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DEFENDANT MAY WAIVE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT FOR SENTENCING ON A FELONY.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined a defendant may waive his right to be present for sentencing on a felony:

Defendant contends that County Court violated CPL 380.40 (1) by permitting him to waive his presence for sentencing and in pronouncing judgment in his absence. We disagree. CPL 380.40 provides, with limited exceptions, that the “defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced” (CPL 380.40 [1]). In situations where the sentence is to be pronounced for a misdemeanor or petty offense, a defendant may move to dispense with the personal presence requirement, and, with the court's permission, may be sentenced in absentia so long as the defendant executes a waiver “reciting the maximum sentence that may be imposed for the offense and stating that the defendant waives the right to be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced” (CPL 380.40 [2]). On its face, the statute provides for no similar exception for felony defendants. * * *

We conclude … that a defendant may expressly waive his right to be present. “[W]aiver results from a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision” … . Although CPL 380.40 protects a defendant's fundamental right to be present at sentencing … , that fundamental right may be waived just as many other fundamental rights may be similarly waived … . People v Rossborough, 2016 NY Slip Op 04250, CtApp 6-2-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT MAY WAIVE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT FOR SENTENCING ON A FELONY)/SENTENCING (DEFENDANT MAY WAIVE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT FOR SENTENCING ON A FELONY)/WAIVER (CRIMINAL LAW, (DEFENDANT MAY WAIVE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT FOR SENTENCING ON A FELONY)

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ONCE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR STATUTORY INTEREST.

The Court of Appeals determined Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for statutory interest after judgment was entered. The post-judgment award of statutory interest ($4.9 million) was properly vacated by the appellate division:

While [petitioner] was appealing Supreme Court's judgment dismissing its action, some of the [respondents] filed a motion seeking an award of statutory interest under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5001. Supreme Court granted the motion, and in August 2013, directed entry of a judgment of approximately $4.9 million, representing interest at the statutory rate. Upon appeal, the Appellate Division reversed; the court denied the [respondents'] motion and vacated the statutory interest judgment … .

We agree with the Appellate Division that Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to award statutory interest on the January 2012 judgment that dismissed the petition. … [T]he January 2012 paper, denominated an “order,” was a final judgment dismissing the proceeding … .

Once Supreme Court dismissed [the] petition and judgment was entered, the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the [respondents'] post-judgment motion for statutory interest … . CRP/Extell Parcel I, L.P. v Cuomo, 2016 NY Slip Op 04251, CtApp 6-2-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ONCE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR STATUTORY INTEREST)/JURISDICTION, SUBJECT MATTER(ONCE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR STATUTORY INTEREST)

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRS AND HANDRAIL CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION.

The Second Department determined questions of fact precluded defendant's motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff alleged the stairway where she fell was defective in that the treads were too narrow and the handrail was tight against the wall. Defendant argued the condition was open and obvious:

“A landowner must act as a reasonable [person] in maintaining his [or her] property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk” … , and must warn of any dangerous or defective condition of which he or she has actual or constructive notice … . However, “[a] property owner has no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition, which as a matter of law is not inherently dangerous” … .

Here, the defendant, who relied only on the plaintiff's deposition testimony in support of her motion, failed to establish, prima facie, that the dimensions of the stairs and the position of the handrail were not inherently dangerous as a matter of law … . Rigatti v Geba, 2016 NY Slip Op 04193, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRS AND HANDRAIL CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION)/SLIP AND FALL (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRS AND HANDRAIL CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION)/STAIRS  (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRS AND HANDRAIL CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION)

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QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT CAUSE OF FALL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF CONDITION.

The Second Department determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact whether a slimy substance caused the ladder to slip (causation) and whether defendant had constructive notice of the condition:

Here, the defendant established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff could not identify what had caused the ladder to move without engaging in speculation … . In opposition, the plaintiff submitted the deposition testimony of a nonparty witness, which raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged slimy substance had caused the ladder to move and, consequently, the plaintiff to fall and sustain personal injuries … . Additionally, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the defendant, who did not inspect the garage within the week prior to the accident, had constructive notice of the alleged slimy condition … . Giordano v Giordano, 2016 NY Slip Op 04177, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT CAUSE OF FALL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF CONDITION)/SLIP AND FALL (QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT CAUSE OF FALL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF CONDITION)

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ONCE INJURED FIREFIGHTER BEGAN RECEIVING GENERAL MUNICIPLA LAW 207-a BENEFITS, THE CITY COULD NOT REQUIRE FIREFIGHTER TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR THOSE BENEFITS AND THEN DENY THEM.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lasalle, determined an injured  firefighter who began receiving General Municpal Law 207-a benefits, before an application process for those benefits had been put in place by the city, could not be required to submit an application which resulted in a denial of those benefits. The denial was deemed to constitute a prohibited reassessment of the firefighter's medical condition:

General Municipal Law § 207-a(2) guarantees the payment of benefits to a firefighter who is permanently disabled in the line of duty, including the continued payment of the firefighter's regular salary until the mandatory retirement age, less certain amounts received from other sources (hereinafter Section 207-a[2] benefits). This proceeding presents an issue of first impression for this Court: whether the provisions of General Municipal Law § 207-a(2) authorize a municipality to terminate permanent disability retirement benefits previously awarded to a firefighter pursuant to that subsection, and require the firefighter to submit a formal application for those benefits pursuant to an application procedure that was adopted by the municipality subsequent to the firefighter's retirement. We hold that a municipality is not authorized to terminate such previously awarded Section 207-a(2) benefits or require the submission of a formal application for such benefits after the firefighter has retired, as this essentially amounts to an improper reconsideration of an award of benefits based on improved medical condition, a procedure which is not authorized by General Municipal Law § 207-a(2) … . Matter of Masullo v City of Mount Vernon, 2016 NY Slip Op 04225, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (ONCE INJURED FIREFIGHTER BEGAN RECEIVING GENERAL MUNICIPLA LAW 207-a BENEFITS, THE CITY COULD NOT REQUIRE FIREFIGHTER TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR THOSE BENEFITS AND THEN DENY THEM)/GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW (FIREFIGHTERS, ONCE INJURED FIREFIGHTER BEGAN RECEIVING GENERAL MUNICIPLA LAW 207-a BENEFITS, THE CITY COULD NOT REQUIRE FIREFIGHTER TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR THOSE BENEFITS AND THEN DENY THEM)/FIREFIGHTERS (ONCE INJURED FIREFIGHTER BEGAN RECEIVING GENERAL MUNICIPLA LAW 207-a BENEFITS, THE CITY COULD NOT REQUIRE FIREFIGHTER TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR THOSE BENEFITS AND THEN DENY THEM)

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PLAINTIFF, A SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INVESTED AND PURCHASED A CONTROLLING INTEREST, PLAINTIFF HAD THE MEANS TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND ANY ALLEGED FALSE CLAIMS.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, determined plaintiff, a sophisticated investor, did not state a cause of action for fraud on the part of the company (DuCool) in which plaintiff invested:

Where a cause of action is based in fraud, “the complaint must allege misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, falsity, scienter on the part of the wrongdoer, justifiable reliance and resulting injury” … . Furthermore, where the plaintiff is a sophisticated party, “if the facts represented are not matters peculiarly within the [defendant's] knowledge, and the [plaintiff] has the means available to [it] of knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth or the real quality of the subject of the representation, [the plaintiff] must make use of those means, or [it] will not be heard to complain that [it] was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations” … . Circumstances constituting fraud must be set forth in a complaint in detail (CPLR 3016[b]). * * *

Plaintiff is an experienced and sophisticated investor. It did not plead facts to support the justifiable reliance element of fraud … . Plaintiff had total, unfettered access to every aspect of DuCool's company information both before and after its initial investment, even before it held a controlling interest in DuCool. Although learning through the due diligence conducted by its own technology and business consultants that there were frequent technological problems with DuCool products, some of them “severe,” plaintiff proceeded to invest in the company. Thereafter, as the 49% shareholder, plaintiff had the largest percentage ownership of any individual shareholder and it had access to information concerning the operations of the business. There is no factual basis on which to conclude that the alleged fraud involved matters peculiarly within defendants' knowledge, because plaintiff had the means to discover the truth behind any false claims about the condition of the company and whether this was a feasible investment… . MP Cool Invs. Ltd. v Forkosh, 2016 NY Slip Op 04159, 1st Dept 5-31-16

FRAUD (PLAINTIFF, A SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INVESTED, PLAINTIFF HAD THE MEANS TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND ANY ALLEGED FALSE CLAIMS)/CORPORATION LAW (PLAINTIFF, A SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INVESTED, PLAINTIFF HAD THE MEANS TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND ANY ALLEGED FALSE CLAIMS)/CORPORATION LAW (PLAINTIFF, A SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INVESTED AND PURCHASED A CONTROLLING INTEREST, PLAINTIFF HAD THE MEANS TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND ANY ALLEGED FALSE CLAIMS)

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER LABOR LAW 741.

The Second Department determined plaintiff was properly found to have been entitled to whistleblower protection under Labor Law 741. Plaintiff complained about an infusion procedure during liver transplant surgery which plaintiff believed threatened the safety and health of the patient. Thereafter plaintiff was demoted and given no further work:

Labor Law § 741 prohibits an employer from taking retaliatory action against an employee because the employee discloses, threatens to disclose, objects to, or refuses to participate in “any activity, policy or practice of the employer or agent that the employee, in good faith, reasonably believes constitutes improper quality of patient care” (Labor Law § 741[2][a], [b]). ” Improper quality of patient care' means, with respect to patient care, any practice, procedure, action or failure to act of an employer which violates any law, rule, regulation or declaratory ruling adopted pursuant to law, where such violation relates to matter which may present a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety or a significant threat to the health of a specific patient” (Labor Law § 741[1][d]). It is a defense that “the personnel action was predicated upon grounds other than the employee's exercise of any rights protected by this section” (Labor Law § 741[5]). Galbraith v Westchester County Health Care Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 04176, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER LABOR LAW 741)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER LABOR LAW 741)/WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER LABOR LAW 741)

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ABSENCE OF SAFETY RAIL ON SCAFFOLDING ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff fell from scaffolding after suffering an electric shock. There was no safety rail on the scaffolding:

Labor Law § 240(1) is to be “interpreted liberally to accomplish its purpose” … . To establish liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of the statute and that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries … . Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that he was injured when he fell from a scaffold that lacked a safety railing, and that he was not provided with a safety device to prevent him from falling … . Viera v WFJ Realty Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 04202, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ABSENCE OF SAFETY RAIL ON SCAFFOLDING ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION)/SCAFFOLDING (ABSENCE OF SAFETY RAIL ON SCAFFOLDING ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION)

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BATTERY CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM KICKBALL GAME SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE DID NOT PRECLUDE ACTION AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Second Department determined defendants did not eliminate questions of fact whether infant defendant intentionally pushed infant plaintiff to the ground during a kickball game. The battery cause of action was therefore not precluded (as a matter of law) by the doctrine of assumption of the risk:

“To recover damages for battery, a plaintiff must prove that there was bodily contact, made with intent, and offensive in nature” … . Contrary to the appellants’ contention, they failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the bodily contact between the infant defendant and the infant plaintiff was intentional or offensive … . The appellants also failed to establish, prima facie, that the complaint was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk. While a participant in a sporting activity consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation, the participant is not deemed to have assumed risks resulting from the reckless or intentional conduct of others … . Dimisa v Oceanside Union Free Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 04172, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

INTENTIONAL TORTS (BATTERY CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM KICKBALL GAME SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE DID NOT PRECLUDE ACTION AS A MATTER OF LAW)/BATTERY (BATTERY CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM KICKBALL GAME SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE DID NOT PRECLUDE ACTION AS A MATTER OF LAW)/ASSUMPTION OF RISK (BATTERY CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM KICKBALL GAME SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE DID NOT PRECLUDE ACTION AS A MATTER OF LAW)

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TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PREPAYMENT BEFORE RETRIEVING PAPER DOCUMENTS WAS JUSTIFIED.

The Second Department determined the town did not demonstrate the need for prepayment of the costs associated with locating the requested documents:

The only evidence in the record that justified the imposition of costs was a letter to the petitioner stating that it would take a Town employee a minimum of eight weeks, at $240 per week, to review 2,500-3,000 files to identify the records available for inspection. Although an agency may charge for employee time spent extracting or segregating data from an electronic database (see Public Officers Law § 87[1][c]), FOIL does not permit an agency to charge for employee time spent searching for paper documents … . Here, the Town failed to demonstrate that the prepayment costs were properly based upon employee time related to retrieving electronic files, rather than a manual search of hard copies for which the Town's recoupment costs are limited to 25¢ per photocopy … . Matter of Ripp v Town of Oyster Bay, 2016 NY Slip Op 04226, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PREPAYMENT BEFORE RETRIEVING PAPER DOCUMENTS WAS JUSTIFIED)

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