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INSURANCE LAW 3105 DOES NOT DISPENSE WITH THE COMMON-LAW PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT IN THIS ACTION BY AN INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined that plaintiff Ambac, which insured residential mortgage-backed securities issued by defendant Countrywide, was required to prove all the elements of common-law fraudulent inducement and Insurance Law 3105 did not dispense with those proof requirements:

We agree with Countrywide that Ambac is required to prove all of the elements of its fraudulent inducement claim, including justifiable reliance and loss causation. The elements of a fraud cause of action are long-settled. To establish fraud, a plaintiff must show “a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by [the] defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury” … . * * *

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There is no merit to Ambac’s contention that Insurance Law § 3105 dispenses with the common-law requirement of proving justifiable reliance and loss causation. Nor can that statute be used affirmatively as a basis to recover monetary damages. Insurance Law § 3105 provides that a material misrepresentation “shall avoid [a] contract of insurance” and “defeat recovery thereunder” (Insurance Law § 3105[b][1]).* * *

Cases applying Insurance Law § 3105 arise in the context of either a declaratory judgment action by an insurer seeking rescission of an insurance policy or an insurer asserting a defense to an insured’s claim for payment under the policy … . Here, Ambac seeks neither to rescind the policies, which are unconditional and irrevocable, nor to defeat a claim by an insured for payment. Instead, Ambac seeks to assert Insurance Law § 3105 as an affirmative claim seeking monetary damages. Under these circumstances, Insurance Law § 3105 is not applicable. Ambac Assur. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03919, 1st Dept 5-16-17

 

FRAUD (INSURANCE LAW 3105 DOES NOT DISPENSE WITH THE COMMON-LAW PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT IN THIS ACTION BY AN INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES)/INSURANCE LAW (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, INSURANCE LAW 3105 DOES NOT DISPENSE WITH THE COMMON-LAW PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT IN THIS ACTION BY AN INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES)/SECURITIES  (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, INSURANCE LAW 3105 DOES NOT DISPENSE WITH THE COMMON-LAW PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT IN THIS ACTION BY AN INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (INSURANCE LAW 3105 DOES NOT DISPENSE WITH THE COMMON-LAW PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT IN THIS ACTION BY AN INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES)

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