You are here: / / IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION, HUSBAND WAS NOT ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR MORTGAGE...

IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION, HUSBAND WAS NOT ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR MORTGAGE PAYMENTS MADE BEFORE THE TERMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE WAS CONTEMPLATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff husband in this divorce action should not have been awarded credit for mortgage payments made before terminating the marriage was contemplated:

Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff a credit in the sum of $34,000 for payments he made toward the mortgage on the marital residence. Where a party has paid the other party’s share of what proves to be marital debt during the pendency of the action, including payments toward the mortgage on the marital residence, reimbursement is required … . However, “[a]s a general rule, where the payments are made before either party is anticipating the end of the marriage, . . . courts should not look back and try to compensate for the fact that the net effect of the payments may, in some cases, have resulted in the reduction of marital assets” … . Here, the plaintiff’s payments toward the mortgage, which was satisfied in October 2017, were made prior to the commencement of this action, and thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to a credit for those payments. Cuomo v Moss, 2021 NY Slip Op 05945, Second Dept 11-3-21

 

You might also like
Doctrine of Practical Location Re: Boundary Line Dispute Explained
FIVE-DAY EXTENSION FOR A RESPONSE TO AN ANSWER SERVED BY MAIL DOES NOT APPLY TO THE SENDER’S 60-DAY PERIOD TO MOVE TO DISMISS (SECOND DEPT).
No Allegation Plaintiffs’ “Physical Safety” Was Endangered Re: Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress/No Allegation of Sufficiently Extreme and Outrageous Conduct Re: Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—Those Causes of Action Were Therefore Properly Dismissed
Frye Hearing Should Have Been Held to Determine Admissibility of an Actuarial Recidivism Risk Assessment Tool as Proof of a Mental Abnormality
ALTHOUGH THE MEDICATION DISPENSED BY DEFENDANT PHARMACY WAS PRESCRIBED, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE MEDICATION WAS CLEARLY CONTRAINDICATED; THE PHARMACIST MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMSSED (SECOND DEPT).
CYNTHIA G SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVOLUNTARILY CONFINED BASED UPON A FINDING SHE WAS MENTALLY ILL IN THE ABSENCE OF A HEARING; THE FINDING WAS MADE BASED SOLELY UPON CYNTHIA G’S BEHAVIOR IN THE COURTROOM; ALTHOUGH CYNTHIA G HAS BEEN RELEASED THE APPEAL WAS HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).
Collision With Another Swimmer Not Actionable/Primary Assumption of Risk
TRIAL COURT MAY NOT SET ASIDE THE VERDICT PURSUANT TO CPL 330.30 ON A GROUND WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL AS A MATTER OF LAW–HERE THE ALLEGED FACTUAL INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE CONVICTION OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD AND THE ACQUITTALS ON ALL THE OTHER SEXUAL-OFFENSE COUNTS (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INSURED MADE A SPECIFIC REQUEST TO DEFENDANT... THE DEFENDANT’S EXECUTION OF A POWER OF ATTORNEY IN FAVOR OF HER (NON-ATTORNEY)...