Page 1028 – New York Appellate Digest

/ Criminal Law, Evidence

PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED AS MOLINEUX AND SANDOVAL EVIDENCE IN THIS ROBBERY PROSECUTION, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined a prior burglary should not have been allowed as Molineux and Sandoval evidence in this robbery prosecution. The error was deemed harmless however:

“The Molineux rule requires that evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts or crimes be excluded unless it is probative of a material issue other than criminal propensity and its probative value outweighs the risk of prejudice to the defendant”… . Although defendant’s intent was at issue, given his defense that he was an innocent bystander who had no knowledge that the codefendants planned to rob [the victim] when he drove them to her residence, the prior conviction was of limited probative value with respect to defendant’s intent because the prior conviction arose from an incident that was not similar to the charged conduct. The prior burglary did not involve a robbery, but, rather, arose from an incident during which defendant entered the residence of another with the intent to assault an occupant. Moreover, [a co-defendant’s] testimony, if believed, was sufficient to permit the jury to find that defendant had the requisite intent to the commit burglary and robbery. Accordingly, the evidence that defendant had committed a prior burglary would serve only to demonstrate that defendant had a propensity to commit burglary and, therefore, the court should have determined that the prior conviction was inadmissible as proof of defendant’s intent … .

County Court also erred in its Sandoval ruling. Although the crime was not too remote to be relevant and the nature of the conviction was probative of defendant’s credibility, allowing the prior crime to be identified as burglary improperly suggested that defendant had a propensity to commit one of the crimes with which he was charged … . People v Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 09196, Third Dept 12-28-17

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED AS MOLINEUX AND SANDOVAL EVIDENCE IN THIS ROBBERY PROSECUTION, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, RIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED AS MOLINEUX AND SANDOVAL EVIDENCE IN THIS ROBBERY PROSECUTION, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER (THIRD DEPT))/MOLINEUX EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED AS MOLINEUX AND SANDOVAL EVIDENCE IN THIS ROBBERY PROSECUTION, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER (THIRD DEPT))/SANDOVAL EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED AS MOLINEUX AND SANDOVAL EVIDENCE IN THIS ROBBERY PROSECUTION, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER (THIRD DEPT))

December 28, 2017

/ Attorneys, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction (by guilty plea) should not have been denied without a hearing. The pro se papers were deemed sufficient to raise the issues of ineffective assistance (failure to accurately inform defendant of the deportation consequences of the plea) and prejudice should defendant be deported after he had successfully sought asylum. The court found that the absence of an attorney affidavit from the motion to vacate papers was explained and should have been excused. Although defendant pled to endangering the welfare of a child, his attorney allowed an allocution on the elements of sexual abuse in the first degree:

Here, the absence of an affidavit by defendant’s counsel does not support the summary denial of defendant’s motion for three reasons.

First, defendant’s allegations are corroborated by other parts of the record … . They are corroborated by defendant’s application to naturalize, postplea, which exposed him to detection by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), since he certainly would not have made the application if he had known that he was in any danger of deportation. In addition, counsel’s failure to object to the court’s unnecessary allocution on the elements of sexual abuse in the first degree … suggests that counsel may not have accurately understood the consequences of the plea.

Second, where, as here, defendant’s application is adverse and hostile to his trial attorney, “[r]equir[ing] the defendant to secure an affidavit, or explain his failure to do so, is wasteful and unnecessary” … .

Third, in any event, defendant explained the absence of an affidavit by his counsel … . People v Mebuin, 2017 NY Slip Op 09276, First Dept 12-28-17

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT))/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO (DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT))

December 28, 2017

/ Contract Law

IN A DESIGN-BUILD TURNKEY PROJECT, A PROPERTY OWNER IS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE TURNKEY BUILDER IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department explained the concept of a design-build “turnkey” project, noting that the property owner is generally not a third-party beneficiary of the contracts entered into by the entity in charge of the design-build “turnkey” project (here RBG):

It is undisputed that neither plaintiff entered into a contract with RZA nor RDI. Rather, RBG entered into contracts with each of those entities, as would be expected in a turnkey project. “In turnkey or design-build construction projects, an owner contracts with one entity to both design and build the project and the turnkey builder is responsible for every phase of the construction from final design through subcontracting, construction, finishing, and testing. The design-builder generally cannot shift liability and is the single point of responsibility under a design-build contract, because” the design-builder is responsible for all phases of construction, including “the responsibility for holding the contracts with its trade contractors” … .

Generally, a party may not assert a cause of action for breach of contract against a person or entity with whom it is not in privity … . Without a contractual relationship and the resulting privity, plaintiffs could proceed against RZA or RDI only if plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of RBG’s contract with those entities or had the functional equivalent of privity… .”[O]rdinarily, construction contracts are not construed as conferring third-party beneficiary enforcement rights” … . Luckow v RBG Design-Build, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 09221, Third Dept 12-28-17

CONTRACT LAW (CONSTRUCTION, DESIGN-BUILD, TURNKEY, IN A DESIGN-BUILD TURNKEY PROJECT, A PROPERTY OWNER IS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE TURNKEY BUILDER IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT))/THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY (CONTRACT LAW, CONSTRUCTION, DESIGN-BUILD, TURNKEY, IN A DESIGN-BUILD TURNKEY PROJECT, A PROPERTY OWNER IS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE TURNKEY BUILDER IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT))/CONSTRUCTION (CONTRACT LAW, DESIGN-BUILD, TURNKEY, IN A DESIGN-BUILD TURNKEY PROJECT, A PROPERTY OWNER IS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE TURNKEY BUILDER IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT))/DESIGN-BUILD (CONTRACT LAW, CONSTRUCTION, DESIGN-BUILD, TURNKEY, IN A DESIGN-BUILD TURNKEY PROJECT, A PROPERTY OWNER IS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE TURNKEY BUILDER IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT))/TURNKEY PROJECT (CONTRACT LAW, CONSTRUCTION, DESIGN-BUILD, TURNKEY, IN A DESIGN-BUILD TURNKEY PROJECT, A PROPERTY OWNER IS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE TURNKEY BUILDER IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT))

December 28, 2017

/ Civil Procedure

COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO NAME NECESSARY PARTIES, BECAUSE THE PARTIES WERE SUBJECT TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE PARTIES JOINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed causes of action for failure to name necessary parties, but rather should have ordered the parties joined:

Supreme Court erred, however, by determining that petitioners’ failure to name Negron, Zell, Lowe, Robertson and Burkert as necessary parties required dismissal of the first three causes of action in the petition/complaint … . CPLR 1001 (b) provides that where a party or parties who should be joined have “not been made a party and [are] subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order [them] summoned” … . Because Negron, Zell, Lowe, Robertson and Burkert are necessary parties and are subject to Supreme Court’s jurisdiction insofar as they were employees of the City of Kingston Police Department at the time of commencement of this proceeding, the court should have ordered them joined… . Accordingly, we find that this matter must be remitted to Supreme Court to order Negron, Zell, Lowe, Robertson and Burkert to be joined as necessary parties … . Matter of Farrell v City of Kingston, 2017 NY Slip Op 09214, Third Dept 12-28-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (NECESSARY PARTIES, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO NAME NECESSARY PARTIES, BECAUSE THE PARTIES WERE SUBJECT TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE PARTIES JOINED (THIRD DEPT))/NECESSARY PARTIES (CIVIL PROCEDURE, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO NAME NECESSARY PARTIES, BECAUSE THE PARTIES WERE SUBJECT TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE PARTIES JOINED (THIRD DEPT))/CPLR 1001 (NECESSARY PARTIES, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO NAME NECESSARY PARTIES, BECAUSE THE PARTIES WERE SUBJECT TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE PARTIES JOINED (THIRD DEPT))

December 28, 2017

/ Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Negligence

ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NEW YORK, PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY REQUESTED IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN THIS DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s separate cause of action for punitive damages should have been dismissed. However, the demand for punitive damages in the ad damnum clause was proper. Plaintiff was a passenger in the car driven by defendant, who was drunk and lost control of the car:

The plaintiff erroneously denominated her request for punitive damages as a separate cause of action. “New York does not recognize an independent cause of action for punitive damages”… . Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the separately pleaded sixth cause of action insofar as asserted against him.

However, the plaintiff’s request for punitive damages in the ad damnum clause of the complaint was proper. Whereas compensatory damages are intended to assure that the victim receives “fair and just compensation commensurate with the injury sustained,” punitive damages are meant to “punish the tortfeasor and to deter this wrongdoer and others similarly situated from indulging in the same conduct in the future” … . With regard to the availability of punitive damages in personal injury cases involving drunk drivers, while this Court has held that “[e]vidence that a defendant was driving while intoxicated is insufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punitive damages”… , this Court has also held that “driving while intoxicated may support an award for punitive damages where there is additional evidence that the defendant engaged in wanton and reckless’ conduct evincing heedlessness and an utter disregard for the safety of others”… . Indeed, punitive damages were properly imposed where the driver was excessively drunk … or was a repeat offender… . Accordingly, a request for punitive damages can be stated in a case arising from drinking and driving. Furthermore, at this stage it would be premature to conclude that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to support a claim that the defendant acted so recklessly or wantonly as to warrant an award of punitive damages … Thus, to the extent the plaintiff sought punitive damages in her ad damnum clause, she stated a request for such damages, and that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss that request for punitive damages insofar as asserted against him was properly denied … . Gershman v Ahmad, 2017 NY Slip Op 09117, Second Dept 12-27-17

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, DAMAGES, DRUNK DRIVING, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NEW YORK, PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY REQUESTED IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN THIS DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (PUNITIVE DAMAGES, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NEW YORK, PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY REQUESTED IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN THIS DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (DRUNK DRIVING, NEGLIGENCE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NEW YORK, PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY REQUESTED IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN THIS DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (NEGLIGENCE, DRUNK DRIVING, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NEW YORK, PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY REQUESTED IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN THIS DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT))/PUNITIVE DAMAGES (DRUNK DRIVING, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NEW YORK, PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY REQUESTED IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN THIS DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT))/DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (NEGLIGENCE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NEW YORK, PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY REQUESTED IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN THIS DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT))

December 27, 2017

/ Negligence

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SAW WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE SEEN BEFORE THE EMPLOYEE’S GARBAGE CART COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S SCOOTER AS PLAINTIFF BACKED OUT OF AN ELEVATOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined questions of fact raised by the defendant housing authority’s evidence precluded summary judgment. Plaintiff was injured when a custodian pushing a cart collided with plaintiff’s scooter as plaintiff backed out of an elevator. The custodian’s claim that he could see clearly in front of him raised a credibility issue:

Here the evidence the Housing Authority submitted in support of the motion was insufficient to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence did not eliminate any material issue of fact as to whether its employee was negligent in handling the garbage cart at the time of the incident. The employee testified at his deposition that he was told to watch for people in the hallways and to never fill the cart too high so as to block his vision at the front of the cart. He never loaded the cart higher than chest height, at the time of the accident there was nothing obstructing his view, and he always looked in front of him when pushing the cart to make sure no one was in front of him. At the time of the incident he could see clearly in front of him, he was not walking fast, and he was cautiously pushing the cart with his usual force. The employee further testified at his deposition that he first saw the plaintiff only after he felt the impact of his cart striking the plaintiff, and he stopped to see what had occurred. It is undisputed that the plaintiff had been on his scooter backing out of the elevator before the impact, which raises a question as to the credibility of the employee’s testimony that he could see clearly in front of him as he was pushing the cart, when he did not see or hear the elevator open or the plaintiff backing out of the elevator. Further, there is a question of fact as to whether the employee was negligent in failing to “see what should be seen” … . Since the Housing Authority failed to eliminate all questions of fact as to the happening of the accident, the Supreme Court should have denied its motion without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers … . Richardson v County of Nassau, 2017 NY Slip Op 09187, Second Dept 12-27-17

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SAW WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE SEEN BEFORE COLLIDING WITH PLAINTIFF’S SCOOTER AS PLAINTIFF BACKED OUT OF AN ELEVATOR (SECOND DEPT))

December 27, 2017

/ Negligence

PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the benches near the field where plaintiff was playing football were open and obvious and plaintiff had assumed the risk of tripping over them:

Under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, “[i]f the risks of [a sporting] activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious to [a voluntary participant], he or she has consented to them and the [defendant] has discharged its duty of care by making the conditions as safe as they appear to be” … . “Risks inherent in a sporting activity are those which are known, apparent, natural, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation” … . “This includes risks associated with the construction of the playing surface and any open and obvious condition on it” … “If the risks are known by or perfectly obvious to the player, he or she has consented to them and the property owner has discharged its duty of care by making the conditions as safe as they appear to be” … .

Here, according to the infant plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which the defendants submitted in support of their motion, there was nothing marking the area where the benches were located as the end zone, but if the ball was caught in the vicinity of the bench, the campers would consider that a touchdown. The infant plaintiff also testified that he flipped over one of the benches as he was running for a pass and that, prior to turning to catch the ball, he had run the full length of the field looking ahead toward the benches, which were situated alongside the volleyball courts. Consequently, the bench was open, obvious, clearly visible, and known to the infant plaintiff … . Since the infant plaintiff, who had been playing football on this field for more than an hour when the accident occurred, was aware of that condition and voluntarily chose to play on the field, he assumed the risk of injury of colliding into one of the benches when attempting to score … . E.B. v Achim, 2017 NY Slip Op 09115, Second Dept 12-27-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (SPORTS, PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/SPORTS (SLIP AND FALL, PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

December 27, 2017

/ Negligence

DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE DEPRESSION OR HOLE PLAINTIFF STEPPED INTO, AREA WAS COVERED WITH GRASS AND APPEARED TO BE LEVEL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant-cemetery had demonstrated it did not have notice of the depression or hole plaintiff stepped in. The area was covered with grass and appeared to be level:

As alleged by the plaintiff, she was visiting the graves of her family members and was walking behind her father when she took a step near one of the headstones and her left foot began to sink into the ground. The spot where her foot sank into the ground was covered with grass, and it appeared to be level. According to the plaintiff, her father had stepped in the exact spot seconds before her accident without incident. The plaintiff, and her husband suing derivatively, commenced this action against the defendants, and the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the defendants appeal.

In a premises liability case, a defendant who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the allegedly dangerous or defective condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence… . To constitute constructive notice, a dangerous condition “must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it” … .

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the subject dangerous condition before the incident occurred … . Carriero v St. Charles/ Resurrection Cemetery, 2017 NY Slip Op 09112, Second Dept 12-27-17

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE DEPRESSION OR HOLE PLAINTIFF STEPPED INTO, AREA WAS COVERED WITH GRASS AND APPEARED TO BE LEVEL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE DEPRESSION OR HOLE PLAINTIFF STEPPED INTO, AREA WAS COVERED WITH GRASS AND APPEARED TO BE LEVEL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

December 27, 2017

/ Negligence

BUS DRIVER WAS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUS CROSSED THE YELLOW LINE INTO PLAINTIFF’S ON-COMING LANE, NO EMERGENCY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion in this traffic accident case should have been granted. Defendant bus driver was aware of an upcoming sharp curve and was aware the road was slippery due to rain. The bus crossed into the on-coming lane, striking plaintiffs’ vehicle. There was no question of fact about whether the bus driver had reacted to an emergency:

“A driver is not required to anticipate that a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction will cross over into oncoming traffic” … . “Crossing a double yellow line into the opposing lane of traffic, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1126 (a), constitutes negligence as a matter of law, unless justified by an emergency situation not of the driver’s own making”… .

Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that the defendant driver’s negligence in crossing over the double yellow line and entering the opposite lane of traffic, in which the plaintiffs’ vehicle had been traveling, was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The defendant driver’s deposition testimony indicated that she knew that there was a sharp curve in the road where she lost control of her vehicle and that rain, which had been falling for some time prior to the accident, had made the roadway slippery. Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the defendant driver merely speculated that there was oil on the ground. Thus, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver was faced with an emergency situation not of her own making which contributed to the happening of the accident … . Browne v Logan Bus Co., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 09111, Second Dept 12-27-17

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BUS DRIVER WAS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUS CROSSED THE YELLOW LINE INTO PLAINTIFF’S ON-COMING LANE, NO EMERGENCY (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BUS DRIVER WAS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUS CROSSED THE YELLOW LINE INTO PLAINTIFF’S ON-COMING LANE, NO EMERGENCY (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (BUS DRIVER WAS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUS CROSSED THE YELLOW LINE INTO PLAINTIFF’S ON-COMING LANE, NO EMERGENCY (SECOND DEPT))

December 27, 2017

/ Evidence, Family Law

FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s visitation rights should not have been suspended indefinitely without a hearing. Family Court had relied on untested evidence presented at conferences:

Generally, where a facially sufficient petition has been filed, modification of a Family Ct Act article 6 custody and visitation order requires a full and comprehensive hearing at which a parent is to be afforded a full and fair opportunity to be heard … . A decision regarding child custody and visitation should be based on admissible evidence … . Here, the Family Court relied on information provided at the court conferences, and the hearsay statements and conclusions of mental health providers whose opinions and credibility were untested by either party … .

Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court erred when it, without a hearing, in effect, denied the father’s petition for increased visitation and indefinitely suspended his visitation with the child … . Matter of Edmunds v Fortune, 2017 NY Slip Op 09126, Second Dept 12-27-17

FAMILY LAW (FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))/VISITATION (FAMILY LAW, FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))

December 27, 2017

Search Results

PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED AS MOLINEUX AND SANDOVAL EVIDENCE IN THIS ROBBERY PROSECUTION, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER (THIRD DEPT).

IN A DESIGN-BUILD TURNKEY PROJECT, A PROPERTY OWNER IS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE TURNKEY BUILDER IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT (THIRD DEPT).

COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO NAME NECESSARY PARTIES, BECAUSE THE PARTIES WERE SUBJECT TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE PARTIES JOINED (THIRD DEPT).

ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NEW YORK, PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY REQUESTED IN THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN THIS DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SAW WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE SEEN BEFORE THE EMPLOYEE’S GARBAGE CART COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S SCOOTER AS PLAINTIFF BACKED OUT OF AN ELEVATOR (SECOND DEPT).

PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE DEPRESSION OR HOLE PLAINTIFF STEPPED INTO, AREA WAS COVERED WITH GRASS AND APPEARED TO BE LEVEL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

BUS DRIVER WAS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUS CROSSED THE YELLOW LINE INTO PLAINTIFF’S ON-COMING LANE, NO EMERGENCY (SECOND DEPT).

FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

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