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THE COURT NEVER ENTERED AN ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; THEREFORE THE TIME FOR DEFENDANT TO INTERPOSE AN ANSWER IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION NEVER STARTED TO RUN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the time for interposing an answer in this foreclosure action never started to run because the court never entered an order deciding defendant’s motion to dismiss:

The Supreme Court, however, erred in granting those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference. In the order … , the court held that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) in abeyance pending the framed-issue hearing, and the defendant therefore had until 10 days after service of notice of entry of the order deciding that branch of the motion to file an answer … . Since the court failed to issue an order deciding that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) prior to granting those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference, the defendant’s time to file an answer had not yet begun to run and the defendant therefore was not in default … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the referee’s report cannot be considered a determination that, in effect, denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) to dismiss the complaint … , as there is no evidence in the record that the parties consented to the reference, and the referee therefore lacked the authority to determine the issue of standing conclusively … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A.. v Sewell, 2021 NY Slip Op 05850, Second Dept 10-27-21

 

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PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONFORM THE PLEADINGS TO THE PROOF... RES JUDICATA PRECLUDED CLAIMS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A PRIOR PROCEEDING...