the extent that the plaintiff's defamation claim alleged that [defendants] communicated the [statement] to third parties, the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered special harm, i.e., the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value, as a result of those statements .. . Gaccione v Scarpinato, 2016 NY Slip Op 01640, 2nd Dept 3-9-16

DEFAMATION (COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PUBLICATION)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT IN DEFAMATION ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (DEFAMATION ACTION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE PLAINTIFF'S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOURTH DEGREE IS NOT A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOURTH DEGREE; SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE.

The Second Department reversed defendant’s conviction (by guilty plea) because the Superior Court Information (SCI) to which defendant pled did not allege a lesser-included offense of an offense charged in the original felony complaint. Attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree is not a lesser-included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree:

The single count in the SCI was not an “offense for which the defendant [had been] held for action of a grand jury” (CPL 195.20), in that it was not an offense charged in the felony complaint or a lesser-included offense of an offense charged in the felony complaint … . Attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree under Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 220.09(1) is not a lesser-included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree under Penal Law § 220.09(3), because the former offense contains the element “narcotic drug” (Penal Law § 220.00[7]) that is not an element of the latter offense and, therefore, it is possible to commit the greater offense “without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct,” the lesser offense (CPL 1.20[37]…). Thus, the SCI upon which the defendant’s plea was based did not “include at least one offense that was contained in the felony complaint” or a lesser-included offense of an offense charged in the felony complaint … , and the SCI was jurisdictionally defective … . This defect survives the defendant’s failure to raise this claim in the County Court, his plea of guilty, and his waiver of the right to appeal … . People v Chacko, 2016 NY Slip Op 01689, 2nd Dept 3-9-16

CRIMINAL LAW (ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOURTH DEGREE NOT A LESSER-INCLUDED OF CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOURTH DEGREE, SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE)/SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION (ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOURTH DEGREE NOT A LESSER-INCLUDED OF CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOURTH DEGREE, SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE)/CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOURTH DEGREE NOT A LESSER-INCLUDED OF CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOURTH DEGREE, SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE)

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ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION OF DEFENDANT DISCARDING A WEAPON IN THE PAPERWORK RELATING TO DEFENDANT’S ARREST, AND THE DIFFERING VERSIONS OF EVENTS PRIOR TO DEFENDANT’S ARREST, RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST DEFENDANT FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined questions of fact precluded summary judgment in favor of the defendants (city and police) in an action alleging, inter alia, malicious prosecution. Defendant was accused of possession of a weapon and spent 247 days in jail before being acquitted at trial. The accusation was based on the testimony of one of the police officers at the scene who said he saw defendant drop the weapon on a pile of garbage bags (where the weapon was apparently recovered). No other officer at the scene saw defendant with a weapon. And there was no mention of defendant discarding the weapon in any of paperwork relating to defendant’s arrest:

The elements of a claim for malicious prosecution are (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) actual malice … . A jury may infer that a defendant acted with actual malice from the fact that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff … . As noted, there are numerous factual questions concerning whether the police had the requisite probable cause to arrest plaintiff and initiate criminal proceedings. The omissions in the police paperwork and the various versions of events raise questions as to the credibility of the police account of what transpired. Further, the presumption of probable cause attaching upon an accused’s arraignment or indictment may be overcome by evidence that “the police witnesses have not made a complete and full statement of facts either to the Grand Jury or to the District Attorney, that they have misrepresented or falsified evidence, that they have withheld evidence or [that they have] otherwise acted in bad faith” … . Mendez v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 01586, 1st Dept 3-8-16

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST, EVIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN FABRICATED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST, EVIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN FABRICATED)

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CONNECTICUT SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE IS BROADER IN ITS REACH THAN NEW YORK COUNTERPARTS AND THEREFORE CANNOT SERVE AS A PREDICATE FELONY IN NEW YORK.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should not have been sentenced as a second felony offender based on a Connecticut conviction for sexual assault. The court found the Connecticut statute was broader than its New York counterparts in both the “threat of harm,” and “accomplice liability” elements.  Therefore the violation of the Connecticut statute could not serve as a predicate felony in New York.

The New York statutes prohibit various sexual acts by forcible compulsion, which is defined (among other things) as the use of a threat “which places a person in fear of immediate death or physical injury [to someone] or in fear that [someone] will immediately be kidnapped” (Penal Law § 130.00[8]…). In contrast, CGSA § 53a-70(a)(1) does not contain any requirement that a threat issued to compel sexual intercourse must threaten immediate harm. Accordingly, the Connecticut statute is necessarily broader than its New York counterparts, and may not serve as a predicate offense … .

In addition, since CGSA § 53a-70(a)(1) is a general intent statute … , “the prosecution need not establish that the accused intended the precise harm or precise result which resulted from his acts” … . Accordingly, a conviction under the statute is warranted even if a rape committed by a person other than the defendant is the unintended result of the defendant's use or threatened use of force … . In contrast, New York law requires that in order to establish accessorial liability the People must establish that a defendant, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of the crime at issue, either solicited, requested, commanded, importuned, or intentionally aided another in committing the crime (Penal Law § 20.00). Accordingly, the Connecticut statute is broader than its New York counterparts in this regard as well. People v Davis, 2016 NY Slip Op 01623, 1st Dept 3-8-16

CRIMINAL LAW (VIOLATION OF CONNECTICUT SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE CANNOT SERVE AS PREDICATE FELONY IN NEW YORK)/SENTENCING (VIOLATION OF CONNECTICUT SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE CANNOT SERVE AS PREDICATE FELONY IN NEW YORK)/SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS (VIOLATION OF CONNECTICUT SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE CANNOT SERVE AS PREDICATE FELONY IN NEW YORK)

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ALTHOUGH BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PRECLUDED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, RELATED PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that, although the breach of contract allegations were precluded by the statute of frauds, the related causes of action for promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff, Peter, and defendant, Lisa, were both named as beneficiaries in their mother's, Madeline's, will. However, when Peter was in the midst of divorce proceedings, Madeline made Lisa the sole beneficiary because she did not want Peter's wife to claim any assets in her estate should she die before the divorce was final.  Lisa orally agreed to split the estate upon Madeline's death in return for Peter's promise to pay Madeline's estate taxes. Peter paid the estate taxes and Lisa reneged on the deal:

Although the breach of contract causes of action cannot stand, the complaint sufficiently states a claim under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: (i) a sufficiently clear and unambiguous promise; (ii) reasonable reliance on the promise; and (iii) injury caused by the reliance … . If a contract is barred by the statute of frauds, a promissory estoppel claim is viable in the limited set of circumstances where unconscionable injury results from the reliance placed on the alleged promise … . * * *

The factual allegations of the complaint sufficiently state a cause of action for unjust enrichment with respect to Peter's payment of Madeline's estate taxes and Lisa's life insurance premiums. To establish unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was enriched, at the plaintiff's expense, and that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered … . Here, the complaint's allegations show that Lisa was enriched at Peter's expense because Peter paid the estate taxes and insurance premiums, despite Lisa's being the sole beneficiary of the will, and that it would be against equity and good conscience to allow Lisa to retain that windfall.

This theory of unjust enrichment is not precluded by the statute of frauds because it is not an attempt to enforce the oral contract but instead seeks to recover the amount by which Lisa was enriched at Peter's expense … . Castellotti v Free, 2016 NY Slip Op 01625, 1st Dept 3-8-16

CONTRACT LAW (ALTHOUGH BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION PRECLUDED BY STATUTE OF FRAUDS, RELATED PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS);/PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL (ALTHOUGH BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION PRECLUDED BY STATUTE OF FRAUDS, RELATED PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)/UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ALTHOUGH BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION PRECLUDED BY STATUTE OF FRAUDS, RELATED PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)

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PETITION SEEKING DISCOVERY BASED UPON THE ALLEGATION RESPONDENT HELD ASSETS OF THE ESTATE PROPERLY DENIED, PETITIONERS DID NOT MEET THEIR INITIAL BURDEN.

After carefully considering all the allegations (not summarized here), the Third Department determined the petitioners (children of the decedent) did not meet their burden of showing respondent (another child of the decedent who had lived with decedent) held any property which was an asset of the estate. The petition seeking discovery pursuant to Surrogate's Court Procedure Act (SCPA) 2103 was therefore properly denied:

SCPA 2103 establishes a discovery procedure by which a fiduciary can identify and recover estate assets held by a third party … . The fiduciary bears the burden to prove that property held by a respondent is an estate asset; only when that obligation has been satisfied does the burden shift to the respondent to prove the proper disposition of the disputed property. We agree with Surrogate's Court that petitioners did not satisfy this initial burden and failed to establish grounds for further inquiry. Dwyer v Valachovic, 2016 NY Slip Op 01542, 3rd Dept 3-3-16

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (PETITIONERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE RESPONDENT HELD ASSETS OF THE ESTATE, PETITION FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO SCPA 2103 PROPERLY DENIED)/SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT (PETITIONERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE RESPONDENT HELD ASSETS OF THE ESTATE, PETITION FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO SCPA 2103 PROPERLY DENIED)

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ARCHITECT MAY BE LIABLE FOR BOTH BREACH OF CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENCE.

The First Department, over a dissent, determined an architect, Perkins, could be sued for both breach of contract and negligence in a lawsuit stemming from the settling of a building and other structures in the vicinity of new construction. The court also concluded the plaintiff city, although not mentioned in the contract with the architect, had raised a question of fact whether the city was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract. With respect to when a professional-party to a contract can be liable in tort, the court wrote:

Perkins, as architect, may be subject to tort liability based on a failure to exercise due care in the performance of its duties. In making this determination, the court is to look at the nature of the injury and whether the plaintiff is merely seeking the benefit of its agreement. Where the plaintiff is merely seeking the benefit of its agreement, it is limited to a contract claim … .

Where, however, “the particular project . . . is so affected with the public interest that the failure to perform competently can have catastrophic consequences,” a professional may be subject to tort liability as well … . Indeed, “[t]his is one of the most significant elements in determining whether the nature of the type of services rendered gives rise to a duty of reasonable care independent of the contract itself” (… citing Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d 540, 553 [1992]). As the Court explained in Sommer, “[I]t is policy, not the parties' contract, that gives rise to a duty of care” … . The “nature of the injury, the manner in which the injury occurred and the resulting harm” are also considered … .

Here, there is a factual question whether Perkins assumed an independent legal duty as an architect to perform its work in a manner consistent with the generally accepted standard of professional care in its industry. Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y. v Samson Constr. Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 01546, 1st Dept 3-3-16

NEGLIGENCE (ARCHITECT MAY BE LIABLE IN TORT AND FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT)/CONTRACT LAW (ARCHITECT MAY BE LIABLE IN TORT AND FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT)/ARCHITECTS (ARCHITECT MAY BE LIABLE IN TORT AND FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT)

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SIDEWALK DEFECT TOO TRIVIAL TO BE ACTIONABLE.

The Third Department determined defendant's motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case was properly granted.  Defendant's demonstrated the defect in the sidewalk was trivial and the plaintiff's expert did not identify any relevant code, standard, or accepted-practice violation:

A property owner “'may not be cast in damages for negligent maintenance by reason of trivial defects on a walkway, not constituting a trap or nuisance, as a consequence of which a pedestrian might merely stumble, stub his [or her] toes, or trip over a raised projection'” … . “Whether a defect is so trivial to preclude liability depends on the particular facts of each case and requires consideration of such relevant factors as the dimensions of the alleged defect and the circumstances surrounding the injury, including the width, depth, elevation, irregularity, and appearance of the defect as well as the time, place and circumstances of the injury” … .

* * * Photographs of the portion of the sidewalk at issue demonstrate that it is relatively smooth and show only a slight height differential between the adjacent slabs of concrete, which were of different shades. Such evidence satisfied defendant's initial burden of making a prima facie showing that any alleged defect in the sidewalk was too trivial to be actionable … . Chirumbolo v 78 Exch. St., LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 01537, 3rd Dept 3-3-16

NEGLIGENCE (SIDEWALK DEFECT TRIVIAL)/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK DEFECT TRIVIAL)/TRIVIAL DEFECT (SIDEWALK DEFECT TOO TRIVIAL TO BE ACTIONABLE)

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