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AMOUNT OF HEROIN ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SOLD NOT PROVEN, STATUTORY SALE AND RELATED CONSPIRACY COUNTS DISMISSED.

The Third Department reversed defendant's conviction of the statutory sale of more than one-half ounce of heroin and the related conspiracy conviction (the remaining 15 counts were not reversed). The court determined the evidence of the amount of heroin sold was equivocal:

A statutory sale may be proven by evidence of an offer or agreement to sell drugs, but “the weight of the material must be independently shown” … . Here, no narcotics were recovered by the police, and the proof of the weight of heroin that defendant agreed to procure for [codefendant] Cochran was equivocal; while the amount of 16 grams was discussed, Cochran also stated that he might purchase “something like that” or, because he had limited funds and other expenses, might “get something lower.” As the People correctly argue, the full amount of transferred narcotics need not always be recovered to satisfy the weight requirement when a sale is based upon an offer or an agreement; nevertheless, there must be some form of independent evidence from which the total weight can be extrapolated … . As there was none here, defendant's conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree is reversed and the corresponding count of the indictment dismissed … . People v Wright, 2016 NY Slip Op 03550, 3rd Dept 5-5-15

CRIMINAL LAW (AMOUNT OF HEROIN ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SOLD NOT PROVEN, STATUTORY SALE AND RELATED CONSPIRACY COUNTS DISMISSED)/STATUTORY SALE (CRIMINAL LAW, AMOUNT OF HEROIN ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SOLD NOT PROVEN, STATUTORY SALE AND RELATED CONSPIRACY COUNTS DISMISSED)/WEIGHT OF DRUGS (AMOUNT OF HEROIN ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SOLD NOT PROVEN, STATUTORY SALE AND RELATED CONSPIRACY COUNTS DISMISSED)

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FAILURE TO READ JURY NOTE VERBATIM WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL.

The Third Department determined the trial judge made a mode of proceedings error by failing to read to the parties, verbatim, a note from the jury:

… [W]e conclude that County Court committed a mode of proceedings error for which no objection was necessary … . The court had an affirmative obligation to read exhibit No. 5 verbatim so that the parties had the opportunity to accurately analyze the jury's question and frame intelligent suggestions for the court's response … . The record is devoid of any information as to whether defendant knew about the portion of exhibit No. 5 stating “# 8G 4NG.” The ambiguity of the notation is also of concern to this Court.

Although the parties requested that the court inquire as to whether the jury had reached a verdict and whether it was “complete,” we cannot speculate as to what defendant knew about exhibit No. 5 … . Furthermore, “we cannot assume that the omission was remedied at an off-the-record conference” … . Accordingly, as County Court committed a mode of proceedings error as to exhibit No. 5, we must remit for a new trial on counts 1 through 9 of the consolidated indictment. People v Victor, 2016 NY Slip Op 03551, 3rd Dept 5-5-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO READ JURY NOTE VERBATIM WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL)/JURIES (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO READ JURY NOTE VERBATIM WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL)

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POLICE DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION UNTIL AFTER DEFENDANT WAS STOPPED AND SEIZED, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The First Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication should have been granted. The police did not notice signs of intoxication until after defendant was stopped and seized:

The officers’ testimony indicated that they did not perceive signs that defendant had committed the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol until after defendant was seized while walking away from the officers and then turned toward them. Thus, the officers’ observations did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, in the absence of “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity” … . People v Coronado, 2016 NY Slip Op 03601, 1st Dept 5-5-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (POLICE DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION UNTIL AFTER DEFENDANT WAS STOPPED AND SEIZED, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SUPPRESSION (POLICE DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION UNTIL AFTER DEFENDANT WAS STOPPED AND SEIZED, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/STREET STOPS (POLICE DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION UNTIL AFTER DEFENDANT WAS STOPPED AND SEIZED, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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PETITIONER NEED NOT CHALLENGE THE REAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT EVERY YEAR TO BE ENTITLED TO BUSINESS INVESTMENT EXEMPTION REFUNDS FOR THOSE YEARS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined petitioner need not challenge the real property tax assessment every year to be entitled to business-investment-exemption refunds for the years following the year the assessment and exemption were challenged. Real Property Tax Law 485-b provides a partial ten-year exemption for certain improvements made to real property:

… [T]he business investment exemption is of ten years' duration and the amount of the exemption in each of the ten years is calculated using a single assessment roll … . * * *

… [W]hen a computational error based on a single assessment roll results in the miscalculation of the RPTL 485-b exemption, we hold that this error may be challenged by a single petition at the time the error is discernible. It is a waste of resources for all involved, including the courts, to require a property owner to bring a challenge addressing the same error in each and every year the exemption applies. Matter of Highbridge Broadway, LLC v Assessor of the City of Schenectady, 2016 NY Slip Op 03544, CtApp 5-5-16

REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (PETITIONER NEED NOT CHALLENGE THE REAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT EVERY YEAR TO BE ENTITLED TO BUSINESS INVESTMENT EXEMPTION REFUNDS FOR THOSE YEARS)/BUSINESS INVESTMENT EXEMPTION (REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, PETITIONER NEED NOT CHALLENGE THE REAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT EVERY YEAR TO BE ENTITLED TO BUSINESS INVESTMENT EXEMPTION REFUNDS FOR THOSE YEARS)

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STORM IN PROGRESS RULE APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Court of Appeals, over a three-judge dissent, determined claimant's slip and fall complaint was properly dismissed because defendant demonstrated the storm in progress rule applied. There had been an ice storm the night before, a wintry mix was falling at 6:50 am and a light rain was falling when claimant slipped and fell on ice at 8:15 am. The dissent argued the weather conditions were contested raising questions of fact about when the storm ended, if at all, and, if it did end, how much time elapsed before the fall. Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 03546, CtApp 5-5-16

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, STORM IN PROGRESS RULE APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW)/SLIP AND FALL (STORM IN PROGRESS RULE APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW)/STORM IN PROGRESS RULE (SLIP AND FALL, STORM IN PROGRESS RULE APPLIED AS A MATTER OF LAW)

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ANTISUBROGATION RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO A PARTY NOT COVERED BY THE RELEVANT POLICY.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, reversing the Appellate Division, re: claims stemming from lead paint exposure, determined the antisubrogation rule did not apply to a party, ANP, which was not covered by the relevant policy:

… [T]he antisubrogation rule is an exception to the right of subrogation … . Under that rule, “an 'insurer has no right of subrogation against its own insured for a claim arising from the very risk for which the insured was covered . . . even where the insured has expressly agreed to indemnify the party from whom the insurer's rights are derived'” … . In effect, “an insurer may not step into the shoes of its insured to sue a third-party tortfeasor . . . for damages arising from the same risk covered by the policy” … , even where there is an express subrogation agreement … . The two primary purposes of the antisubrogation rule are to avoid “a conflict of interest that would undercut the insurer's incentive to provide an insured with a vigorous defense” and “to prohibit an insurer from passing its loss to its own insured” … .  * * *

The antisubrogation rule … requires a showing that the party the insurer is seeking to enforce its right of subrogation against is its insured, an additional insured, or a party who is intended to be covered by the insurance policy in some other way … . Here, as recognized by the courts below, ANP and its predecessor were not insured under the relevant insurance policies. … Thus, the principal element for application of the antisubrogation rule — that the insurer seeks to enforce its right of subrogation against its own insured, additional insured, or a party intended to be covered by the insurance policy — is absent. Millennium Holdings LLC v Glidden Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 03543, CtApp 5-5-16

INSURANCE LAW (INSURANCE LAW, ANTISUBROGATION RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO A PARTY NOT COVERED BY THE RELEVANT POLICY)/SUBROGATION (INSURANCE LAW, ANTISUBROGATION RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO A PARTY NOT COVERED BY THE RELEVANT POLICY)/ANITSUBROGATION RULE  (INSURANCE LAW,  ANTISUBROGATION RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO A PARTY NOT COVERED BY THE RELEVANT POLICY)

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APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a partial dissent, determined appeals as of right, irrespective of the issues raised, should not be dismissed because the appellant has been deported. Permissive appeals, such as an appeal of the denial of a motion to vacate a conviction, are, however, subject to discretionary dismissal because the appellant has been deported:

… [W]e conclude that this Court’s holding in Ventura [17 NY3d 675] prohibits an intermediate appellate court from exercising its discretion to dismiss a pending direct appeal on the ground that the defendant has been involuntarily deported, regardless of the appellate contentions raised by the defendant. …

We reach a different conclusion with respect to [a] pending permissive appeal. Our holding in Ventura was based upon a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to a direct appeal granted by CPL 450.10. That statute has no application, however, in the context of permissive appeals. Rather, CPL 450.15 governs an appeal from an order denying a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate a judgment, and provides that a certificate granting leave to appeal must be obtained pursuant to CPL 460.15 (see CPL 450.15 [1]). In Ventura, this Court spoke of a criminal defendant’s “absolute right,” “statutory right,” “fundamental right,” and “basic entitlement” to appellate consideration of a direct appeal … . A defendant has no such fundamental right or basic entitlement to appeal where the defendant must seek permission to appeal to the intermediate appellate court pursuant to CPL 450.15. …

Where an intermediate appellate court has permissive jurisdiction over a pending appeal, the intermediate appellate court retains its discretion to dismiss the pending permissive appeal due to the defendant’s involuntary deportation. People v Harrison, 2016 NY Slip Op 03547, CtApp 5-5-16

CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL, APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND)/IMMIGRATION (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND)/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS AS OF RIGHT MAY NOT BE DISMISSED BASED UPON THE DEPORTATION OF APPELLANT; PERMISSIVE APPEALS, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL ON THAT GROUND)

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STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF GOING-PRIVATE MERGERS ANNOUNCED; SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION CHALLENGING THE GOING-PRIVATE MERGER DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, determined a shareholder class action complaint challenging a going-private merger was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The court adopted a Delaware standard of review for going-private mergers, i.e., where the controlling shareholder seeks to buy out all the outstanding shares and, in effect, take the publicly-traded company private. Plaintiff argued the “entire fairness” review standard should be applied. Defendants argued the “business judgment” review standard should be applied. The Court of Appeals chose a middle ground (the Delaware standard) which is essentially the business judgment standard with added protections for minority shareholders:

Plaintiff urges that we apply the entire fairness standard, which places the burden on the corporation's directors to demonstrate that they engaged in a fair process and obtained a fair price. Defendants seek application of the business judgment rule, with or without certain conditions. We are persuaded to adopt a middle ground. Specifically, the business judgment rule should be applied as long as the corporation's directors establish that certain shareholder-protective conditions are met; however, if those conditions are not met, the entire fairness standard should be applied.

[The adopted Delaware standard has been summarized as follows:] … “[I]n controller buyouts, the business judgment standard of review will be applied if and only if: (i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii) the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority” … . Matter of Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc, 2016 NY Slip Op 03545, CtApp 5-5-16

CORPORATION LAW (STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF GOING-PRIVATE MERGERS ANNOUNCED; SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION CHALLENGING THE GOING-PRIVATE MERGER DISMISSED)/SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS (STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF GOING-PRIVATE MERGERS ANNOUNCED; SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION CHALLENGING THE GOING-PRIVATE MERGER DISMISSED)/GOING PRIVATE MERGER (CORPORATION LAW, STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF GOING-PRIVATE MERGERS ANNOUNCED; SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION CHALLENGING THE GOING-PRIVATE MERGER DISMISSED)

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COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined Supreme Court properly refused to approve a settlement in a class action challenging a corporate merger because there was no opt-out provision for out-of-state shareholders. Because the suit included claims for damages, effectively prohibiting out-of-state shareholders from bringing actions in other jurisdictions would deprive them of a property right:

While the complaint seeks predominately equitable relief, the settlement would also release any damage claims relating to the merger by out-of-state class members. The broad release encompassed in the agreement bars the right of those class members to pursue claims not equitable in nature, which … are constitutionally protected property rights. Jiannaras v Alfant, 2016 NY Slip Op 03548, CtApp 5-5-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT)/CLASS ACTIONS (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT)/CORPORATION LAW (SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION, (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT)/SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS (SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION, (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT)

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LANDOWNERS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN PUBLIC VESTIBULE OF THEIR BUILDING WHERE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS SHOT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the landowner did not have a duty to provide minimal security precautions in the public vestibule of their building in this third party assault case, despite a history of shooting on the premises:

Defendant established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that it owed no duty to protect plaintiff Charles Wong’s decedent, Malachi Wong, and his brother, plaintiff Timothy Wong, from the shootings that occurred in the public vestibule of their building. A landowner’s duty to take minimal security precautions does not extend to exterior public areas, including walkways and vestibules … . Contrary to the motion court’s finding, plaintiffs’ evidence failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the shootings were foreseeable. The article in the Co-op City Times, expressing the need for a greater police presence in Co-op City, and defendant’s public safety records, indicating 24 reports of gunshots fired on the premises, were insufficient, since they did not indicate that any of the reported shootings occurred in the vicinity of plaintiffs’ building … . The location of where the shots were fired is relevant, in light of the fact that Co-op City spans two-square miles and is comprised of approximately 200 residential buildings … .

The affidavit of plaintiffs’ security expert in which he states that defendant’s reduction of its security officers at midnight proximately caused decedent’s and Timothy Wong’s injuries is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant breached its duty to provide minimal precautions against the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties … . Furthermore, defendant did not proximately cause the injuries, since the record shows that the assailant specifically targeted Malachi and Timothy … . Wong v Riverbay Corp. 2016 NY Slip Op 03585 [139 AD3d 440], First Dept 5-5-16

 

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