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THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE AND SNOW IN A “PASSAGEWAY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant’s summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell on ice and snow on a passageway which had not been cleared of ice and snow:

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes on owners, general contractors, and their agents a nondelegable duty to provide “reasonable and adequate protection” to workers engaged in construction, demolition, and excavation activities by complying with Industrial Code regulations that specify concrete safety directives, regardless whether they exercised supervision or control over the work … . Industrial Code § 23-1.7(d) provides that employers shall not allow any employee to use a “floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform, or other elevated work surface which is in a slippery condition,” and specifically enumerates ice and snow as foreign substances that must be removed, sanded, or covered. Plaintiff was allegedly injured at the construction site where he was working when he slipped and fell on snow and ice after he had passed through a perimeter gate, towards his employer’s shanty nearby upon arriving for work one morning. Defendant construction manager … testified the shanty area “was commonly used as a roadway for egress” and an “egress path” for workers going from the office trailers on one side of the shanties to the building under construction. Although it is unclear on this record whether there was a defined path where plaintiff fell, it is also unclear whether he was within the “shanty area” that was used as a “roadway for egress” and an “egress path.” Accordingly, issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff was in a defined walkway within the meaning of Industrial Code § 23-1.7(d) … . Lapinsky v Extell Dev. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 00815, First Dept 2-8-22

 

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IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT).
THE WRENCH WHICH FELL AND STRUCK PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE BEEN TETHERED TO THE WORKER WHO DROPPED IT; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SUBMIT AN EXPERT AFFIDAVIT (FIRST DEPT).
PRIOR FLORIDA CONVICTION WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A NEW YORK FELONY, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER (FIRST DEPT).
THE STRUCTURED ACQUISITION OF A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DID NOT CONSTITUTE A DISSOLUTION OF THE COMPANY UNDER THE TERMS OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE REFERENCE TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WAS REQUIRED; STATUTE OF FRAUDS DID NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL BECAUSE IT WAS ALLEGED THERE WAS NEW CONSIDERATION FOR THE PROMISE TO PAY THE DEBT OF ANOTHER (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S LADDER SHIFTED AND HE FELL, HEARSAY IN A REPORT WHICH CONSTITUTED A MISTRANSLATION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT DID NOT RAISE A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE STEPS WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL WERE LAST INSPECTED OR CLEANED; THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT). ​
THE INCAPACITATED PERSON’S SON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REPLACED AS GUARDIAN BY A NON-FAMILY-MEMBER IN THE ABSENCE OF A TESTIMONIAL HEARING (FIRST DEPT).

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