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DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE CASE COULD BE PRESENTED WITHOUT THE COMPLAINANT, WHO HAD NO MEMORY OF THE INCIDENT; DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT UNAVAILABLE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE BECAUSE A COLLEAGUE WAS IN COURT REPRESENTING DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s speedy trial motion should have been granted. The court noted the issue is the prosecution’s readiness for trial, not whether defense counsel is available:

The court erred, firstly, in excluding 93 days of pre-readiness delay in which the prosecution failed to present its case to the grand jury. “[T]he obligation to obtain a proper accusatory instrument is the prosecutor’s alone” … , making “the period prior to the People’s obtaining an indictment [] chargeable to them, absent the applicability of some exclusion” … . …

… [T]he prosecutor did not and could not establish its inability to proceed with the case since the complainant was not necessary to present its case to the grand jury. The charges against defendant were for leaving the scene of the accident without reporting it. The complainant remembered nothing of the accident, let alone defendant’s actions in its aftermath, professing to this lack of memory on the very day of the accident. …

The court also erred in excluding 83 days of post-readiness delay that was due to the prosecutor’s improper declaration that its readiness was “moot” because lead defense counsel was on trial. While acknowledging that a colleague of defense counsel was present, the court nonetheless erroneously concluded that “the People’s state of readiness is irrelevant where counsel is unavailable,” misconstruing the law as to what constitutes “unavailability.” …

Because a colleague of defense counsel stood up on the case on July 8, 2015, as the court itself acknowledged, defendant was not without representation on the basis that “counsel was unavailable.” People v Alvarez, 2021 NY Slip Op 03286, First Dept 5-25-21

 

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