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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE SALE OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE; HUSBAND AND WIFE HAD NOT AGREED ON THE MATERIAL TERMS OF THE SALE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rodriguez, over a two justice dissent, determined the wife did not consent to the sale of the marital residence. There was never a meeting of the minds. Therefore Supreme Court should not have ordered the sale:

The husband’s proposed order contained many of the conditions imposed by Supreme Court in the order on appeal, including scheduled mandatory price reductions and required acceptance of certain offers. The wife’s proposed counter order, on the other hand, contained no proposed initial list price, no procedure for list price reduction or reevaluation, and no required acceptance of offers at any price level. As to a potential sale, the wife’s proposed counter order provided that the property “should either be listed for sale or the Wife shall advise the Husband in writing that she intends to buy-out his interest in the Townhouse” and, further, that “[t]he Townhouse will only be sold under the terms of an agreed Stipulation between the parties.”

The order on appeal reflects that Supreme Court adopted the husband’s order with minimal revisions, essentially rejecting the wife’s preconditions to the sale of the townhouse and imposing its own additional conditions. … [E]ven assuming arguendo that the dissent is correct that the wife initially agreed to the sale of the townhouse, she revoked her consent because the parties were unable to agree on the material terms of the sale … . Taglioni v Garcia, 2021 NY Slip Op 05936, First Dept 10-28-21

 

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