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THE DEFENDANT’S EXECUTION OF A POWER OF ATTORNEY IN FAVOR OF HER (NON-ATTORNEY) HUSBAND DID NOT AUTHORIZE HER HUSBAND TO FILE COURT PAPERS ON HER BEHALF IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S ACCOUNT STATED ACTION; THE HUSBAND’S REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT IS PROHIBITED BY THE JUDICIARY LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s husband could not represent the defendant in this account stated action based upon his holding a power of attorney executed by the defendant:

The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover on an account stated, alleging that the defendant failed to pay sums due on her credit card account. Following service of the summons and complaint, the defendant’s husband, James W. Gilliam II (hereinafter Gilliam), purportedly in his capacity as the defendant’s attorney-in-fact by short form power of attorney, in accordance with New York General Obligations Law §§ 5-1502A-N, filed with the court an answer and certain cross claims on behalf of the defendant. …

“New York law prohibits the practice of law in this State on behalf of anyone other than himself or herself by a person who is not an admitted member of the Bar, regardless of the authority purportedly conferred by execution of a power of attorney” … . The designation as an attorney-in-fact under General Obligations Law §§ 5-1502A-N does not confer upon a designated agent the right to provide representation as an attorney-at-law, and “cannot be read to displace the provisions of Judiciary Law § 478” … . Discover Bank v Gilliam, 2021 NY Slip Op 05949, Second Dept 11-3-21

 

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