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COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, over an extensive dissent, determined defendant should be afforded the opportunity to move to vacate his guilty plea because the court did not inform him of the deportation consequences. Although the probation report indicated defendant was not a US citizen and was undocumented, the defendant, who had a history of mental illness, told the court, when asked, the he was a US citizen. The First Department held that all defendants must be informed of the deportation consequences for non-citizens:

In People v Peque (22 NY3d 168 [2013]…), the Court of Appeals held that before accepting a plea, due process requires that a court “apprise a defendant that, if the defendant is not an American citizen, he or she may be deported as a consequence of a guilty plea to a felony” … . The Court reasoned that “fundamental fairness . . . requires a trial court to make a noncitizen defendant aware of the risk of deportation because deportation frequently results from a noncitizen's guilty plea and constitutes a uniquely devastating deprivation of liberty” … . Accordingly, “a noncitizen defendant convicted of a removable crime can hardly make a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action'” unless informed of the possibility of deportation … .

Defendant's statement to the court that he was a citizen did not absolve the court of its obligations pursuant to Peque. Notably, Peque did not condition the need to give this warning on whether or not the court has reason to believe the defendant is not a citizen. The warning mandated by Peque is required whether the defendant is a citizen or not. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that in order to protect the rights of the large number of noncitizen defendants pleading guilty to felonies in the state, it was necessary to “make all defendants aware that, if they are not United States citizens,” pleading guilty to a felony might lead to deportation … . People v Palmer, 2018 NY Slip Op 00638, First Dept 1-2-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEPORTATION, COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/IMMIGRATION (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/DEPORTATION CRIMINAL LAW, COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEPORTATION, COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))

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THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE COMPLAINT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RATHER, THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action on the complaint should have been stayed, not dismissed, based upon the agreement to arbitrate. The Third Department further held that the complaint, augmented by affidavits, stated causes of action and should not have been dismissed:

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Supreme Court improperly dismissed the action against [defendant], rather than staying the action. Initially, there is no dispute on this record that plaintiff and [defendant], in the settlement agreement, consented to arbitrate any and all disputes regarding, among other things, the subject property. However, under established law, “[a]n agreement to arbitrate is not a defense to an action” and, thus, “may not be the basis for a motion to dismiss” … . [Defendant’s] cross motion to dismiss based upon CPLR 3211 (a) (1), premised upon the agreement to arbitrate, does not entitle him to dismissal of this action… . Rather, where, as here, there is a valid arbitration clause in an agreement and the party sued … moves to compel arbitration, the court should stay the judicial action rather than dismiss it (see CPLR 7503 [a]…). By statute, the order granting [defendant’s] motion to compel arbitration “operate[s] to stay [the] pending or subsequent action” (CPLR 7503 [a]). …

We further find that Supreme Court improperly dismissed the complaint against the remaining defendants … . Importantly, on the remaining defendants’ pre-answer cross motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court was bound to “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . The court was also authorized to “consider affidavits submitted by plaintiff[] to remedy any defects in the complaint” … . Piller v Tribeca Dev. Group LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 09209, Third Dept 12-28-17

ARBITRATION (THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE COMPLAINT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RATHER, THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE COMPLAINT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RATHER, THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED (THIRD DEPT))/CPLR 7503  (THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE COMPLAINT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RATHER, THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED (THIRD DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION WHETHER ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE THIS EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE WOULD, BECAUSE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED, EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM PURSUING HIS CLAIM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to consideration whether compliance with the agreement to arbitrate would, because of the costs involved, effectively prohibit plaintiff from pursing his claim alleging untimely payment of wages:

… [T]he court erred in failing to address plaintiff’s contention that, because of his financial circumstances, requiring him to arbitrate, and to do so in Florida, would preclude him from pursuing his claims (Matter of Brady v Williams Capital Group, L.P., 14 NY3d 459 [2010]). Acknowledging the “strong state policy favoring arbitration [] and the equally strong policy requiring the invalidation of such agreements when they contain terms that could preclude a litigant from vindicating his/her statutory rights in the arbitral forum” … , the Court of Appeals in Brady held, as here relevant, that,

“in this context, the issue of a litigant’s financial ability [to arbitrate] is to be resolved on a case-by-case basis and that the inquiry should at minimum consider the following questions: (1) whether the litigant can pay the arbitration fees and costs; (2) what is the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court; and (3) whether the cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims in the arbitral forum. Although a full hearing is not required in all situations, there should be a written record of the findings pertaining to a litigant’s financial ability” … .

Applying the foregoing standard, we hold that plaintiff has made a preliminary showing that the fee sharing and venue provisions in the arbitration agreement have the effect of precluding him from pursuing his statutory wage claim in arbitration …

… While Brady did not expressly address this issue, by extension of its logic, the risk of plaintiff having to pay defendant’s attorneys’ fees, if it prevails, may be taken into account in considering whether the total costs associated with arbitration preclude plaintiff from pursuing his claim in the arbitral forum. Adams v Kent Sec. of N.Y., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 09274, First Dept 12-28-17

 

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TOWN BOARD’S DENIAL OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT ALLOWING THE BLASTING AND REMOVAL OF ROCK WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS DESPITE THE TOWN’S IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION GATHERED OUTSIDE THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT PROCESS, THE TOWN’S RULING WAS SUPPORTED BY THE LOCAL LAW CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the town board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it denied a quarry’s (Troy Sand’s) application for a special use permit allowing the blasting and removal of rock. The court based its ruling on the local law which describes the criteria for issuance of a special use permit. The fact that the town improperly relied on information outside that gathered during the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) process did not change the fact that the local law was properly applied and justified the denial:

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The first special use standard provides that “[t]he location and size of the use, the nature and intensity of the operations involved, the size of the site in relation to the use and the location of the site with respect to existing or future access shall be in harmony with the orderly development of the district” (Local Law No. 2 [1986] of Town of Nassau art VI [A] [1]). There is ample evidence in the SEQRA [State Environmental Quality Review Act] record that the proposed quarry will be a sizable operation, and the final EIS [environmental impact statement] supports the Town Board’s determination that the project would create a highly intensive industrial land use in an area where only one small commercial entity currently exists. …

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The second special use standard requires that “the nature and intensity of intended [*5]operations shall not discourage the appropriate development and use of adjacent land and buildings nor impair the value thereof” (Local Law No. 2 [1986] of Town of Nassau art VI [A] [2]). In finding that this standard was not satisfied, the Town Board relied on, among other things, a property value impact analysis, prepared by an expert whose qualifications have not been challenged.

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The fourth special use standard requires that “[t]he character and appearance of the proposed use . . . shall be in harmony with the character and appearance of the surrounding neighborhood” (Local Law No. 2 [1986] of Town of Nassau art VI [A] [4]). The Town Board rationally concluded that the proposed project would alter the essential character of the Town and the immediate neighborhood, which is comprised of residential lots and undeveloped forest land valued by residents and tourists alike for the tranquility and recreational opportunities that the rural landscape affords. …

“In sum, it was in no way irrational, on this record, to find that petitioners failed to carry their burden of showing that their contemplated use of the subject property conforms with the standards imposed”… . … We recognize that the Town Board relied on environmental information that was outside of the SEQRA record and made factual findings with no basis in the final EIS in evaluating most of the standards it applied…  However, inasmuch as the failure to meet even one applicable standard is a sufficient basis upon which to deny a special use permit application … , we cannot say that the Town Board’s determination was irrational … . Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v Fleming, 2017 NY Slip Op 09222, Third Dept 12-28-17

 

ZONING (TOWN BOARD’S DENIAL OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT ALLOWING THE BLASTING AND REMOVAL OF ROCK WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, DESPITE THE TOWN’S IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION GATHERED OUTSIDE THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT PROCESS, THE TOWN’S RULING WAS SUPPORTED BY THE LOCAL LAW CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT (THIRD DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (SPECIAL USE PERMIT, BLASTING OPERATION, TOWN BOARD’S DENIAL OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT ALLOWING THE BLASTING AND REMOVAL OF ROCK WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, DESPITE THE TOWN’S IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION GATHERED OUTSIDE THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT PROCESS, THE TOWN’S RULING WAS SUPPORTED BY THE LOCAL LAW CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT (THIRD DEPT))/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (TOWN BOARD’S DENIAL OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT ALLOWING THE BLASTING AND REMOVAL OF ROCK WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, DESPITE THE TOWN’S IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION GATHERED OUTSIDE THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT PROCESS, THE TOWN’S RULING WAS SUPPORTED BY THE LOCAL LAW CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT (THIRD DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS)  (TOWN BOARD’S DENIAL OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT ALLOWING THE BLASTING AND REMOVAL OF ROCK WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, DESPITE THE TOWN’S IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION GATHERED OUTSIDE THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT PROCESS, THE TOWN’S RULING WAS SUPPORTED BY THE LOCAL LAW CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT (THIRD DEPT))/SPECIAL USE PERMIT (ZONING, (TOWN BOARD’S DENIAL OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT ALLOWING THE BLASTING AND REMOVAL OF ROCK WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, DESPITE THE TOWN’S IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION GATHERED OUTSIDE THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT PROCESS, THE TOWN’S RULING WAS SUPPORTED BY THE LOCAL LAW CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT (THIRD DEPT))

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OFFICE LEASING BROKER WAS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined an office leasing broker was an employee of Kaufman Leasing Company LLC and was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

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Here, the record establishes that claimant, a licensed real estate salesperson, submitted his resume and was interviewed twice before being hired as an office leasing broker and signing an independent contractor agreement. Kaufman provided claimant and those similarly situated an extensive training program that included assignment of a mentor and instruction by a third-party vendor hired by the Kaufman that took place either at Kaufman’s offices or the vendor’s location. The training included instruction on best practices, basic leasing terminology, how to identify prospects, how to make cold calls and how to negotiate a transaction. Even after claimant successfully completed the training program within the probationary period, the services of the vendor were still available to him. Claimant was paid a draw during the probationary and training period, for which Kaufman did not seek reimbursement. Kaufman also provided claimant and those similarly situated an office with equipment and supplies — including desks, computers, Internet and multiple listing service — where claimant and those similarly situated were expected to report when the office opened at 8:30 a.m. or otherwise inform a supervisor of his or her whereabouts during the day.

In addition, Kaufman issued claimant and those similarly situated a work email address, as well as business cards with the salesperson’s name and Kaufman’s name on them. Pursuant to the signed agreement, Kaufman reimbursed claimant and those similarly situated for certain professional expenses, set the commission rates, reserved the right to request monthly reports, required confidential final transaction reports, provided health insurance at Kaufman’s expense, prohibited the performance of similar services outside the company and required that the services be performed to the best of the salesperson’s abilities in a timely and productive manner. Matter of Slater (Kaufman Leasing Co. LLC–Commissioner. of Labor), 2017 NY Slip Op 09218, Third Dept 12-28-17

 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (OFFICE LEASING BROKER WAS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))

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EASEMENT WHICH ALLOWED ACCESS TO A GARAGE AND WOODSHED WAS EXTINGUISHED, GARAGE AND WOODSHED NO LONGER EXISTED AND HAD NOT EXISTED FOR 50 YEARS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined an easement which originally allowed access to a garage and woodshed had been extinguished because the garage and woodshed longer existed, and had not existed for some 50 years:

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An easement appurtenant, such as the one at issue on this appeal, is created through a written conveyance, subscribed by the grantors, that burdens the servient estate for the benefit of the dominant estate … . An easement expressly created for, or limited to, a specific purpose may be extinguished by the abandonment of that purpose … , which must be demonstrated through “unequivocal” acts establishing that the owner of the dominant estate intended to “permanently relinquish all rights to the easement” … . In determining the nature and extent of an express easement, the easement must be construed “to give effect to the [conveyors’] intent, as manifested by the language of the grant” … . Stone v Donlon, 2017 NY Slip Op 09225, Third Dept 12-28-17

 

REAL PROPERTY (EASEMENTS, EASEMENT WHICH ALLOWED ACCESS TO A GARAGE AND WOODSHED WAS EXTINGUISHED, GARAGE AND WOODSHED NO LONGER EXISTED AND HAD NOT EXISTED FOR 50 YEARS (THIRD DEPT))/EASEMENTS (EASEMENT APPURTENANT WHICH ALLOWED ACCESS TO A GARAGE AND WOODSHED WAS EXTINGUISHED, GARAGE AND WOODSHED NO LONGER EXISTED AND HAD NOT EXISTED FOR 50 YEARS (THIRD DEPT))/EASEMENT APPURTENANT (EASEMENT APPURTENANT WHICH ALLOWED ACCESS TO A GARAGE AND WOODSHED WAS EXTINGUISHED, GARAGE AND WOODSHED NO LONGER EXISTED AND HAD NOT EXISTED FOR 50 YEARS (THIRD DEPT))

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STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the single eight inch step which allegedly caused plaintiff to fall was open and obvious and, therefore, not actionable:

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Defendants established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment based on evidence that the single 8″ step onto the furniture display platform in defendants’ showroom — on which plaintiff wife tripped — was an illuminated, open and obvious condition which was readily observable by reasonable use of one’s senses … .Plaintiff wife, together with her family, had navigated the single step onto the furniture display platforms earlier that shopping day, and also during an uneventful visit to the same showroom just a few weeks prior to the date of her accident. There was no evidence to indicate that the single step, in its design, placement and maintenance, was inherently dangerous, and the defendants’ use of warning signs to give notice of the step’s presence did not, standing alone, render the steps unsafe.

Plaintiffs have not presented any proof that negligence on the part of defendants in the design, construction or maintenance of the subject step contributed to her fall, or that alleged showroom distractions support grounds to find liability on defendants’ part under the circumstances presented … . Faber v Place Furniture, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 09265, First Dept 12-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (STEP, SLIP AND FALL,  STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/STEPS (SLIP AND FALL,  STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))

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PRESENCE OF LOOSE GRANULES WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SLIP TO HIS KNEES VIOLATED INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action because the presence of loose material on a roof which cause plaintiff to slip to his knees violated an industrial code provision:

 

The record demonstrates that the loose granules on the roof surface that caused plaintiff to slip were not integral to the structure or the work … , but were an accumulation of debris from which § 23-1.7(e)(2) requires work areas to be kept free … .. Thus, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to liability on the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as it is predicated upon § 23-1.7(e)(2). Lester v JD Carlisle Dev. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 09259, First Dept 12-28-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PRESENCE OF LOOSE GRANULES WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SLIP TO HIS KNEES VIOLATED INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/INDUSTRIAL CODE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PRESENCE OF LOOSE GRANULES WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SLIP TO HIS KNEES VIOLATED INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, dismissing the juvenile delinquency petition, determined the juvenile’s admission to endangering the welfare of a child did not meet the criteria required by the Family Court Act:

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Family Court “shall not consent to the entry of an admission unless it advises the respondent of his or her right to a fact-finding hearing and, further, ascertains through allocution of the respondent and his or her parent that the respondent committed the acts underlying the admission, is voluntarily waiving a fact-finding hearing and is aware of the possible specific dispositional orders” … . Even though Family Court partially complied with Family Ct Act § 321.3, we agree with respondent that the allocution was insufficient overall … .

At the hearing, Family Court merely asked respondent whether he “engaged in conduct that was likely to pose a risk of injury to a child.” Although Family Court specified the date and the location of the alleged crime, the court did not mention any other specific underlying fact forming the basis of the alleged crime… .. As such, Family Court did not “elicit a sufficient factual basis to support respondent’s admission” … . Furthermore, while Family Court advised respondent of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent, the record does not indicate that respondent was advised of his right to present witnesses on his behalf, his right to confront witnesses and that the presentment agency had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the alleged act, which if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime … . Nor do we find that merely asking respondent’s mother as to whether respondent’s admission to the charge of endangering the welfare of the child was done with her approval constituted a sufficient allocution of respondent’s parent as required by Family Ct § 321.3 (1) … . Matter of Kameron Vv., 2017 NY Slip Op 09215, Third Dept 12-28-17

FAMILY LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (FAMILY LAW, ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, FAMILY LAW, ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/ADMISSION (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, FAMILY LAW, ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/ALLOCUTION (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, FAMILY LAW,  ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))

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MOTHER, ALTHOUGH A FIT AND LOVING PARENT, WAS PROPERLY STRIPPED OF LEGAL CUSTODY, DISSENT DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice partial dissent, determined mother was properly stripped of joint legal custody:

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The evidence reveals the parties’ inability to communicate effectively regarding the child. Notwithstanding their numerous discussions, occurring both in court and out of court, the mother continued to undermine the father and to act contrary to his express wishes. The mother testified that she “knew [the father] was not in agreement” with allowing the child’s continued contact with the boy and that she did not make a “joint decision[].” Nonetheless, she unilaterally decided to permit the child to have physical contact with the boy, and to attend the church where he served as her youth leader and his baseball game. She further acknowledged that a message that she had sent to the father “threaten[ed] to file court papers if he didn’t allow [the child] to do what she wanted on his time.” In sum, although the parties are able to communicate, there is scant evidence that the mother is willing to accept or act upon that communication; instead, after speaking with the father, she disregards his requests and opinion regarding essential parenting issues, and fails to acknowledge that it is important to do so.

Upon this record, a sound and substantial basis supports the determination awarding the parents equal shared physical custody and the father sole legal custody, while directing him to “solicit and reasonably consider” the mother’s input regarding any major decisions … . Similarly, the record supports Family Court’s finding that the mother willfully violated the 2011 order by her admitted failure to bring the child to visitation and by her discussion of court proceedings with the child, as well as the court’s bench order by permitting the child to have further contact with the boy and returning her cell phone … .

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From the Dissent:

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As the majority recognizes, the mother and the father were not on the same page regarding the issue of the child’s relationship with the 15-year-old boy and the extent and manner in which she should be disciplined for her alleged transgressions. Nevertheless, this is not a situation where the parties’ joint decision making has so broken down that joint legal custody is no longer feasible … . Indeed, the record established that, despite their significantly different parenting styles, the parties had been successfully following the previous order, communicating in the best interests of the child for several years and operating “in harmony” under the concept of “[my] house, [my] rules, [your] house, [your] rules” — a concept that was, notably, introduced by the father. Matter of Thompson v Wood, 2017 NY Slip Op 09219, Third Dept 12-28-17

 

FAMILY LAW (CUSTODY, MOTHER, ALTHOUGH A FIT AND LOVING PARENT, WAS PROPERLY STRIPPED OF LEGAL CUSTODY, DISSENT DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, LEGAL CUSTODY, MOTHER, ALTHOUGH A FIT AND LOVING PARENT, WAS PROPERLY STRIPPED OF LEGAL CUSTODY, DISSENT DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT))/LEGAL CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW,  MOTHER, ALTHOUGH A FIT AND LOVING PARENT, WAS PROPERLY STRIPPED OF LEGAL CUSTODY, DISSENT DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT))

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