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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH A LADDER AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO CLIMB UP THE SIDE OF A BRIDGE FROM WHICH HE FELL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, COMPARATIVE FAULT IS NOT A DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was properly granted summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff alleged he was not provided with a ladder and was instructed to climb up the side of a bridge, from which he fell. The defendants’ claim that plaintiff was at fault because of his size is of no consequence because comparative fault is not a defense:

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Plaintiff made a prima facie showing that Labor Law § 240(1) was violated, and that the violation was a proximate cause of his injury … . He testified that onsite supervisors gave him a work assignment requiring him to work from the top of a sidewalk bridge, thereby exposing him to elevation-related risks covered under Labor Law § 240(1). He further stated that he was not provided with a ladder or any other safety device; was instructed to access the top of the bridge by climbing up its side; and that, while attempting to do so, he lost his grip, slipped, and fell to the ground. * * *

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Defendants’ recalcitrant worker defense fails, since there is no indication that they instructed plaintiff to use a ladder or informed him that a ladder or other safety device was located at the sidewalk bridge … .

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Defendants’ contention that plaintiff fell from the sidewalk bridge as a result of his “carelessness” and “bad decisions,” and because of his size, is unavailing. Any comparative negligence by plaintiff is not a defense to his Labor Law § 240(1) claim … . Cardona v New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 06620, First Dept 9-26-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH A LADDER AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO CLIMB UP THE SIDE OF A BRIDGE FROM WHICH HE FELL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, COMPARATIVE FAULT IS NOT A DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT))

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INSURER’S ATTORNEY MUST BE DEPOSED TO DETERMINE HIS ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF A FIRE ON PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY AND THE DENIAL OF COVERAGE, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPOSITION WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THE ATTORNEY’S FILES ARE DISCOVERABLE BY THE PLAINTIFFS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined an attorney who worked for defendant insurer must be deposed to ascertain his role in an investigation of a fire at plaintiffs’ property and the denial of coverage. Based on the deposition, Supreme Court will address what portions of the insurer’s files, including the attorney’s, are discoverable by plaintiffs:

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“[T]he CPLR establishes three categories of protected materials, also supported by policy considerations: privileged matter, absolutely immune from discovery (CPLR 3101[b]); attorney’s work product, also absolutely immune (CPLR 3101[c]); and trial preparation materials, which are subject to disclosure only on a showing of substantial need and undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means CPLR 3101 [d][2]” … . “[I]n order for attorney-client communications to be privileged, the document must be primarily or predominantly a communication of a legal character” … . …

“Reports of insurance investigators or adjusters, prepared during the processing of a claim, are discoverable as made in the regular course of the insurance company’s business” … . “Furthermore, attorney work product applies only to documents prepared by counsel acting as such, and to materials uniquely the product of a lawyer’s learning and professional skills, such as those reflecting an attorney’s legal research, analysis, conclusions, legal theory or strategy” … . “Documents prepared in the ordinary course of an insurance company’s investigation to determine whether to accept or reject coverage and to evaluate the extent of a claimant’s loss are not privileged and are, therefore, discoverable. In addition, such documents do not become privileged merely because an investigation was conducted by an attorney” … . Venture v Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 06594, First Dept 9-26-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (INSURER’S ATTORNEY MUST BE DEPOSED TO DETERMINE HIS ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF A FIRE ON PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY AND THE DENIAL OF COVERAGE, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPOSITION WILL INFORM WHETHER THE ATTORNEY’S FILES ARE DISCOVERABLE BY THE PLAINTIFFS (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS  (INSURER’S ATTORNEY MUST BE DEPOSED TO DETERMINE HIS ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF A FIRE ON PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY AND THE DENIAL OF COVERAGE, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPOSITION WILL INFORM WHETHER THE ATTORNEY’S FILES ARE DISCOVERABLE BY THE PLAINTIFFS (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISCOVERY, ATTORNEYS, INSURER’S ATTORNEY MUST BE DEPOSED TO DETERMINE HIS ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF A FIRE ON PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY AND THE DENIAL OF COVERAGE, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPOSITION WILL INFORM WHETHER THE ATTORNEY’S FILES ARE DISCOVERABLE BY THE PLAINTIFFS (FIRST DEPT))/DISCOVERY (INSURANCE LAW, ATTORNEYS, (INSURER’S ATTORNEY MUST BE DEPOSED TO DETERMINE HIS ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF A FIRE ON PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY AND THE DENIAL OF COVERAGE, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPOSITION WILL INFORM WHETHER THE ATTORNEY’S FILES ARE DISCOVERABLE BY THE PLAINTIFFS (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in an extensive opinion by Justice Friedman, determined plaintiff’s age discrimination and breach of contract causes of action should be dismissed. Plaintiff’s position at a medical school was eliminated as part of a phasing out of her department and her age was not demonstrated to be a factor in the decision-making process. In addition, the breach of contract cause of action was based on a provision in the faculty handbook which did not apply to plaintiff:

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In this action for age discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) … and for breach of contract, plaintiff, a former member of the radiology department of defendant medical school and hospital, challenges defendant’s decision not to renew her employment at the expiration of the term of her last appointment. Although Supreme Court assumed (as do we) that plaintiff carried her “de minimis” burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination … , the court correctly determined that plaintiff, in response to defendant’s evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action, failed to present any evidence raising a triable issue as to whether bias against employees of her age played a role in that decision … .

… [D]efendant established that the non-specialized section of the radiology department in which plaintiff worked, which produced no research, was phased out as part of a restructuring of the department, at a time of financial constraint, to achieve greater focus on the specialized, research-producing sections of the department. Defendant further established that, as part of this restructuring, it retained three physicians from plaintiff’s section, each of whom was of approximately the same age as plaintiff (60), and reassigned them to specialized departments. Plaintiff, however, was reasonably deemed to lack the specialized expertise and the proclivity for research that defendant deemed necessary to maintain its status as a top-tier academic radiology department. Not only did plaintiff fail to present any evidence casting doubt on this explanation, she failed to present any evidence, either direct or circumstantial, suggesting that bias against employees of her age was even a partial motive for the ending of her employment. Hamburg v New York Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 2017 NY Slip Op 06635, First Dept 9-26-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/AGE DISCRIMINATION (PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))

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JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s arson second conviction, determined the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense of arson fourth:

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The relevant difference between these crimes in this case is that second-degree arson involves intentionally damaging a building by starting a fire, while fourth-degree arson involves recklessly damaging a building by intentionally starting a fire … . Viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, there was a reasonable view of the evidence that he did not intend to damage his apartment, or any other part of the building, by setting a fire to a video game console, and that his sole object in doing so was to kill himself through smoke inhalation. It cannot be said that the only interpretation of defendant’s actions was that he intended to damage the building by fire. Although a natural and probable consequence of setting the fire was that the fire would damage the building, this did not conclusively establish such an intent, which was for the jury to decide … . On these facts, the jury could have found that, rather than actually intending to cause damage, defendant was “aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [damage would] occur” … . People v Acevedo, 2017 NY Slip Op 06626, First Dept 9-26-17

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, ARSON, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE (ARSON, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/ARSON (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))

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FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO EXPRESSED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the for cause challenge to a jury should have been granted. The juror exhibited a bias in favor of the credibility of police officers:

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The court should have granted defendant’s challenge for cause to a prospective juror, a police officer who stated on voir dire that he believed that the testimony of police witnesses would be accurate, except insofar as they were relaying inaccurate information provided by a victim or other witness. Pressed by defense counsel on whether he thought it was possible for a police witness to lie, exaggerate, or be mistaken, the prospective juror allowed that there was “a little room” for this and stated that he “suppose[d]” it was possible.

“[A] prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial” … . Bias expressed by a prospective juror is purged only when, in response to additional inquiry, the juror is able to “voice[] with conviction” that he or she will be able to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence and the court’s instructions … . The link between the biased state of mind previously indicated by the prospective juror’s statements and the assurance of the ability to render an impartial verdict “must be evident” … . “Where there remains any doubt in the wake of such statements, . . . the prospective jurors should be discharged for cause” … .

The panelist clearly showed a predisposition to believe that police officers testify truthfully … . Viewed as a whole, his responses to followup questions did not “expressly state that his prior state of mind . . . [would] not influence his verdict” … . People v Whitefield, 2017 NY Slip Op 06618, First Dept 9-26-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO EXPRESSED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO EXPRESSED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/FOR CAUSE JUROR CHALLENGE  (FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO EXPRESSED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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EMAILS DID NOT EXPLICITLY WAIVE THE INITIAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT BE BOUND UNTIL A FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED, NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the complaint in this employment contract action was properly dismissed. The term sheet relied upon by plaintiff included a clause indicating neither party would be bound until a more formal agreement was executed. Subsequent emails including the phrase “firm and binding” did not waive the formal agreement required by the term sheet:

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Plaintiff’s allegations that his agent requested that any offer be “firm and binding,” that defendant’s agent acknowledged this request, that internal communications between defendant and its agents reveal an intention to make a firm offer, that the cover email transmitting the term sheet labeled the offer “firm and binding,” and that defendant later offered a fee to “kill” the contract are not sufficient to negate or demonstrate a waiver of the provision that the parties would not be bound until they executed a formal written agreement … .Morever, waiver of a contractual provision “should not be lightly presumed,” “must be unmistakably manifested, and is not to be inferred from a doubtful or equivocal act” … . Plaintiff’s agent’s demand for a firm offer and defendant’s agent’s acknowledgment of this request, before consulting with her client, prove nothing about what was ultimately agreed. Nor do defendant and its agents’ internal communications preceding the offer, to which plaintiff was not privy, prove what was ultimately agreed. Keitel v E*TRADE Fin. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 06624, First Dept 9-26-17

CONTRACT LAW (EMAILS DID NOT EXPLICITLY WAIVE THE INITIAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT BE BOUND UNTIL A FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED, NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (CONTRACT LAW, EMAILS DID NOT EXPLICITLY WAIVE THE INITIAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT BE BOUND UNTIL A FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED, NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED (FIRST DEPT))

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DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined that the People did not demonstrate defendant understood he had a right to an attorney at the time he made statement, even if he could not afford one. Both of his statements should have been suppressed:

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… [T]he People failed to establish that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights before giving oral and written statements to a detective at the precinct. In a videotaped statement to the prosecutor, made several hours after the statements to the detective, defendant said, “I cannot pay for a lawyer, why do I write yes or no.” The prosecutor then said, “[D]o you understand if you can’t, the Court will give you one?,” to which defendant responded, “[S]o I put no.” After the prosecutor reread the warnings defendant stated, “[Y]es, I need to have a lawyer . . . I cannot pay a lawyer.” The prosecutor next asked, “[B]ut do you understand that one will be provided if you cannot pay,” and defendant again stated “yes, but I can’t pay for a lawyer.” Finally, the prosecutor told defendant, “[O]kay, so you can write yes’ if you understand, and no’ if you don’t understand,” and defendant said, “[Y]es, I do understand.” Based on this exchange, the court correctly suppressed defendant’s videotaped statement. Given defendant’s failure to comprehend that he had the right to an attorney at the time of his statements if he could not afford one, it is evident that defendant’s previous statement to the detective should also be suppressed … .

We find that the error was not harmless, because there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed to defendant’s guilty plea … . People v Flores, 2017 NY Slip Op 06629, First Dept 9-26-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))/SUPPRESSION (STATEMENTS, CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))/MIRANDA WARNINGS DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))

 

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HEARING OFFICER DID NOT PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH WRITTEN NOTICE OF HER DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S REQUEST THAT A WITNESS TESTIFY, PETITIONER ENTITLED TO A NEW HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

Third Department determined petitioner was entitled to a new hearing because the hearing officer failed to provide him with written notice of her denial of the inmate’s request that a witness testify:

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At the start of the hearing, petitioner indicated three times that he wanted to call inmate X as a witness, and also informed the Hearing Officer that he wished to call six inmates who were housed in his dorm. The Hearing Officer adjourned the hearing to interview the inmates requested and, when the hearing resumed, she informed petitioner that the six inmates housed in his dorm had refused to testify, briefly mentioning the various reasons given and that they had signed refusal forms. The Hearing Officer, however, did not mention whether she had also spoken to inmate X and, if so, what he had said regarding his prior agreement to testify. No other reference was made to inmate X at the hearing and the hearing thereafter concluded without inmate X’s testimony.

Despite the fact that the hearing transcript is devoid of any indication of the Hearing Officer’s efforts to obtain inmate X’s testimony, the record contains a refusal form completed by the Hearing Officer indicating that she personally interviewed inmate X during the pendency of the hearing and that he refused to testify because he did not “want to be involved.” This record evidence establishes the Hearing Officer’s personal efforts to secure inmate X’s testimony and ascertain a sufficient reason for his refusal … . It is equally apparent that the Hearing Officer effectively made a determination to deny petitioner’s request to call this witness for this reason. However, we find that her failure to provide any written notice to petitioner concerning her effective denial of his request amounts to a regulatory violation requiring the matter to be remitted for a new hearing … . Matter of Blades v Annucci, 2017 NY Slip Op 06581, Third Dept 9-21-17

 

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (HEARING OFFICER DID NOT PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH WRITTEN NOTICE OF HER DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S REQUEST THAT A WITNESS TESTIFY, PETITIONER ENTITLED TO A NEW HEARING (THIRD DEPT))

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HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR RELIEF FOR ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND IS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL A PRISONER IS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department noted that habeas corpus is not a vehicle for relief for issues which could have been raised on appeal and is not available until the maximum sentence has been served (must be entitled to immediate release):

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Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition, as “habeas corpus relief is not an appropriate remedy for resolving claims that could have been or that were raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion” … . Petitioner’s contentions regarding his sentence were or could have been raised on his direct appeal and in his CPL article 440 motions to vacate the judgment and sentence … . In addition, even if petitioner’s claims were determined to have merit and his sentences were to run concurrently, he would not be entitled to immediate release from prison and, consequently, habeas relief is not appropriate … . To that end, it is the expiration of the maximum sentence, and not the conditional release date, that is required to establish entitlement to release in a habeas corpus proceeding, and petitioner has not yet reached the maximum expiration of his sentences even if they were concurrent … . People v D’Amico, 2017 NY Slip Op 06574, Third Dept 9-21-17

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Similar issue and result in People v Kirkpatrick, 2017 NY Slip Op 06578, Third Dept 9-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR RELIEF FOR ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND IS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL A PRISONER IS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE (THIRD DEPT))/HABEAS CORPUS (HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR RELIEF FOR ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND IS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL A PRISONER IS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE (THIRD DEPT))

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COUNTERCLAIMS FOR CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION BASED UPON NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE INJURED CHILD ARE NOT PROPER IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendant manufacturer was not entitled to amend its answer with counterclaims for indemnification and contribution based upon negligent supervision by the injured child’s mother in this products liability action. The child was injured by blender blades. The blender was on the kitchen counter but was not running at the time:

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… [P]laintiff’s … four-year-old daughter allegedly was injured when her hand came into contact with the blades of a hand-held stick blender that was left on the kitchen counter, plugged in but not running, while the plaintiff went to retrieve something from the freezer. The plaintiff commenced this action … to recover damages for strict products liability and breach of warranty against the defendants, which allegedly manufactured and sold the blender. The defendants moved for leave to amend their answer to assert a counterclaim against the plaintiff for contribution and indemnification. …

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In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, applications for leave to amend a pleading are to be freely granted “unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit”… . Here, the acts complained of in the proposed counterclaim did not implicate a duty owed to the public at large, but rather, only gave rise to an allegation that the plaintiff negligently supervised her child, which cannot serve as the basis for cognizable claims for contribution or indemnification … . The proposed amendment was, therefore, palpably insufficient, and the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion. Siragusa v Conair Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 06564, Second Dept 9-20-17

 

PRODUCTS LIABILITY (COUNTERCLAIMS FOR CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION BASED UPON NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE INJURED CHILD ARE NOT PROPER IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, COUNTERCLAIMS FOR CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION BASED UPON NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE INJURED CHILD ARE NOT PROPER IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/INDEMNIFICATION (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, COUNTERCLAIMS FOR CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION BASED UPON NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE INJURED CHILD ARE NOT PROPER IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRIBUTION (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, COUNTERCLAIMS FOR CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION BASED UPON NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE INJURED CHILD ARE NOT PROPER IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

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