You are here: / / THE POLICE MISTAKENLY BELIEVED THE MAN IN A MOTEL ROOM (DEFENDANT) WAS...
,

THE POLICE MISTAKENLY BELIEVED THE MAN IN A MOTEL ROOM (DEFENDANT) WAS A SUSPECT IN A SHOOTING; AN INFORMANT HAD TOLD THE POLICE THE MAN IN THE ROOM WAS FROM ROCHESTER, HIS NICKNAME WAS “JAY” AND HE “HAD A WARRANT;” WHEN THE MAN LEFT THE ROOM, THE POLICE STOPPED HIS TAXI; THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the denial of defendant’s suppression motion and dismissing the indictment, determined the People did not demonstrate the legality of the defective’s order to stop the taxi in which defendant was a passenger. An informant told the police a man in a motel room was from Rochester, his nickname was “Jay,” and he “had a warrant.” The detective believed the man in the motel room was a suspect in a shooting which occurred a month before. Surveillance was set up and the detective was told a man had left the room and gotten into a taxi. The defective, who did not see the man leave the room, ordered the stop of the taxi: It turned out that defendant was not the shooting suspect. He was charged with possession of a controlled substance:

At the suppression hearing, a police detective testified that he directed the stop of the taxi based on a belief that defendant was in fact a different man whom authorities had identified as a suspect in a shooting that had occurred over a month earlier. …

The detective conceded that he had never seen a still photo of the suspect, that the video of the shooting that he did view lacked detail, and that he was unaware of whether the suspect’s actual height, weight, skin tone, or other specific discernable characteristic were on the arrest warrant for the shooting suspect. Further, the informant never identified the man in the motel room as the shooter, and the vague description given, i.e., that the man was from Rochester, that his nickname was the ubiquitous “Jay,” and that he “had a warrant”, is too generalized to support the reasonable suspicion required for the officers’ stop of the taxi … . … This is also not a case in which the “proximity of the defendant to the site of the crime[ and] the brief period of time between the crime and the discovery of the defendant near the location of the crime” added to the totality of circumstances supporting the detective’s reasonable suspicion … . People v Singleton, 2022 NY Slip Op 01893, Fourth Dept 3-18-22

Practice Point: The police mistakenly thought the man in a motel room (defendant) was a shooting suspect based upon vague and general allegations made by an informant. When he left the motel room, the defendant’s taxi was stopped and he was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. The People did not demonstrate the legality of the stop.

 

You might also like
Suppression Motion Should Not Have Been Granted, Officers Had “Objective Credible Reason” to Approach.
Department of Social Services (DSS) Is Not a “Victim” under the Penal Law—Defendant Can Not Be Ordered to Pay Restitution to DSS for Care of Child-Victim of Defendant’s Offense
Mother’s Parental Rights Terminated Because of Her Mental Retardation
STEP ONE OF DEFENDANT’S BATSON CHALLENGE PROPERLY REJECTED AS VAGUE AND CONCLUSORY; THERE WAS NO CONCEPCION BARRIER TO AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S STEP-ONE RULING; THE REQUEST FOR THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT COMPLAINED THAT HIS ATTORNEY HAD NOT FILED OMNIBUS MOTIONS BUT DEFENSE COUNSEL SAID HE HAD FILED THEM AND THE COURT SAID IT HAD RECEIVED THEM; IN FACT, HOWEVER NO MOTIONS HAD BEEN FILED; DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS ASSIGNED COUNSEL WARRANTED FURTHER INQUIRY BY THE COURT; DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERMS OF THE NOTE REFLECTED THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES (MUTUAL MISTAKE) (FOURTH DEPT).
Court Is Powerless After Release Signed and Filed
THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER WHEN AN OFFICER ENTERED THE VEHICLE TO RETRIEVE THE REGISTRATION AND SAW A HANDGUN; THE DEFENDANT HAD STANDING TO CONTEST THE SEIZURE BECAUSE OF THE PEOPLE’S RELIANCE ON THE STATUTORY AUTOMOBILE PRESUMPTION; THE HANDGUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE JUDGE DID NOT FOLLOW PROPER PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS, I.E., PLAINTIFF’S... THE NEGLECT FINDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, CRITERIA...