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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE PROOF AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to conform the pleadings to the proof should have been granted in this medical malpractice action. Defendants submitted proof on the relevant issues (the treatment of plaintiff by defendant Slavin on January 26, 2009) and did not demonstrate amending the pleadings would result in any prejudice to them:

As the parties opposing such amendment, defendants had the burden of establishing that they had been prejudiced, that is that they “ha[d] been hindered in the preparation of [their] case or ha[d] been prevented from taking some measure in support of [their] position” … . That burden cannot be met when the difference between the original pleading and the evidence results from “‘proof admitted at the instance or with the acquiescence of [the opposing] party'”… . * * *

… [A]s defendants acquiesced to the introduction of the evidence of Slavin’s negligence on January 26, 2009, they could not meet their burden when they later opposed plaintiff’s cross motion to conform the pleadings to the proof adduced at trial … . Even if this were not the case, defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing prejudice. Defendants’ contentions that they had been unprepared for cross-examination of plaintiff’s expert was conclusory, as defendants failed to offer a single example as to the manner in which the introduction of evidence that Slavin was negligent on January 26, 2009 hindered their cross-examination. Morever, defendants’ claims that they were prejudiced by the introduction of the January 26, 2009 negligence were unsupported by specific examples or proof in the record. More generally, the record establishes that plaintiffs had plainly notified defendants by their bills of particulars that plaintiff had been treated by Slavin on January 26, 2009 and that Slavin’s negligence included his failure to recognize, from imaging studies, the need to perform a closed reduction on plaintiff’s injured leg. Noble v Slavin, 2017 NY Slip Op 03578, 3rd Dept 5-4-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMEND PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE PROOF, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE PROOF AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/PLEADINGS, MOTION TO CONFORM TO PROOF (PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE PROOF AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/PLEADINGS, AMENDMENT OF (PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE PROOF AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE PROOF AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE PROOF AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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