You are here: / / IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION, HUSBAND WAS NOT ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR MORTGAGE...

IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION, HUSBAND WAS NOT ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR MORTGAGE PAYMENTS MADE BEFORE THE TERMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE WAS CONTEMPLATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff husband in this divorce action should not have been awarded credit for mortgage payments made before terminating the marriage was contemplated:

Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff a credit in the sum of $34,000 for payments he made toward the mortgage on the marital residence. Where a party has paid the other party’s share of what proves to be marital debt during the pendency of the action, including payments toward the mortgage on the marital residence, reimbursement is required … . However, “[a]s a general rule, where the payments are made before either party is anticipating the end of the marriage, . . . courts should not look back and try to compensate for the fact that the net effect of the payments may, in some cases, have resulted in the reduction of marital assets” … . Here, the plaintiff’s payments toward the mortgage, which was satisfied in October 2017, were made prior to the commencement of this action, and thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to a credit for those payments. Cuomo v Moss, 2021 NY Slip Op 05945, Second Dept 11-3-21

 

You might also like
COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION.
THE BANK DID NOT PROVE IT HAD STANDING IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PRESENTING ONLY HEARSAY; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
LANDLORD DEMONSTRATED THE BREAK-IN WAS NOT FORESEEABLE BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO SIMILAR BREAK-INS IN THE VICINITY, PLAINTIFFS’ SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURY DURING A ROBBERY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
PUBLIC POLICY PRECLUDED RECOVERY OF CHILD SUPPORT OVERPAYMENTS (SECOND DEPT).
THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND PLAINTIFF BUS PASSENGER’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE NORMAL JERKS AND JOLTS OF BUS TRAVEL AND NOT BY ANY NEGLIGENCE ON DEFENDANTS’ PART; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Agency’s Failure to Follow Its Own Regulations Renders Determination Arbitrary and Capricious
THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MEET THE 90-DAY-NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF RPAPL 1304 BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HAD MOVED FROM THE RESIDENCE; HOWEVER THE BANK WAS STILL REQUIRED BY RPAPL 1304 TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF THE FORECLOSURE TO THE DEFENDANT; THE PROOF THAT NOTICE WAS MAILED WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).
POLICE OFFICERS’ TESTIMONY BASED UPON DEBRIEFING GANG MEMBERS WAS INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY AND THE POLICE OFFICERS, WHO WERE QUALIFIED AS GANG EXPERTS, ACTED AS IMPERMISSIBLE SUMMATION WITNESSES, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INSURED MADE A SPECIFIC REQUEST TO DEFENDANT... THE DEFENDANT’S EXECUTION OF A POWER OF ATTORNEY IN FAVOR OF HER (NON-ATTORNEY)...