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PLAINTIFF’S STEPPING ON AN UNSECURED PLANK HE HAD JUST PLACED, RATHER THAN AN AVAILABLE SECURED PLANK, CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, DEFENDANTS’ PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was constructing a scaffold floor by laying planks. He fell when he stepped on an unsecured plank he had just put down, instead of an available secured plank. Therefore plaintiff’s action was the sole proximate cause of his fall:

To succeed on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a violation of the statute and that the violation was a proximate cause of the accident … . Where the plaintiff is the sole proximate cause of his or her own injuries, there can be no recovery under Labor Law § 240(1)… . Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action by demonstrating that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident that caused his alleged injuries, since he chose to step upon an unsecured plank that he had just seconds before placed on a narrow steel beam, rather than standing upon the secured planking available to him, which he had used in the minutes leading up to the accident. Melendez v 778 Park Ave. Bldg. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 06175, Second Dept 8-16-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, PLAINTIFF’S STEPPING ON AN UNSECURED PLANK HE HAD JUST PLACED, RATHER THAN AN AVAILABLE SECURED PLANK, CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, DEFENDANTS’ PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S STEPPING ON AN UNSECURED PLANK HE HAD JUST PLACED, RATHER THAN AN AVAILABLE SECURED PLANK, CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, DEFENDANTS’ PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

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CONSTRUCTION MANAGER DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL TO BE LIABLE UNDER... QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE...