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FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED.

The Second Department determined the four-month statute of limitations for bringing an Article 78 action starts when petitioner’s attorney is notified of the challenged determination, not when the petitioner is notified:

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the four-month statute of limitations did not begin to run when the petitioner was personally served with a copy of the respondents’ letter notifying him that his employment had been terminated. At that time, the respondents were on notice that the petitioner had retained counsel to represent him in connection with the disciplinary charges. ” [B]asic procedural dictates and . . . fundamental policy considerations . . . require that once counsel has appeared in a matter a Statute of Limitations or time requirement cannot begin to run unless that counsel is served with the determination or the order or judgment sought to be reviewed'” … . Under the circumstances of this case, the respondents were required to serve a copy of the letter on the petitioner’s counsel in order for the statute of limitations to commence running … . Matter of Munroe v Ponte, 2017 NY Slip Op 02041, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (ARTICLE 78, FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)/ARTICLE 78 (FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)

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DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A HOLE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The First Department determined the defendant owner (In LIne) and restaurant manager (Spanburgh) did not demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff, a restaurant patron, was injured when he stepped in a hole in the front lawn of the property while playing a game (apparently sanctioned by the restaurant):

Defendants failed to establish that In Line did not create the hole in its front lawn by submitting Spanburgh’s deposition testimony and affidavit, because Spanburgh did not state that the lawn was inspected after it was last maintained by the outside company In Line had hired to mow the grass. They also failed to satisfy their initial burden to show that In Line lacked actual notice of the hole in its lawn, because they submitted no evidence that its employees and the outside company had received no complaints about the defect prior to the incident and that there were no similar accidents at the subject location … . The fact that Spanburgh testified and averred that he did not receive any complaints about the condition of the lawn does not establish that In Line lacked actual notice, because he did not state that he was working when the accident happened.

Defendants also failed to satisfy their initial burden to show that In Line lacked constructive notice of the hole in its lawn, because Spanburgh’s testimony and averment that he would inspect the entire premises every time the restaurant was open is insufficient to establish when the lawn was last checked before the accident … . Clarkin v In Line Rest. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 02004, 1st Dept 3-21-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A HOLE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL)/SLIP AND FALL (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A HOLE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL)/NOTICE (SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A HOLE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL)

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NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION BUILDING CONSTRUCTED IN 1974 DID NOT HAVE LEAD PAINT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The First Department determined the New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA’s) motion for summary judgment in this lead-paint poisoning case was properly denied. The NYCHA argued that the building was constructed in 1974 and lead paint was banned in 1960:

Although NYCHA relies on its own testing that was negative for lead paint, DOH’s [Department of Health’s] lead testing came back positive. NYCHA’s arguments that these were false positives due to the manner in which, and location from where, the samples were taken is insufficient to disregard them as a matter of law. * * *

Nor did NYCHA prove as a matter of law, that it had no actual or constructive notice of the existence of lead paint in the building. Pursuant to the City’s Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act (Local Law 1 of 2004), lead-based paint is presumed to exist in a multiple dwelling unit if the building was built before 1960. Where, as here, the building is built between 1960 and 1978, the presumption will apply only if the owner knows that there is lead-based paint, and a child under the age of six lives in the apartment. Although in a pre-1960 building, paint is presumed to contain lead, the opposite is not true; there is no presumption that paint in a building constructed after 1960 is not lead-based. Given plaintiff’s claim, that NYCHA maintains the premises and assumed the duty to have the apartments painted, the absence of any evidence concerning the history of painting in the subject apartments is insufficient for the court to rule out, as a matter of law, notice. Dakota Jade T. v New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 01987, 1st Dept 3-21-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (LEAD PAINT, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION BUILDING CONSTRUCTED IN 1974 DID NOT HAVE LEAD PAINT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/MUNICIPAL LAW  (LEAD PAINT, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION BUILDING CONSTRUCTED IN 1974 DID NOT HAVE LEAD PAINT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/LEAD PAINT (NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION BUILDING CONSTRUCTED IN 1974 DID NOT HAVE LEAD PAINT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)

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EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS, QUESTION OF FACT RAISED WHETHER SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS CREATED OR EXACERBATED THE DANGEROUS ICY CONDITION.

The First Department determined defendants’ summary judgment motion in this slip and fall case was properly denied. Although there was a snow storm in progress at the time of the fall, there was evidence plaintiff slipped on a sheet of ice which, because the temperature was well below freezing, could not have formed during the storm:

Here, as plaintiffs concede, there was a storm in progress at the time of the accident. Thus, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether Sterling created or exacerbated the hazardous condition through its snow removal activities. Plaintiffs have met that burden, as they have both testified that they saw an ice patch at the scene of the accident. * * * This evidence supports plaintiffs’ argument that ice could not have formed after the snowclearing efforts by [defendant’s] employees. Accordingly, an issue of fact was raised as to whether [defendant’s] actions created or exacerbated a hazardous condition by employing a snowblower to remove snow without taking further steps to de-ice the sidewalk … . Baumann v Dawn Liquors, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01986, 1st Dept 3-21-17

NEGLIGENCE (EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS, QUESTION OF FACT RAISED WHETHER SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS CREATED OR EXACERBATED THE DANGEROUS ICY CONDITION)/SLIP AND FALL (EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS, QUESTION OF FACT RAISED WHETHER SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS CREATED OR EXACERBATED THE DANGEROUS ICY CONDITION)/STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE (EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS, QUESTION OF FACT RAISED WHETHER SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS CREATED OR EXACERBATED THE DANGEROUS ICY CONDITION)/SIDEWALKS (EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS, QUESTION OF FACT RAISED WHETHER SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS CREATED OR EXACERBATED THE DANGEROUS ICY CONDITION)

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PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A LADDER DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE.

The First Department determined plaintiff’s inability to state exactly how the accident happened did not warrant summary judgment. Circumstantial evidence established that the bottom of plaintiff’s ladder slid out from under him:

“A plaintiff’s inability to testify exactly as to how an accident occurred does not require dismissal where negligence and causation can be established with circumstantial evidence” … . Plaintiff established his entitlement to partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, despite his admitted inability to remember the specifics of the accident, through the submission of a workers’ compensation report and the statement of defendant … , both of which established that the accident occurred when the bottom of the ladder from which plaintiff was descending suddenly slipped out from under him, causing him to fall to the ground … . Weicht v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01995, 1st Dept 3-21-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A LADDER DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE)/EVIDENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A LADDER DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE)/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A LADDER DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSE)

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FIRST DEPT REDUCED DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK LEVEL FROM THREE TO TWO, BASED PRIMARILY UPON DEFENDANT’S USE OF EDUCATIONAL AND REHABILITATIVE RESOURCES WHILE IN PRISON.

The First Department took the unusual step of reducing defendant’s SORA risk level from three to two. Defendant committed a heinous rape 30 years ago when he was using drugs and alcohol. While in prison defendant earned two bachelor degrees and completed many therapeutic programs:

The Court of Appeals has enunciated a three-step process for determining whether to depart downward from a defendant’s presumptive risk level … . First, a court must decide whether the proffered mitigating circumstance or circumstances are “of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into account by the guidelines” … . Second, a court must determine whether the defendant seeking a downward departure has proven the existence of these alleged mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence … . If the defendant surmounts these first two steps, a court must then exercise its discretion and determine at the final third step, “whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure” …. .

Here, we find that, under this three-step analysis, a departure to level two is warranted. Initially, we note that defendant has met his burden of proving the existence of mitigating circumstances unaccounted for in the Guidelines by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant’s remarkable rehabilitation and his pain and mobility problems constitute, in this case, the sort of “special circumstances” for which a downward departure is appropriate … . Moreover, defendant supported his application with a number of exhibits, including his degrees, his medical records, and his letters of recommendation. People v Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 01988, 1st Dept 3-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FIRST DEPARTMENT REDUCED DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK LEVEL FROM THREE TO TWO, BASED PRIMARILY UPON DEFENDANT’S USE OF EDUCATIONAL AND REHABILITATIVE RESOURCES WHILE IN PRISON)/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (FIRST DEPARTMENT REDUCED DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK LEVEL FROM THREE TO TWO, BASED PRIMARILY UPON DEFENDANT’S USE OF EDUCATIONAL AND REHABILITATIVE RESOURCES WHILE IN PRISON)

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TRIVIAL DEFECT IN SIDEWALK NOT ACTIONABLE, DESPITE ABSENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BROAD INDEMNFICATION CLAUSE MANDATED PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT’S COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTION.

The First Department determined the sidewalk defect was trivial and not actionable but the costs associated with defending the action were recoverable under the broad language of an indemnification clause (despite the absence of negligence):

Plaintiff’s description of the alleged defect that caused her fall as an “uneven spot” that “wasn’t as level as the other side” of a “little ridge” of concrete in the ground, without more, establishes that the alleged defect was trivial and nonactionable … . Moreover, defendants established that they had no notice of the alleged defect … . …

The indemnification provision in Montesano’s contract was … broad and required Montesano to indemnify defendants for liability, damage, etc., “resulting from, arising out of or occurring in connection with the execution of the Work,” including attorneys’ fees. Thus, although there was no negligence here, to the extent defendants incurred costs connected with Montesano’s execution of its work, which included constructing/resurfacing roads and sidewalks on this shopping center renovation project, Montesano is required to indemnify defendants. Robinson v Brooks Shopping Ctrs., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01972 1st Dept 3-16-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (TRIVIAL DEFECT IN SIDEWALK NOT ACTIONABLE, DESPITE ABSENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BROAD INDEMNFICATION CLAUSE MANDATED PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT’S COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTION)/CONTRACT LAW (INDEMNFICATION CLAUSE, TRIVIAL DEFECT IN SIDEWALK NOT ACTIONABLE, DESPITE ABSENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BROAD INDEMNFICATION CLAUSE MANDATED PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT’S COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTION)/INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE TRIVIAL DEFECT IN SIDEWALK NOT ACTIONABLE, DESPITE ABSENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BROAD INDEMNFICATION CLAUSE MANDATED PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT’S COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTION)/SLIP AND FALL (TRIVIAL DEFECT IN SIDEWALK NOT ACTIONABLE, DESPITE ABSENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BROAD INDEMNFICATION CLAUSE MANDATED PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT’S COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTION)/TRIVIAL DEFECT (SLIP AND FALL, TRIVIAL DEFECT IN SIDEWALK NOT ACTIONABLE, DESPITE ABSENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BROAD INDEMNFICATION CLAUSE MANDATED PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT’S COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTION)

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ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE.

The First Department determined a police officer was properly allowed to testify the robbery victim identified defendant at a showup because the victim’s statement was an excited utterance:

At trial, the court properly permitted a police officer to testify that the victim of the … robbery identified defendant at a showup. This testimony was admissible, notwithstanding the general rule against third-party bolstering … , because the victim’s declaration qualified as an excited utterance. Shortly after the victim was robbed at gunpoint in his taxicab, he called 911 and was brought in a police vehicle to defendant, who was being detained. The victim immediately yelled, “[O]h my God[!] . . . [I]t is the same guy . . . . Thank God you caught him[!]” Under the circumstances, this identification was made “under the stress of excitement caused by an external event, and [was] not the product of studied reflection and possible fabrication” … . People v Everette, 2017 NY Slip Op 01962, 1st Dept 3-16-17

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/BOLSTERING (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/EXCITED UTTERANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/INDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)

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INSURANCE BROKER ENGAGED IN UNTRUSTWORTHY CONDUCT STEMMING FROM A MISLEADING AD FOR VIATICAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND WAS PROPERLY FINED.

The Third Department determined petitioner, a licensed insurance agent/broker, had engaged in untrustworthy conduct and was properly fined. Petitioner sold so-called viatical settlement agreements involving the purchase of interests in life insurance policies of elderly and terminally ill persons. Whether the purchased interests would return a profit depended on whether the amounts paid for the policies and premiums was less than the amount the policies paid out upon death. Petitioner took out an ad which was deemed misleading and there was evidence petitioner did not inform purchasers of the risks:

Insurance Law article 21 tasks respondent’s superintendent with, among other things, the dual responsibility of “ensuring that licenses are issued only to trustworthy and competent [insurance] producers” … and disciplining any insurance producer who demonstrates untrustworthiness or incompetence … . These statutory mandates are designed “to protect the public by requiring and maintaining professional standards of conduct on the part of all insurance brokers acting as such within this state” … . * * *

… [W]e agree with respondent’s determination that the subject advertisement was misleading. As a starting point, the language at issue indeed could be read as suggesting that an investor would receive a fixed rate of return at the end of a predetermined period of time — a representation that was not universally true, as the timing of the payout was entirely dependent upon when the viator died; more to the point, the promised fixed rate of return could effectively be diminished if the viator exceeded his or her life expectancy, i.e., did not die within the “plan” period, and the investor’s profit might be eliminated altogether if he or she was required to assume responsibility for paying the premiums due.  * * *

We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the finding that respondent failed to fully disclose the risks of viatical settlements to some of his clients. … [R]espondent’s finding that petitioner acted in an untrustworthy manner in this regard stems from petitioner’s failure to “sufficiently disclose the risks in his oral presentations to some of his clients.” Without recounting the extensive testimony adduced on this point, suffice it to say that the record contains conflicting evidence as to what petitioner did or did not say to investors regarding the nature and risks of viatical settlements. Matter of Nichols v New York State Dept. of Fin. Servs., 2017 NY Slip Op 01944m 3rd Dept 3-16-17

INSURANCE LAW (INSURANCE BROKER ENGAGED IN UNTRUSTWORTHY CONDUCT STEMMING FROM A MISLEADING AD AND WAS PROPERLY FINED)/UNTRUSTWORTHY CONDUCT (INSURANCE LAW, INSURANCE BROKER ENGAGED IN UNTRUSTWORTHY CONDUCT STEMMING FROM A MISLEADING AD AND WAS PROPERLY FINED)/VIATICAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS (INSURANCE LAW, INSURANCE BROKER ENGAGED IN UNTRUSTWORTHY CONDUCT STEMMING FROM A MISLEADING AD AND WAS PROPERLY FINED)

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FAILURE TO PRODUCE A COPY OF THE MAIL WATCH AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED THAT THE DETERMINATION BE ANNULLED AND EXPUNGED.

The Third Department determined the respondent did not demonstrate the mail watch which led to the charges against petitioner was properly authorized. The related evidence could not be the basis for the determination, which was annulled and expunged:

… [P]etitioner requested a copy of the mail watch authorization four times during the course of the hearing, but it was never produced and is not part of the record. Although the senior investigator testified that the mail watch was authorized by the Superintendent of the facility, the reason for its issuance and the specific facts underlying it were never disclosed and are not apparent from the record. Under these circumstances, we find that authorization for the mail watch was not established in accordance with the requirements of 7 NYCRR 720.3 (e) (1) … . Inasmuch as correspondence obtained through the unlawful mail watch was instrumental in finding petitioner guilty of solicitation and violating facility correspondence procedures, that part of the determination must ,,, be annulled … . Matter of Wilson v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2017 NY Slip Op 01921, 3rd Dept 3-16-17

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (FAILURE TO PRODUCE A COPY OF THE MAIL WATCH AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED THAT THE DETERMINATION BE ANNULLED AND EXPUNGED)/MAIL WATCH AUTHORIZATION (INMATE DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS, FAILURE TO PRODUCE A COPY OF THE MAIL WATCH AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED THAT THE DETERMINATION BE ANNULLED AND EXPUNGED)

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