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THE JUDGE DID NOT ENSURE THAT DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL WAS KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s manslaughter and criminal possession of a weapon convictions, determined the judge did not make an adequate inquiry to ensure defendant’s waiver of a jury trial was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Although the issue was not preserved, the appeal was considered in the interest of justice:

A defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury trial is governed by CPL 320.10, which provides, in relevant part, that a defendant “may at any time before trial waive a jury trial and consent to a trial without a jury in the superior court in which the indictment is pending. . . . Such waiver must be in writing and must be signed by the defendant in person in open court in the presence of the court, and with the approval of the court” … . In addition, the record as a whole must also reflect that “[t]he circumstances surrounding the waiver . . . support the conclusion that it was knowing, intelligent and voluntary” … . While the trial judge eliciting the defendant’s “full understanding of the importance of the right being waived” … is considered good practice, “no particular catechism is required to establish the validity of a jury trial waiver” … .

… [A]t the time of the purported jury waiver, the 76-year-old defendant—who had no prior contact with the criminal justice system other than a disorderly conduct violation dating back to 1980—had a recent history of paranoid delusional thinking and possible early dementia and was being treated with anti-psychotic medication. The defendant had been examined several times pursuant to CPL article 730 and had repeatedly been found unfit to proceed in the two years immediately following his arrest. … [D]uring the very terse oral colloquy that preceded the signing of the written waiver, the Supreme Court did not ask the defendant, for instance, if he was compliant with his anti-psychotic medication and was able to understand the proceedings. Indeed, the court failed to ask the defendant a single question relating to the waiver. People v Black, 2021 NY Slip Op 06183, Second Dept 11-10-21

 

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