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AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, found that the objection to a designating petition on the ground that 135 of the signers could not vote in the relevant district was not untimely. Because the designating petition did not have enough signers, it was invalid:

The Supreme Court denied the petition, inter alia, to invalidate the designating petition and dismissed the proceeding on the ground that the specifications of objections of the aggrieved candidate were served six days beyond the statutory deadline. The petitioners appeal.

The Supreme Court may entertain specific objections to signatures on a designating petition that were not asserted before a board of elections to the extent the respondent was given adequate notice of which signatures on his or her designating petition are being challenged and the grounds thereof … . Here, the court erred in concluding that the specifications of objections of the aggrieved candidate were untimely due to their being served six days beyond the statutory deadline. An aggrieved candidate is not bound by the strict time constraints governing the filing of objections set forth in Election Law § 6-154(2) … . The petition to invalidate the designating petition incorporated the objections and specifications of objections filed with the Board, and the respondent was served with the aggrieved candidate’s specifications of objections on the distinct ground she raised as to the signatures at issue several days before the matter was briefed and heard. As such, the respondent had adequate notice of the grounds for objecting to the signatures at issue to enable him to prepare his defense …. . Matter of Lancaster v Nicolas, 2017 NY Slip Op 06275, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

ELECTION LAW (AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/DESIGNATING PETITIONS  (AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/OBJECTIONS (ELECTION LAW, DESIGNATING PETITIONS, AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the dentist who provided an affidavit for plaintiff was an expert, the expert raised a question of fact whether defendant departed from the accepted standard of care, and a question of fact was raised about whether plaintiff gave informed consent to the procedure. The court noted that plaintiff’s expert’s qualifications were not questioned in defendant’s reply papers. Therefore, the court should not have raised the issue on its own and used the issue to support granting  summary judgment to the defendant. With regard to informed consent, the court wrote:

“A cause of action predicated on a lack of informed consent is meant to redress a failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical . . . practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation”… .. To establish a cause of action to recover damages for malpractice based on lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the person providing the professional treatment failed to disclose alternatives thereto and failed to inform the patient of reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the treatment, and the alternatives, that a reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed in the same circumstances, (2) that a reasonably prudent patient in the same position would not have undergone the treatment if he or she had been fully informed, and (3) that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury … .

Here, the defendant failed to submit proof sufficient to establish, prima facie, that he had informed the plaintiff of the reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the treatment, and, in any event, that a reasonably prudent patient in the same position would have undergone the treatment if he or she had been fully informed … . Dyckes v Stabile, 2017 NY Slip Op 06252, Second Dept 8-23-17

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NEGLIGENCE (DENTAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DENTAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT))/DENTAL MALPRACTICE (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT))/EXPERT OPINION  (DENTAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT))/INFORMED CONSENT (DENTAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ISSUES NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, DENTAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT  (ISSUES NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, DENTAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE  (DENTAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED, EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED AND THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (SECOND DEPT))

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STATE HAS NO DUTY TO WARN SWIMMERS OF NATURAL CONDITIONS OF THE OCEAN FLOOR, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE DIVING INTO WAVES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the state’s motion for summary judgment in this personal injury action was properly granted. Claimant alleged he suffered a head injury when diving into waves at a state park beach. Apparently claimant’s head hit the ocean floor:

Governmental entities owe a duty to ” act as a reasonable [person] in maintaining [their] property in a reasonably safe condition'” … . “The duty goes beyond the mere maintenance of the physical condition of the park” … , as there is also a “recognized duty of general supervision” … . The degree of general supervision must be “adequate” … .

Here, in support of its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that it furnished a sufficient number of lifeguards, that those lifeguards were experienced and competent, and that they reacted to the situation in accordance with proper procedure … . Furthermore, the defendant had no duty to warn swimmers of threats arising from the existence of natural, transitory conditions of the ocean floor … . Courtney v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 06250, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SWIMMERS, STATE HAS NO DUTY TO WARN SWIMMERS OF NATURAL CONDITIONS OF THE OCEAN FLOOR, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE DIVING INTO WAVES (SECOND DEPT))/COURT OF CLAIMS (STATE BEACHES, SWIMMERS, STATE HAS NO DUTY TO WARN SWIMMERS OF NATURAL CONDITIONS OF THE OCEAN FLOOR, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE DIVING INTO WAVES (SECOND DEPT))/SWIMMERS (STATE BEACHES, STATE HAS NO DUTY TO WARN SWIMMERS OF NATURAL CONDITIONS OF THE OCEAN FLOOR, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE DIVING INTO WAVES (SECOND DEPT))/STATE PARKS  (STATE BEACHES, STATE HAS NO DUTY TO WARN SWIMMERS OF NATURAL CONDITIONS OF THE OCEAN FLOOR, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE DIVING INTO WAVES (SECOND DEPT))

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INSUFFICIENT WEIGHT BEARING CAPACITY OF SHEETROCK FORMING THE ATTIC FLOOR WAS NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department. reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant homeowners’ motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. Plaintiff, who was hired to clean defendants’ attic, was injured when she stepped on sheetrock and fell through:

Landowners have a duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition … ‘ However, there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous … . “While the issue of whether a hazard is . . . open and obvious is generally fact-specific and thus a jury question, a court may determine that a risk was open and obvious as a matter of law when the established facts compel that conclusion, and may do so on the basis of clear and undisputed evidence” … .

Here, the homeowners failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment a matter of law, as they failed to establish that the insufficient weight-bearing capacity of the sheetrock ceiling was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous as a matter of law … . Gallardo v Gilbert, 2017 NY Slip Op 06256, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (INSUFFICIENT WEIGHT BEARING CAPACITY OF SHEETROCK FORMING THE ATTIC FLOOR WAS NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT))/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (NEGLIGENCE, INSUFFICIENT WEIGHT BEARING CAPACITY OF SHEETROCK FORMING THE ATTIC FLOOR WAS NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT))

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SNOW AND ICE ON FRONT STEPS WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, NO DUTY TO WARN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant homeowners’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was properly granted. Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice and snow which was on defendants’ front steps. The defendants demonstrated the storm in progress rule applied and the condition was open and obvious:

… [T]he defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence, including climatological data, demonstrating that they did not have a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition under the storm in progress rule … . Similarly, the defendants did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff of the open and obvious condition on the front step … . De Chica v Saldana, 2017 NY Slip Op 06251, Second Dept 8-23-17

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, SNOW AND ICE ON FRONT STEPS WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, NO DUTY TO WARN (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (SNOW AND ICE ON FRONT STEPS WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, NO DUTY TO WARN (SECOND DEPT))/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (SLIP AND FALL, SNOW AND ICE ON FRONT STEPS WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, NO DUTY TO WARN (SECOND DEPT))/WARN, DUTY TO (SLIP AND FALL, SNOW AND ICE ON FRONT STEPS WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, NO DUTY TO WARN (SECOND DEPT))

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SECOND MECHANIC’S LIEN MAY BE FILED TO CORRECT THE NAMING OF THE WRONG CONTRACTOR IN THE FIRST LIEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court’s discharge of a mechanic’s lien, noted that the filing of a second mechanic’s lien to correct a mistake (i.e., naming the wrong party) would be timely as long as the statute of limitations had not run at the time the second lien was filed. In this case, the general contractor’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied because ITS motion papers did not indicate when the statute of limitations began to run:

A public improvement mechanic’s lien may be filed “[a]t any time before the construction or demolition of a public improvement is completed and accepted by the . . . public corporation, and within thirty days after such completion and acceptance” (Lien Law § 12). “Such authority would seem to include the right to file a second lien within the time so provided, at least to cure an irregularity in a lien first filed, or to reassert a lien when the prior one has been lost by delay in its enforcement” … . ” The significant date in section 12 of the Lien Law is the completion and acceptance by the public corporation. The requirement is in the conjunctive and both branches must be met . . . before the time starts running'” … . “Both these requirements, completion and acceptance, are usually questions of fact” … . Munoz Trucking Corp. v Darcon Constr., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06283, Second Dept 8-23-17

LIEN LAW (MECHANIC’S LIEN, SECOND MECHANIC’S LIEN MAY BE FILED TO CORRECT THE NAMING OF THE WRONG CONTRACTOR IN THE FIRST LIEN (SECOND DEPT))/MECHANIC’S LIEN ( SECOND MECHANIC’S LIEN MAY BE FILED TO CORRECT THE NAMING OF THE WRONG CONTRACTOR IN THE FIRST LIEN (SECOND DEPT))

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MISTAKEN COMMENCEMENT DATE IN A LEASE IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RESCISSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a mistaken start-date in the lease was a sufficient ground for rescission:

Rescission “rests upon the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself [or herself] unjustly at the expense of another” … , and is invoked “where the parties can be substantially restored to their status quo ante positions” … . The remedy of rescission may be granted where, as here, a mistake existed at the time the contract was entered into if “the mistake is so material that . . . it goes to the foundation of the agreement”… .

Here, the landlord’s principal admitted at trial that a mistake was made regarding the commencement date of the parties’ lease. Contrary to the landlord’s contention, however, the mistake as to the commencement date related to a material term of the lease … , and substantially defeated the purpose of the lease. K.A.M.M. Group, LLC v 161 Lafayette Realty, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06260, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

LANDLORD-TENANT (LEASE, MISTAKEN COMMENCEMENT DATE IN A LEASE IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RESCISSION (SECOND DEPT))/LEASE (MISTAKEN COMMENCEMENT DATE IN A LEASE IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RESCISSION (SECOND DEPT))/RESCISSION (LEASE, MISTAKEN COMMENCEMENT DATE IN A LEASE IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR RESCISSION (SECOND DEPT))

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BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. The bank did not demonstrate compliance with statutory notice requirements:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 … . In support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the affidavit of Rodolfo Arias, its vice president of loan documentation, along with a copy of a 90-day notice to the defendants dated May 9, 2010, and Proof of Filing Statements from the New York State Department of Financial Services, demonstrating that the plaintiff filed the information required by RPAPL 1306. Arias stated in his affidavit that the letter dated May 9, 2010, was forwarded to the defendants “by regular and certified mail,” and annexed to his affidavit a copy of the letter. The letter contained a bar code with a 20-digit number below it, but no language indicating that a mailing was done by first-class or certified mail, or even that a mailing was done by the U.S. Postal Service… . While mailing may be proved by documents meeting the requirements of the business records exception to the rule against hearsay, Arias did not make the requisite showing that he was “familiar with the plaintiff’s mailing practices and procedures, and therefore did not establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed” … . The plaintiff’s submission of the Proof of Filing Statements pursuant to RPAPL 1306 was also unavailing. While the statements constituted some proof that a mailing was done, they contained no information indicating that the mailing was done by both registered or certified mail and first-class mail in accordance with RPAPL 1304 … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Lewczuk, 2017 NY Slip Op 06318, Second Dept 8-23-17

FORECLOSURE (BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))

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PETITIONERS CLOSE TO THE PROPOSED GAS STATION HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE BOARD’S SEQRA RULING APPROVING CONSTRUCTION, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE BOARD’S APPROVAL WAS IMPROPER UNDER SEQRA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined one of the petitioners did not have standing to contest the board’s State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) ruling because he lived more that 2000 feet from the proposed gas station. The other petitioners, whose businesses were across the street from the proposed gas station, had standing. The Second Department held that the board had not taken the required “hard look” at the proposal to add a gas station with 16 pumps to the project which had been approved:

… [T]he Supreme Court properly concluded that the Planning Board failed to comply with the substantive requirements of SEQRA in determining that a second SEIS (Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement] was not required prior to its approval of the site plan. As is relevant to this appeal, a lead agency may require a SEIS, “limited to the specific significant adverse environmental impacts not addressed or inadequately addressed in the EIS that arise from . . . changes proposed for the project” (6 NYCRR 617.9[a][7][i]). “In making this fact-intensive determination, the lead agency has discretion to weigh and evaluate the credibility of reports and comments submitted to it and must assess environmental concerns in conjunction with other economic and social planning goals”… .

Although a lead agency’s determination whether to require a SEIS, or a second SEIS, is discretionary … , the lead agency must “consider[ ] the environmental issues requiring permits” and must make “an independent judgment that they would not create significant environmental impact” … . Here, the changes proposed for the project after the issuance of the 2009 findings statement included the construction of a large convenience store with 16 gas pumps. …

Under these circumstances, the Planning Board failed to take the requisite hard look at the project change adding the gas station, and did not make a reasoned elaboration of its basis for determining that a second SEIS was not necessary to address that change … . Matter of Green Earth Farms Rockland, LLC v Town of Haverstraw Planning Bd., 2017 NY Slip Op 06273, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (PETITIONERS CLOSE TO THE PROPOSED GAS STATION HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE TOWN BOARD’S SEQRA RULING APPROVING CONSTRUCTION, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE TOWN BOARD’S APPROVAL WAS IMPROPER UNDER SEQRA (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, PETITIONERS CLOSE TO THE PROPOSED GAS STATION HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE TOWN BOARD’S SEQRA RULING APPROVING CONSTRUCTION, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE TOWN BOARD’S APPROVAL WAS IMPROPER UNDER SEQRA (SECOND DEPT))/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (PETITIONERS CLOSE TO THE PROPOSED GAS STATION HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE TOWN BOARD’S SEQRA RULING APPROVING CONSTRUCTION, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE TOWN BOARD’S APPROVAL WAS IMPROPER UNDER SEQRA (SECOND DEPT))/STANDING, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, (PETITIONERS CLOSE TO THE PROPOSED GAS STATION HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE TOWN BOARD’S SEQRA RULING APPROVING CONSTRUCTION (SECOND DEPT))

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FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC VIOLATION OF THE ELECTION LAW OR PARTY RULE REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION, JUDICIAL INTERVENTION NOT WARRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that petitioner, who sought to have the designating petition of a candidate for town justice declared invalid, did not allege the violation of the Election Law or a party rule. Therefore petitioner was not entitled to judicial intervention:

… [P]etitioner alleges that, at a meeting in April 2017, respondent Town of Greece Republican Committee (Town Committee) endorsed him to be a candidate for the office of Town of Greece Justice, but [*2]a designating petition was prepared that named Granville in place of him, despite the fact that Granville had not been endorsed or even nominated for that office at that meeting. Petitioner alleges that the Town Committee violated its own rules and the rules of respondent Monroe County Republican Committee in failing to circulate a designating petition naming him for the office….

… Petitioner, a member of the Republican Party, “had a bona fide claim” to be the Republican Party’s candidate for the office in question and has standing to challenge the Party’s compliance with its own rules … .

… Judicial intervention is warranted only upon ” a clear showing that a party or its leaders have violated th[e] [Election Law] or the party’s own rules adopted in accordance with law, or otherwise violat[ed] the rights of party members or the electorate’ ” … . Here, petitioner failed to identify any specific provision of the Election Law or rule of the Republican Party that was allegedly violated. Matter of Nitti v Reilich, 2017 NY Slip Op 06327, Fourth Dept 8-23-17

 

ELECTION LAW (FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC VIOLATION OF THE ELECTION LAW OR PARTY RULE REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION, JUDICIAL INTERVENTION NOT WARRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/JUDICIAL INTERVENTION (ELECTION LAW, FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC VIOLATION OF THE ELECTION LAW OR PARTY RULE REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION, JUDICIAL INTERVENTION NOT WARRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

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