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PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL, DETAILED EXPLANATION OFFERED.

The Second Department reversed defendant’s conviction solely on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. The court offered a detailed explanation of the misconduct:

“[I]n summing up to the jury, [the prosecutor] must stay within the four corners of the evidence’ and avoid irrelevant and inflammatory comments which have a tendency to prejudice the jury against the accused” … .

Here, during that summation, the prosecutor directly attacked defense counsel’s role and his integrity. Specifically, the prosecutor raised a hypothetical that bore no relation to the evidence in the case and then suggested what defense counsel would have argued with respect to that irrelevant hypothetical, in effect, implying that the defense arguments were the product of expediency. This tactic invited the jury to reject defense counsel’s argument not on the merits, but merely because it was raised by defense counsel. We strongly disapprove of this attack on the legitimacy of defense counsel’s role … . The prosecutor also improperly referenced facts not in evidence in order to call for speculation by the jury … and misstated critical testimony provided by a defense witness, alleging that certain facts were “undisputed” when in fact they were disputed … .

The prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury’s sympathy and generalized fear of crime by asserting that the defendant possessed a loaded gun while families and children from the “20 residential buildings” were “everywhere” having “cookouts” and celebrating the Fourth of July, and that because the various police officers “did their jobs,” “fortunately, nothing happened.” These comments implied to the jury that the defendant intended to commit crimes with which he was not charged … . Furthermore, immediately upon praising the police officers who “did their jobs,” the prosecutor turned to the jury and advised that “[n]ow it’s your turn to uphold your oaths as jurors and do your jobs” by finding the defendant guilty. This type of “safe streets” argument is inflammatory and has repeatedly been disapproved by the courts … .

The prosecutor also compared the defendant’s in-court demeanor and appearance to how he appeared on the night of his arrest in order to argue that the jury should not be fooled into considering him a “gentleman” … . The prosecutor went so far as to point to the defendant’s precinct photo and stated that his appearance there represented his “true colors.” People v Brisco, 2016 NY Slip Op 08878, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQURED REVERSAL, DETAILED EXPLANATION OFFERED)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQURED REVERSAL, DETAILED EXPLANATION OFFERED)/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQURED REVERSAL, DETAILED EXPLANATION OFFERED)

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DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS PREMATURE, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY TO FLESH OUT RELATIONSHIP AMONG PARTIES, RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE ALLOWED AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO ADD PARTY, NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR SUIT AGAINST LONG ISLAND POWER AUTHORITY.

CIVIL PROCEDURE, MUNICIPAL LAW.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case was premature. The truck which struck plaintiff’s vehicle was registered to Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) but the driver was an employee of National Grid, which was under contract with LIPA. Plaintiff never served a notice of claim on LIPA, as required by the Public Authorities Law and the General Municipal Law. The Second Department held that plaintiff was entitled to discovery concerning the relationship between LIPA and National Grid, and further held that the relation-back doctrine allowed the amendment of the complaint to add National Grid as a defendant:

A party who contends that a motion for summary judgment is premature must “demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant” … . In opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendants had not revealed that, at the time of the subject accident, the defendant driver was actually employed by National Grid LLC, and not LIPA, until the defendants filed their summary judgment motion. The award of summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant driver was therefore premature, inasmuch as substantial discovery with respect to the relationship between the National Grid LLC and the defendant driver, as well as the nature of the business the defendant driver was conducting at the time of the subject accident, remains outstanding … . Marrone v Miloscio, 2016 NY Slip Op 08856, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS PREMATURE, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY TO FLESH OUT RELATIONSHIP AMONG PARTIES, RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE ALLOWED AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO ADD PARTY)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE ALLOWED AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO ADD PARTY)/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS PREMATURE, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY TO FLESH OUT RELATIONSHIP AMONG PARTIES)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR SUIT AGAINST LONG ISLAN POWER AUTHORITY)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (SUIT AGAINS LONG ISLAND POWER AUTHORITY)

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AN ORDER IS NOT ABANDONDED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 UNLESS THE ORDER DIRECTS THAT IT BE SETTLED OR SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined dismissal of a motion to enter a default judgment as abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCTT 202.48(b) was improper because the underlying order did not direct that it be settled or submitted for signature:

The Supreme Court incorrectly, sua sponte, dismissed the action as abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48(b) because … its determination of the plaintiff’s 2014 motion did not expressly direct that the proposed judgment or order be settled or submitted for signature (see 22 NYCRR 202.48[a]; Funk v Barry, 89 NY2d 364, 367). HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Moley, 2016 NY Slip Op 08844, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AN ORDER IS NOT ABANDONDED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 UNLESS THE ORDER DIRECTS THAT IT BE SETTLED OR SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE)/ABANDONMENT (CIVIL PROCEDURE, ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS, AN ORDER IS NOT ABANDONDED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 UNLESS THE ORDER DIRECTS THAT IT BE SETTLED OR SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE)/ORDERS (ABANDONMENT, (AN ORDER IS NOT ABANDONDED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 UNLESS THE ORDER DIRECTS THAT IT BE SETTLED OR SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE)

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ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL WAS NOT LIABLE IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE FOR RELEASING PLAINTIFF AND NOT ENSURING A SAFE RETURN HOME, THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the motion to dismiss the medical malpractice cause of action was properly denied. The negligence cause of action against the hospital stemming from the same facts had previously been dismissed. Plaintiff was released from the hospital and found two hours later, disoriented and frost-bitten. The hospital, in the negligence cause of action, was found to have no duty to prevent plaintiff from leaving the hospital against medical advice and no duty to ensure plaintiff’s safe return home. However, allegations that the assessment plaintiff’s medical and mental status and the discharge of plaintiff from the hospital were not in accordance with good and accepted medical practice stated a cause of action in medical malpractice:

Although “no rigid analytical line separates the two” … , we have long recognized the distinction between an ordinary negligence cause of action against a hospital and/or a physician … and a medical malpractice cause of action against a hospital and/or a physician … . We note that there is no prohibition against simultaneously pleading both an ordinary negligence cause of action and one sounding in medical malpractice … . It is simply beyond cavil “that an action for personal injuries may be maintained, in the proper case, on the dual theories of medical malpractice or simple negligence where a person is under the care and control of a medical practitioner or a medical facility” … . Moreover, in a proper case, both theories may be presented to the jury … .

Here, the medical malpractice cause of action alleges, inter alia, that defendant did not properly assess plaintiff’s medical and mental status and rendered medical care that was not in accordance with good and accepted medical practice, and that the discharge of plaintiff was not in accordance with good and accepted medical practices. Ingutti v Rochester Gen. Hosp., 2016 NY Slip Op 08615, 4th Dept 12-23-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL WAS NOT LIABLE IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE FOR RELEASING PLAINTIFF AND NOT ENSURING A SAFE RETURN HOME, THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL WAS NOT LIABLE IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE FOR RELEASING PLAINTIFF AND NOT ENSURING A SAFE RETURN HOME, THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE)

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GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF LOSING CONTROL OF HER GOLF CART ON A WET SLOPE.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff had assumed the risk of losing control of her golf cart on a steep slope:

… [D]efendants established on the motion that plaintiff was an experienced golfer who had played that hole and driven that cart path several times previously. Apart from her familiarity with the steep topography of the hole, plaintiff was aware that it had rained the night before and that the course was still wet that morning. She had driven her golf cart on that cart path just moments before her accident, and further had observed the leaves and berries on the cart path as she began down the cart path. It is common knowledge that leaves and other natural litter may be present on a golf course and that such litter may become slick when it is wet … . For those reasons, we conclude that plaintiff was aware of the risk posed by the cart path and assumed it … . Kirby v Drumlins, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08709, 4th Dept 12-23-16

NEGLIGENCE (GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF LOSING CONTROL OF HER GOLF CART ON A WET SLOPE)/GOLF CARTS (GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF LOSING CONTROL OF HER GOLF CART ON A WET SLOPE)/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF LOSING CONTROL OF HER GOLF CART ON A WET SLOPE)

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INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff’s injury from diving into the shallow end of a pool was not actionable:

It is well established that “[s]ummary judgment is an appropriate remedy in swimming pool injury cases when from his general knowledge of pools, his observations prior to the accident, and plain common sense’ . . . , the plaintiff should have known that, if he dove into the pool, the area into which he dove contained shallow water and, thus, posed a danger of injury” … . In light of that standard, we conclude that defendant met her burden on the motion, and that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact … . The record establishes that plaintiff lived on the same street as defendant, swam in the subject pool multiple times prior to the accident, was aware that striking the bottom of a pool was a risk when diving into the shallow end of the pool, and acknowledged that he knew the depth dimensions of defendant’s pool, i.e., where the shallow end started and ended. Under those circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff’s reckless conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries … . Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant was negligent in failing to provide a “safety float line separating the shallow and deep end of [her] pool, [we conclude that] even the most liberal interpretation of the record eliminates any cause of this accident other than the reckless conduct of plaintiff” … . Brady v Domino, 2016 NY Slip Op 08687, 4th Dept 12-23-16

NEGLIGENCE (INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE)/SWIMMING POOLS (INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE)/DIVING (INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE)/SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE (INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE)

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INDICTMENT COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY.

The Fourth Department determined the trial testimony rendered a count of the indictment duplicitous and dismissed it:

We agree with defendant that the third count of the indictment, charging defendant with engaging in anal sexual contact with the complainant by forcible compulsion, was rendered duplicitous by the complainant’s testimony … . The complainant testified that the acts of anal sexual contact occurred “more than once” over the course of a two-hour incident, and, contrary to the People’s contention, such acts did not constitute a continuous offense … , but rather were separate and distinct offenses … . People v Cox, 2016 NY Slip Op 08661, 4th Dept 12-23-16

CRIMINAL LAW (INDICTMENT COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY)/INDICTMENTS (INDICTMENT COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY)/EVIDENCE (INDICTMENT COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY)/DUPLICITOUS (INDICTMENT COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY)/SEXUAL ACT (CRIMINAL LAW, (INDICTMENT COUNT CHARGING CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY)

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HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL DEEMED DE MINIMUS AND NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), PIPE WHICH FELL WAS ONE FOOT ABOVE PLAINTIFF’S HEAD AND WITHIN HIS REACH.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly dismissed. Plaintiff was working in the basement when a pipe, which was one foot above him and was within his reach, fell and injured him. The majority found the height differential “de minimus” and therefore not actionable:

“Liability may . . . be imposed under [Labor Law § 240 (1)] only where the plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential’ ” … . Although there is conflicting deposition testimony concerning the exact elevation of the pipe, it is undisputed that the pipe was, at most, one foot above plaintiff’s head, and that the pipe was always within his reach. We therefore conclude that plaintiff’s injury did not fall within the scope of section 240 (1) inasmuch as “any height differential between plaintiff and the [pipe] that fell on him was de minimis” … . Kuhn v Giovanniello, 2016 NY Slip Op 08633, 4th Dept 12-23-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL DEEMED DE MINIMUS AND NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), PIPE WHICH FELL WAS ONE FOOT ABOVE PLAINTIFF’S HEAD AND WITHIN HIS REACH)/DE MINIMUS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL DEEMED DE MINIMUS AND NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), PIPE WHICH FELL WAS ONE FOOT ABOVE PLAINTIFF’S HEAD AND WITHIN HIS REACH)/HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL DEEMED DE MINIMUS AND NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), PIPE WHICH FELL WAS ONE FOOT ABOVE PLAINTIFF’S HEAD AND WITHIN HIS REACH)

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED PATERNITY BY ESTOPPEL BEFORE ORDERING TEST FOR BIOLOGICAL PATERNITY.

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court and ordering further proceedings before a different judge, reiterated that a court should consider paternity by estoppel before ordering a test for biological parternity. Here, Gerald, the acknowledged father of the child and the custodial parent of the child, was not a named party in the proceedings (a paternity petition brought by the mother naming another party, Shane, as the father). Shane appeared and stated he wanted nothing to do with child. Yet the court ordered a paternity test without making Gerald a party and without notifying him:

“Family Court should consider paternity by estoppel before it decides whether to test for biological paternity” … . That did not occur here because Gerald was not a named party in the paternity proceeding and did not otherwise appear when the court ordered Shane to submit to a genetic marker test, so he did not have the opportunity to raise the doctrine of estoppel. The court should have joined Gerald in that proceeding or otherwise notified him before it ordered the test … . After all, Gerald was not only the acknowledged father of the child, but was the custodial parent of the child, and the court was well aware of those facts inasmuch as it had issued the custody orders. The court made it clear in its decision, however, that even if Gerald had made a timely objection and raised the defense earlier, the court nevertheless would have ordered the test because the child was young and “the truth is important.” That is contrary to both the plain language of the statute and statements of law by the Court of Appeals. Matter of Jennifer L. v Gerald S., 2016 NY Slip Op 08730, 4th Dept 12-23-16

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED PATERNITY BY ESTOPPEL BEFORE ORDERING TEST FOR BIOLOGICAL PATERNITY)/PATERNITY (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED PATERNITY BY ESTOPPEL BEFORE ORDERING TEST FOR BIOLOGICAL PATERNITY)

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COURT ERRED IN CLASSIFYING HOUSE PURCHASED BEFORE MARRIAGE AS MARITAL PROPERTY, HOWEVER THE APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE WAS MARITAL PROPERTY.

The Fourth Department determined a house purchased by the husband prior to marriage was his separate property, despite the fact it was used a the marital residence and proceeds from the sale were used to purchase a marital residence. The appreciation in the value of the house, however, was marital property:

It was undisputed that the Seneca Hill Property was purchased by defendant prior to the marriage, and we conclude that it was not transmuted into marital property when the parties used it as the marital residence for approximately two years, or by virtue of defendant having used some of the sale proceeds therefrom to assist in funding the purchase of a new marital residence … . Defendant was therefore entitled to a credit for his separate property contributions to the marital estate … . We further conclude, however, that the appreciated value of the Seneca Hill Property that the court determined to be attributable to the contributions of plaintiff should have been classified as marital property … . Hart v Hart, 2016 NY Slip Op 08692, 4th Dept 12-23-16

FAMILY LAW (MARITAL PROPERTY, COURT ERRED IN CLASSIFYING HOUSE PURCHASED BEFORE MARRIAGE AS MARITAL PROPERTY, HOWEVER THE APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE WAS MARITAL PROPERTY)/EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION (MARITAL PROPERTY, COURT ERRED IN CLASSIFYING HOUSE PURCHASED BEFORE MARRIAGE AS MARITAL PROPERTY, HOWEVER THE APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE WAS MARITAL PROPERTY)/MARITAL PROPERTY (COURT ERRED IN CLASSIFYING HOUSE PURCHASED BEFORE MARRIAGE AS MARITAL PROPERTY, HOWEVER THE APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE WAS MARITAL PROPERTY)/SEPARATE PROPERTY (EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, COURT ERRED IN CLASSIFYING HOUSE PURCHASED BEFORE MARRIAGE AS MARITAL PROPERTY, HOWEVER THE APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE WAS MARITAL PROPERTY)/APPRECIATION IN VALUE (EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, COURT ERRED IN CLASSIFYING HOUSE PURCHASED BEFORE MARRIAGE AS MARITAL PROPERTY, HOWEVER THE APPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE WAS MARITAL PROPERTY)

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