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IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION, HUSBAND WAS NOT ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR MORTGAGE PAYMENTS MADE BEFORE THE TERMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE WAS CONTEMPLATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff husband in this divorce action should not have been awarded credit for mortgage payments made before terminating the marriage was contemplated:

Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff a credit in the sum of $34,000 for payments he made toward the mortgage on the marital residence. Where a party has paid the other party’s share of what proves to be marital debt during the pendency of the action, including payments toward the mortgage on the marital residence, reimbursement is required … . However, “[a]s a general rule, where the payments are made before either party is anticipating the end of the marriage, . . . courts should not look back and try to compensate for the fact that the net effect of the payments may, in some cases, have resulted in the reduction of marital assets” … . Here, the plaintiff’s payments toward the mortgage, which was satisfied in October 2017, were made prior to the commencement of this action, and thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to a credit for those payments. Cuomo v Moss, 2021 NY Slip Op 05945, Second Dept 11-3-21

 

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