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THE EXTENSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CPLR 213-B(1) WHICH ALLOWS A VICTIM OF A CRIME TO SUE THE PERPETRATOR WITHIN SEVEN YEARS OF THE DATE OF CRIME APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE PERPETRATOR HAS BEEN “CONVICTED OF [THE] CRIME;” A PERPETRATOR WHO HAS BEEN ADJUDICATED A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER HAS NOT BEEN “CONVICTED OF A CRIME” WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 213-B(1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Connelly, in a matter of first impression, determined CPLR 213-b(1) does not extend the statute of limitations for civil actions against someone “convicted of a crime” where that person has been adjudicated a youthful offender. Here plaintiff, Anthony Pitt, was accused of rape by Ericka Feagles. The charges against Pitt were resolved in his favor in October 2011. Although Feagles was subsequently charged with falsely reporting an incident and making a false written statement, she was adjudicated a youthful offender in connection with those charges in April 2012. Plaintiff’s August 2016 suit against Feagles would only be timely if the seven-year extension of the statute of limitations in CPLR 213-b(1) applied. The Second Department determined being adjudicated a youthful offender does not equate to being “convicted of a crime.” Therefore the extension in CPLR 213-b(1) did not apply and plaintiff’s suit was time-barred. The court noted the plaintiff could have brought an intentional tort action within the applicable one-year statute of limitations:

CPLR 213-b, entitled “Action by a victim of a criminal offense,” provides, as relevant, that “an action by a crime victim . . . may be commenced to recover damages from a defendant: (1) convicted of a crime which is the subject of such action, for any injury or loss resulting therefrom within seven years of the date of the crime” … . * * *

… [W]e … must consider the competing legislative purpose of the youthful offender statute. In enacting the youthful offender statute, the legislature sought to relieve youthful offenders of the consequences of a criminal conviction and give them a “second chance” … . It would be inconsistent with that legislative purpose to allow plaintiffs to commence civil actions against youthful offenders long after the conduct underlying the adjudication occurred … .

Our determination does not prohibit civil actions against defendants for the conduct underlying youthful offender adjudications. We simply hold that plaintiffs must commence such actions within the applicable statutes of limitations, without the benefit of the seven-year extension provided in CPLR 213-b(1). We note that here, the plaintiffs commenced the prior action within the applicable one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts and would have had a timely action against Feagles had they properly served her. The plaintiffs did not do so. Pitt v Feagles, 2021 NY Slip Op 07299, Second Dept 12-22-21

 

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