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DEFENDANT DID NOT USE ANY PHYSICAL FORCE IN REFUSING TO COOPERATE AFTER A TRAFFIC STOP; OBSTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction of obstructing governmental administration second degree, determined there was no evidence the defendant used physical force. Passive refusal to cooperate after a traffic stop is not enough:

… [T]he defendant was argumentative throughout the traffic stop and arrest-booking process, repeatedly refused to answer the officers’ questions, and refused to participate physically in any way in the arrest-booking process, including refusing to stand for a photograph, to provide his fingerprints, or to sign a Miranda form … . The People concede that the defendant did not physically resist the officers, but argue that his conduct constituted physical interference because he refused to cooperate physically in the arrest-booking process. However, neither the defendant’s conduct during the traffic stop nor his conduct during the arrest-booking process constituted a knowing, physical interference with, and disruption of, the official function being performed by the officers. The defendant did not struggle, physically resist, or do anything to interfere with the officers, and he did not intrude into, or get in the way of, any ongoing police activity … . The defendant’s passive unwillingness to cooperate with the officers during the traffic stop and arrest-booking process lacked the requisite intentional physical component … . People v Johnson, 2021 NY Slip Op 03851, Second Dept 6-16-21

 

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