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ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539.

CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The Court of Appeals determined evidence which was originally generated in electronic form was admissible under CPLR 4518 (a) and CPLR 4539 (b) applies only to documents originally in hard copy and subsequently scanned into digital form. The document in question was a record of testing of the simulator solution used during an alcohol breath test:

County Court correctly held that the applicable statute is CPLR 4518 (a), which was amended in 2002 (see L 2002, ch 136, § 1) to provide that an “electronic record . . . shall be admissible in a tangible exhibit that is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record” (CPLR 4518 [a]). The statute further provides that the court “may consider the method or manner by which the electronic record was stored, maintained or retrieved in determining whether the exhibit is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record,” but “[a]ll other circumstances of the making of the memorandum or record. . . may be proved to affect its weight,” and “shall not affect its admissibility” (id. [emphasis added]).

The 2002 amendment to CPLR 4518 (a) was adopted by the legislature upon the recommendation of the Chief Administrative Judge’s Advisory Committee on Civil Practice specifically because the Committee and the legislature concluded that CPLR 4539 (b) had no application to documents originally created in electronic form. People v Kangas, 2016 NY Slip Op 06857, CtApp 10-20-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)DWI (BREATH TEST,  ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/BREATH TEST (DWI, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CRIMINAL LAW, DWI, BREATH TEST, ADMISSIBILITYY OF DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED IN ELECTRONIC FORM, HERE A RECORD OF TESTING OF THE SIMULATOR SOLUTION USED IN AN ALCOHOL BREATH TEST, IS DETERMINED UNDER CPLR 4518, NOT CPLR 4539)

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FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE IS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR WHICH NEED NOT BE PRESERVED; FAILURE TO PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, HOWEVER, IS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND MUST BE PRESERVED BY OBJECTION.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the trial judge’s acceptance of a verdict before responding to the jury’s request for a readback was not a mode of proceedings error and therefore must be preserved by objection. Just prior to the verdict, the judge had read the jury’s request verbatim in the presence of counsel, defendant and the jury. The judge’s failure to respond to the request (unlike a failure to apprise the parties of the contents of the request) is not a mode of proceedings error:

… “[W]here counsel has meaningful notice of the content of a jury note and of the trial court’s response, or lack thereof, to that note, the court’s alleged violation of the meaningful response requirement does not constitute a mode of proceedings error, and counsel is required to preserve any claim of error for appellate review” … .

Here, the trial court complied with its responsibility to provide counsel with meaningful notice of the jury’s notes by reading the notes verbatim into the record in the presence of counsel, defendant, and the jury … . Inasmuch as counsel had meaningful notice of the jury notes, the trial court’s failure to provide a response to the jury’s outstanding request for a readback of testimony before accepting the verdict does not constitute a mode of proceedings error … . Counsel was required to object to preserve any claim of error for this Court’s review. “Although the court’s procedure here may have been error, it was not a mode of proceedings error, and we have no jurisdiction to review it” .. . . People v Wiggs, 2016 NY Slip Op 06860, CtApp 10-20-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE IS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR WHICH NEED NOT BE PRESERVED; FAILURE TO PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, HOWEVER, IS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND MUST BE PRESERVED BY OBJECTION)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE IS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR WHICH NEED NOT BE PRESERVED; FAILURE TO PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, HOWEVER, IS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND MUST BE PRESERVED BY OBJECTION)/JURY NOTES (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE IS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR WHICH NEED NOT BE PRESERVED; FAILURE TO PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, HOWEVER, IS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND MUST BE PRESERVED BY OBJECTION)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR (FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE IS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR WHICH NEED NOT BE PRESERVED; FAILURE TO PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, HOWEVER, IS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND MUST BE PRESERVED BY OBJECTION)

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DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL ARGUMENT PRESERVED BY A HEARING; HAD THE HEARING NOT BEEN HELD, HOWEVER, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO REPLY TO THE PEOPLE’S EXPLANATION OF THE DELAY WOULD HAVE RENDERED THE ARGUMENT UNPRESERVED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined defendant’s speedy trial argument was preserved for review and affirmed dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial grounds. In response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, the People produced an explanation of the delay in seeking the indictment (witness out of the country). The defendant did not reply to the People’s explanation. But a hearing on the speedy trial motion was subsequently held. The Court of Appeals found that the issue was preserved by the hearing. The court noted, however, had there been no hearing, the defendant’s failure to reply to the People’s explanation of the delay would have rendered the issue unpreserved. A defendant, therefore, should always reply to the People’s explanation of a delay:

In the absence of a hearing, a defendant’s substantive CPL 30.30 arguments will be unpreserved where the defendant failed to otherwise raise them, for instance, “in his initial submission or in a reply” … . Accordingly, a defendant would be well-advised to raise any CPL 30.30 arguments in a reply so as to ensure their preservation. For instance, where a defendant mistakenly believes that the People failed to “conclusively refute[]” his motion (CPL 210.45[5][c]) — and therefore opts not to reply — the defendant risks summary denial of his motion, leaving him with an unsuccessful and unpreserved claim. However, a defendant’s failure to reply is not fatal to his claim where, as here, the defendant properly requests and receives a hearing and, at that hearing, his arguments are raised and developed … . People v Allard, 2016 NY Slip Op 06853, CtApp 10-20-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL ARGUMENT PRESERVED BY A HEARING; HAD THE HEARING NOT BEEN HELD, HOWEVER, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO REPLY TO THE PEOPLE’S EXPLANATION OF THE DELAY WOULD HAVE RENDERED THE ARGUMENT UNPRESERVED)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, (DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL ARGUMENT PRESERVED BY A HEARING; HAD THE HEARING NOT BEEN HELD, HOWEVER, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO REPLY TO THE PEOPLE’S EXPLANATION OF THE DELAY WOULD HAVE RENDERED THE ARGUMENT UNPRESERVED)/SPEEDY TRIAL (DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL ARGUMENT PRESERVED BY A HEARING; HAD THE HEARING NOT BEEN HELD, HOWEVER, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO REPLY TO THE PEOPLE’S EXPLANATION OF THE DELAY WOULD HAVE RENDERED THE ARGUMENT UNPRESERVED)

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ZONING BOARD DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE DURATIONAL LIMIT ON PERMIT FOR A NONCONFORMING USE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the zoning board did not have statutory authority to impose a durational limit on a permit allowing property in a residential zone to be used as a parking lot for the adjacent restaurant:

The Board did not have the authority to impose a durational limit on a permit granted pursuant to Town Code § 70-225(E). “Judicial review of a determination by a zoning board is generally limited to determining whether the action taken by the zoning board was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion” … . “[W]here the issue involves pure legal interpretation of statutory terms, deference [to the board] is not required” … .

“[C]onditions imposed by a Board of Zoning Appeals must be authorized by the zoning ordinance” … . “[I]f a zoning board imposes unreasonable or improper conditions, those conditions may be annulled although the variance is upheld” … .

Here, Town Code § 70-225(E) does not explicitly provide the Board with the authority to impose durational limits upon permits granted pursuant to that section. Thus, it was improper for the Board to include a five-year durational limit on a permit granted pursuant to that provision, and the durational limit must be annulled … . Matter of Citrin v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 2016 NY Slip Op 06827, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

ZONING (ZONING BOARD DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE DURATIONAL LIMIT ON PERMIT FOR A NONCONFORMING USE)

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE.

In an action for partition and sale of a four-family brownstone, the Second Department determined Supreme Court properly determined there was a question of fact whether physical partition or sale was the appropriate remedy:

“A person holding and in possession of real property as joint tenant or tenant in common, in which he [or she] has an estate of inheritance, or for life, or for years, may maintain an action for the partition of the property, and for a sale if it appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners” (RPAPL 901[1]). “The right to partition is not absolute, however, and while a tenant in common has the right to maintain an action for partition pursuant to RPAPL 901, the remedy is always subject to the equities between the parties” … . “The actual physical partition of property is the preferred method and is presumed appropriate unless one party demonstrates that actual physical partition would cause great prejudice, in which case the property must be sold at public auction” … .

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there is a question of fact as to whether physical partition or sale of the subject property is appropriate … . Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which sought a sale of the property, and properly appointed a referee to determine whether physical partition or sale was the appropriate remedy. Perretta v Perretta, 2016 NY Slip Op 06814, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

REAL PROPERTY (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)/PARTITION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)/PHYSICAL PARTITION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PHYSICAL PARTITION OR SALE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY RE: A FOUR-FAMILY BROWNSTONE)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE.

The Second Department determined the People were entitled to a writ of prohibition re: a County Court Judge’s order that they produce the names of all lab personnel whose initials appeared on lab report concerning DNA test results. The People had notified defense counsel persons at the lab had cheated on an exam for certification for use of a DNA software program. The software program was not used in defendant’s case. The People provided defense counsel with the names of the two persons implicated in the cheating whose initials appeared on the lab report. Defense counsel requested the names of all the persons whose initials were on the report. County Court granted that request:

…[T]he only relevant inquiry is whether or not [the judge’s] actions exceeded his authorized powers … . We conclude that Judge De Rosa exceeded his authority by directing the People to make available to the defendant the full names corresponding to the initials that appear on the subject laboratory reports … . Nothing contained in CPL 240.20 imposes an obligation on the People to respond to the defendant’s questions concerning notations that appear in discoverable materials, or to affirmatively create or compile material, or obtain it from sources beyond their control … . Matter of Hoovler v De Rosa, 2016 NY Slip Op 06830, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

JUDGES (WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/PROHIBITION, WRIT OF (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE

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ERROR TO ALLOW PROSECUTOR TO IMPEACH HER OWN WITNESS WITH THE WITNESS’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

The Second Department determined the allowing the prosecutor to impeach her own witness with the witness’s grand jury testimony, allowing inadmissible hearsay, together with the prosecutor’s improper remarks in summation, required reversal in the interest of justIce:

… [A] new trial is warranted as a result of two evidentiary errors, both of which were compounded by improper remarks made during the People’s summation. Specifically, the Supreme Court allowed the prosecutor to impeach one of her own witnesses, who testified at trial that it was dark at the time of the shooting and she “couldn’t really see” the shooter. The prosecutor was permitted to read that witness’s prior grand jury testimony, in which she stated that she recognized the shooter as a person going by the nickname of E-Villain. This was error … . Moreover, during summation, the prosecutor compounded the error by improperly using the prior inconsistent statement as evidence in chief … , telling the jury that when that witness previously spoke to the police, to an assistant district attorney, and to the grand jury, “on each of those occasions, she said what it is she saw and who it is that she saw do it,” and urging the jury to find “she was not telling you the truth when she said that I now am telling you I did not see who did it, that it was too dark.” Later, the prosecutor went one step further, stating, in direct contradiction to the witness’s trial testimony, that “[she] saw who it was.”

The Supreme Court also erred in allowing another witness to testify that a “little girl said that [the defendant] shot [the victim]” … . Moreover, on summation, the prosecutor not only repeated the improper hearsay testimony but also mispresented the defendant as having told one of the witnesses, “You know what, that little girl that told you that was a hundred percent right.” People v Thomas, 2016 NY Slip Op 06851, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/APPEALS (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/GRAND JURY (PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/IMPEACHMENT (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S IMPEACHMENT OF PEOPLE’S WITNESS WITH GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, (EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)

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POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined evidence of defendant’s intoxication should not have been suppressed. The arresting officer approached defendant’s car because she was stopped for some time behind a police cruiser which was blocking the turning lane. The Second Department ruled that the officer did not need a suspicion of criminal activity to approach the defendant and ask for her license, insurance card and registration. In the course of interacting with the defendant, the officer noticed signs of intoxication:

Based on the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, the officer had an objective, credible reason for approaching the defendant’s vehicle and asking for her license, registration, and insurance card. The defendant’s vehicle was oddly stopped in the left turning lane behind the officer’s vehicle, when it was obvious that she could not make a left turn. The defendant could have easily proceeded north on Oceanside Road, but instead stopped her vehicle for several minutes behind the officer’s vehicle. Under these circumstances, the officer had an objective, credible reason to approach the defendant’s vehicle and request information … . People v Karagoz, 2016 NY Slip Op 06842, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 CRIMINAL LAW (POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/STREET STOPS (POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (STREET STOP, POLICE OFFICER HAD AN OBJECTIVE, CREDIBLE REASON FOR APPROACHING DEFENDANT IN HER CAR, EVIDENCE OF DWI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

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SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court committed reversible error when it, in the absence of defendant, received the verdict sheet from the jury indicating an impasse on two counts and sent the verdict sheet back to the jury with a message, conveyed by a court officer, to indicate what the jury’s issues were:

This message communicated to the jury that the court was rejecting the verdict and was, in effect, instructing the jury to continue deliberations. Indeed, approximately 10 minutes later, the jury sent a note indicating that it had reached a verdict on one of the two counts upon which the jury had earlier been unable to reach a verdict. An instruction to continue deliberations when the jury has indicated an inability to reach a verdict is not a mere “ministerial” matter … . Thus, the defendant was absent during a material stage of the trial, and the trial court improperly delegated a judicial duty to a nonjudicial staff member … . People v Gray, 2016 NY Slip Op 06839, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

CRIMINAL LAW (SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/JURIES (CRIMINAL LAW, SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT (CRIMINAL LAW, SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/COURT OFFICERS (CRIMINAL LAW, SENDING THE VERDICT SHEET BACK TO THE JURY WITH A MESSAGE CONVEYED BY A COURT OFFICER, IN THE DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, REQUIRED REVERSAL)

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DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL.

The Second Department, affirming the Court of Claims, determined the state was protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs were injured when a van in which they were riding struck a highway guardrail and concrete pillar. The complaint alleged the guardrail was not long enough:

To establish its entitlement to qualified immunity, the governmental body must demonstrate “that the relevant discretionary determination by the governmental body was the result of a deliberate decision-making process” … . “A municipality is entitled to qualified immunity where a governmental planning body has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury'” … . Accordingly, where the decision made by the municipality or governmental body was not the product of a governmental plan or study, the doctrine of qualified immunity is inapplicable … .

Here, the Court of Claims correctly applied the doctrine of qualified immunity based on the evidence the defendants submitted at trial that the guardrail was designed pursuant to the design standards set forth by the New York State Department of Transportation, which were the result of a deliberate decision-making process of the type afforded immunity from judicial interference … . Ramirez v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06815, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

COURT OF CLAIMS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/HIGHWAYS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)/GUARDRAILS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL)

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