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EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO FULL REIMBURSEMENT OF WAGES PAID TO CLAIMANT SINCE THE ACCIDENT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT CLAIMANT WAS NOT PAID COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR THE ENTIRE TIME SINCE THE ACCIDENT.

The Third Department determined that an employer who paid the claimant during the disability period was entitled to reimbursement from the award for the entire time beginning when the accident occurred, despite the fact that claimant was not awarded compensation for that entire period:

Claimant does not dispute that the employer paid him wages for the period of his disability prior to the schedule award and that the employer filed a timely claim for reimbursement with the Board as required by Workers’ Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) … . Claimant challenges the Board’s reimbursement directive upon the ground that the reimbursement here covers a period of time when there were no awards of compensation made, arguing that, as a result, the employer is not entitled to reimbursement of wages paid to claimant during those periods of time and that the amount of reimbursement should be reduced.

However, under settled law, where, as here, a claimant ultimately receives a schedule loss of use award, “an employer has the right to reimbursement for the full amount of wages paid during a claimant’s period of disability from the claimant’s schedule award of worker[s’] compensation benefits” … . * * *  Inasmuch as claimant received a schedule award compensating him for the partial loss of use of his right foot, the Board was correct in finding that the employer was entitled to full reimbursement out of that award for all of its advanced payment of wages to claimant during that time (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25 [4] [a]). The fact that a temporary disability award was denied during part of that period based upon missing medical evidence in the Board’s record is not relevant to the employer’s entitlement to reimbursement. Matter of Newbill v Town of Hempstead, 2017 NY Slip Op 01049, 3rd Dept 2-9-17

 

WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW (EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO FULL REIMBURSEMENT OF WAGES PAID TO CLAIMANT SINCE THE ACCIDENT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT CLAIMANT WAS NOT PAID COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR THE ENTIRE TIME SINCE THE ACCIDENT)

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DENIAL OF INMATE’S REQUEST FOR WITNESS TESTIMONY AND INCOMPLETE INVESTIGATION BY EMPLOYEE ASSISTANT REQUIRED ANNULMENT AND EXPUNGEMENT.

The Third Department determined errors made by the hearing officer and employee assistant deprived the inmate of his constitutional right to meaningful employee assistance. The determination was annulled and expunged:

Petitioner contends, among other things, that the Hearing Officer improperly denied his request to have an inmate who was involved in the initial fight testify at the hearing. The Hearing Officer denied this inmate’s testimony as irrelevant, noting that “[a]t the time of [the] incident [,] this inmate was in the process of being restrained by security staff and was face down on the floor.” However, as respondent concedes, there is no proof in the record to substantiate the Hearing Officer’s conclusion. The fight occurred in the area where petitioner allegedly assaulted staff and the requested witness may have made observations helpful to petitioner’s defense. Consequently, the Hearing Officer’s denial of this witness based upon his own speculation as to the content of the witness’s testimony was error … .

… [I]it appears from the record that the assistant interviewed only six of the 30 inmates housed in petitioner’s cell block, five of whom refused to testify and one who provided a vague written statement. It is unclear from the record what attempts, if any, petitioner’s assistant made to interview the other inmates housed in his cell block who were present during the incident. In view of this, and given that the observations of such inmates could have potentially supported petitioner’s defense, petitioner was prejudiced by his assistant’s failure to interview them and by the Hearing Officer’s failure to remedy this deficiency … . Matter of Nance v Annucci, 2017 NY Slip Op 01044, 3rd Dept 2-9-17

 

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (DENIAL OF INMATE’S REQUEST FOR WITNESS TESTIMONY AND INCOMPLETE INVESTIGATION BY EMPLOYEE ASSISTANT REQUIRED ANNULMENT AND EXPUNGEMENT)

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EXPUNGEMENT NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHILD NEGLECT CASE REFERRED TO THE FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACK (FAR TRACK).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, determined the statutory scheme for a potential child-neglect case referred to the Family Assessment Response Track (FAR track) does not provide a mechanism for expungement. Here a potential educational neglect case was referred to the FAR track and ultimately no action was taken by the caseworker and the case was closed. The petitioners requested expungement:

Petitioners contend that the right to seek early expungement may be inferred from the silence of Social Services Law § 427-a on this topic. We disagree. Principles of statutory construction teach that “the failure of the Legislature to include a substantive, significant prescription in a statute is a strong indication that its exclusion was intended” … . Moreover, this is not a case in which the two statutes that petitioners seek to interpret in identical fashion “relate to the same subject matter, contain identical language and were adopted together” … . Rather, the FAR track was created as a new and entirely separate means of addressing certain allegations of child abuse in a program geared toward the provision of social services, rather than an investigation assessing blame. In other words, the subject matter of the FAR track cannot be deemed identical to that of a traditional child abuse investigation. Matter of Corrigan v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 2017 NY Slip Op 01020, CtApp 2-9-17

FAMILY LAW (EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT, EXPUNGEMENT NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHILD NEGLECT CASE REFERRED TO THE FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACK (FAR TRACK))/CHILD ABUSE (EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT, EXPUNGEMENT NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHILD NEGLECT CASE REFERRED TO THE FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACK (FAR TRACK))/CHILD NEGLECT (EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT, EXPUNGEMENT NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHILD NEGLECT CASE REFERRED TO THE FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACK (FAR TRACK))/EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT (EXPUNGEMENT NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHILD NEGLECT CASE REFERRED TO THE FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACK (FAR TRACK))/EXPUNGEMENT (EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT, EXPUNGEMENT NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHILD NEGLECT CASE REFERRED TO THE FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACK (FAR TRACK))/SOCIAL SERVICES LAW  (EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT, EXPUNGEMENT NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHILD NEGLECT CASE REFERRED TO THE FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACK (FAR TRACK))/FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACT (FAR TRACK) (EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT, EXPUNGEMENT NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHILD NEGLECT CASE REFERRED TO THE FAMILY ASSESSMENT RESPONSE TRACK (FAR TRACK))

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ELEMENTS OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT, MALFEASANCE AND NONFEASANCE, EXPLAINED; COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE A DEFENDANT JOINS A CONSPIRACY AND AFTER A DEFENDANT LEAVES A CONSPIRACY ARE ADMISSIBLE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, affirmed the conviction of a Nassau County Police Department detective on two counts of official misconduct and conspiracy. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The charges stemmed from allegations defendant participated in an attempt to prevent the arrest of the son of a prominent supporter of the police department. It was alleged the supporter's son stole electronic equipment from his high school. Despite many attempts by members of the police department to have the high school withdraw the charges, the school refused. The opinion explains in detail the proof requirements for official misconduct, based upon malfeasance and nonfeasance. In a question of first impression, the Court of Appeals ruled that statements made by coconspirators before a defendant joins the conspiracy and after a defendant leaves the conspiracy are admissible:

We now hold that when a conspirator subsequently joins an ongoing conspiracy, any previous statements made by his or her coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against the conspirator pursuant to the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. …

We further conclude, in line with federal case law, that statements made after a conspirator's alleged active involvement in the conspiracy has ceased, but the conspiracy continues, are admissible unless this conspirator has unequivocally communicated his or her withdrawal from the conspiracy to the coconspirators … . People v Flanagan, 2017 NY Slip Op 01018. CtApp 2-9-17

CRIMINAL LAW (ELEMENTS OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT, MALFEASANCE AND NONFEASANCE, EXPLAINED, COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE A DEFENDANT JOINS A CONSPIRACY AND AFTER A DEFENDANT LEAVES A CONSPIRACY ARE ADMISSIBLE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE A DEFENDANT JOINS A CONSPIRACY AND AFTER A DEFENDANT LEAVES A CONSPIRACY ARE ADMISSIBLE)/CONSPIRACY (CRIMINAL LAW, COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE A DEFENDANT JOINS A CONSPIRACY AND AFTER A DEFENDANT LEAVES A CONSPIRACY ARE ADMISSIBLE)/OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT (ELEMENTS OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT, MALFEASANCE AND NONFEASANCE, EXPLAINED)

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NO EVIDENCE JURY COULD SEE ORANGE CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT PANTS WORN BY DEFENDANT ON THE FIRST DAY OF TRIAL, DEFENDANT NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL.

The Court of Appeals determined the fact that defendant appeared on the first day of the trial wearing orange sweat pants issued by the department of corrections did not require reversal. There was no evidence the jury could see the defendant's legs:

Under the circumstances described here by the trial judge on the record, there is no merit to defendant's contention that he was denied a fair trial because he was compelled to appear before the jury in correctional garb. We have previously held that “to require [a defendant] to appear in convict's attire — a continuing visual communication to the jury — is to deny” the defendant the right to appear “with the dignity and self-respect of a free and innocent” person … , consistent with the Supreme Court's holding that “[t]he State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes” … . These concerns are not implicated here, however, where there is no evidence that defendant's orange correctional pants were visible to the jury and the clothing that was visible to the jury was clearly not identifiable as correctional garb … . People v Then, 2017 NY Slip Op 01021, CtApp 2-9-17

CRIMINAL LAW (NO EVIDENCE JURY COULD SEE ORANGE CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT PANTS WORN BY DEFENDANT ON THE FIRST DAY OF TRIAL, DEFENDANT NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL)/PRISON CLOTHES (CRIMINAL LAW, (NO EVIDENCE JURY COULD SEE ORANGE CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT PANTS WORN BY DEFENDANT ON THE FIRST DAY OF TRIAL, DEFENDANT NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL)

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ETHICAL VIOLATION CANNOT BE USED AS A SWORD TO AVOID PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEE; BECAUSE TRIAL PREPARATION NOT NECESSARY, LOWER ATTORNEY’S-FEE PERCENTAGE APPLIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined the fee arrangement contracts between plaintiff's attorney, Menkes, and two attorneys Menkes contracted with for assistance, Manheimer and Golomb, should be enforced according to standard prinicples of contract interpretation. Menkes argued that Manheimer was not entitled to payment because the clients were never informed (by Menkes) of Manheimer's involvement (an ethical violation). Golomb argued he was entitled to 40% of the fees because the matter did not settle at the mediation session. The Court of Appeals determined the 40% term only applied if it became necessary to prepare for trial (the case settled before trial preparation):

Menkes's attempt to use the ethical rules as a sword to render unenforceable, as between the two attorneys, the agreements with Manheimer that she herself drafted is unavailing. Her failure to inform her clients of Manheimer's retention, while a serious ethical violation, does not allow her to avoid otherwise enforceable contracts under the circumstances of this case … . * * *

Here, the mediator and Golomb communicated in the days following the May 20 mediation session, with the mediator continuing to act as go-between. Ten days after the session, the mediator communicated the final $8 million offer, which Golomb accepted. Reading the agreement as a whole, the plain language of the agreement entitles Golomb to 12% of net attorneys' fees. Marin v Constitution Realty, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01019, CtApp 2-9-17

ATTORNEYS (FEES, ETHICAL VIOLATION CANNOT BE USED AS A SWORD TO AVOID PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEE, BECAUSE TRIAL PREPARATION NOT NECESSARY, LOWER ATTORNEY'S-FEE PERCENTAGE APPLIED)/CONTRACT LAW (ATTORNEY'S FEES, ETHICAL VIOLATION CANNOT BE USED AS A SWORD TO AVOID PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEE, BECAUSE TRIAL PREPARATION NOT NECESSARY, LOWER ATTORNEY'S-FEE PERCENTAGE APPLIED)

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CLAIM; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT WAS INTENDED TO BE EFFECTIVE RETROACTIVELY.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff, who was not wearing a harness, had fallen through a skylight. The anchor points for harnesses had not yet been installed. The employer’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the property owner’s third-party complaint seeking indemnification was, however, properly denied. The Workers’ Compensation Law allows suit only when the injury is grave (not so here) or where there is a written indemnification agreement. Here there was an indemnification agreement entered after the accident. There was a question of fact whether the agreement was intended to be effective retroactively:

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that he was not provided with necessary protection from the gravity-related risk of his work and that the absence of the necessary protection was a proximate cause of his injuries … .

… An employer may be held liable for contribution or indemnification only when its employee has sustained a grave injury as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Law or when there is a “written contract entered into prior to the accident or occurrence by which the employer had expressly agreed to contribution or indemnification of the claimant” … . The Workers’ Compensation Law does not bar indemnification or contribution pursuant to a written agreement that was entered into after the employee’s injury and which the parties agree will have retroactive effect … . “[I]ndemnity contracts are to be strictly construed to avoid reading into them duties which the parties did not intend to be assumed” … . Therefore, an indemnity contract will not be held to have retroactive effect “unless by its express words or necessary implication it clearly appears to be the parties’ intention to include past obligations” … . Cacanoski v 35 Cedar Place Assoc., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 00956, 2nd Dept 2-8-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CLAIM, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT WAS INTENDED TO BE EFFECTIVE RETROACTIVELY)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CLAIM, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT WAS INTENDED TO BE EFFECTIVE RETROACTIVELY)/CONTRACT LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT WAS INTENDED TO BE EFFECTIVE RETROACTIVELY)

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CORRIDOR FORMED BY LUMBER AND MATERIALS PILED ON EITHER SIDE WAS A PASSAGEWAY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, DEFENDANT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 241 (6).

The Second Department determined a two to three-foot wide corridor created by lumber and materials piled on either side was a “passageway” within the meaning to the industrial code. Plaintiff was injured when he tripped while carrying materials along the corridor. The Court of Claims properly found defendant liable under Labor Law 241 (6):

The claimant filed a claim pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) alleging a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1), which provides in relevant part that “[a]ll passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping.” …

“Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers” … . “In order to recover damages on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must establish the violation of an Industrial Code provision which sets forth specific safety standards” … . To establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff or a claimant must demonstrate that his injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the case … . Contributory and comparative negligence are valid defenses to a Labor Law § 241(6) claim … . Aragona v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00954, 2nd Dept 2-8-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (CORRIDOR FORMED BY LUMBER AND MATERIALS PILED ON EITHER SIDE WAS A PASSAGEWAY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, DEFENDANT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 241 (6))

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BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT CAUSE DEFENDANT TO LOSE THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION TO LIABILITY UNDER THE LABOR LAW.

The Second Department determined the defendant property owner was entitled to the homeowners’ exemption from liability under the Labor Law, despite the fact that the residence included an office used for defendant’s business:

Owners of one- or two-family dwellings are exempt from liability under Labor Law § 241(6) unless they directed or controlled the work being performed … . “The exception was enacted to protect those people who, lacking business sophistication, would not know or anticipate the need to obtain insurance to cover them against the absolute liability”… .

… [T]he use of a portion of the defendant’s residence for commercial purposes did not automatically cause him to lose the protection of the exemption. The presence of an office in the basement did not detract from the building’s primary use as a residence, and the defendant’s commercial activity was incidental thereto … .

… The defendant’s alleged discussion with the injured plaintiff about the scope of the project and the defendant’s request to install a shelf and support beam were insufficient to transform the defendant from a legitimately concerned homeowner into a de facto supervisor, because these acts, without any specific direction as to how the injured plaintiff was to accomplish his tasks, do not constitute direction or control over the manner or method of the injured plaintiff’s work … . Levy v Baumgarten, 2017 NY Slip Op 00963, 2nd Dept 2-8-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT CAUSE DEFENDANT TO LOSE THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION TO LIABILITY UNDER THE LABOR LAW)/HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION (LABOR LAW, BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT CAUSE DEFENDANT TO LOSE THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION TO LIABILITY UNDER THE LABOR LAW)

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MOTION FOR FINDINGS ALLOWING CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined Family Court should have granted the child’s motion for findings to allow him to petition for special immigrant juvenile status:

Pursuant to 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) … and 8 CFR 204.11, a special immigrant is a resident alien who, inter alia, is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent upon a juvenile court or legally committed to an individual appointed by a state or juvenile court. Additionally, for a juvenile to qualify for SIJS, a court must find that reunification of the juvenile with one or both of the juvenile’s parents is not viable due to parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under state law … , and that it would not be in the juvenile’s best interests to be returned to his or her previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence … .

Based upon our independent factual review, we find that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not a viable option due to parental abandonment … , and that it would not be in his best interests to return to India … . Matter of Varinder S. v Satwinder S., 2017 NY Slip Op 00987, 2nd Dept 2-8-17

 

FAMILY LAW (MOTION FOR FINDINGS ALLOWING CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/IMMIGRATION LAW  (MOTION FOR FINDINGS ALLOWING CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (MOTION FOR FINDINGS ALLOWING CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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