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IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION A DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF STANDING IS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS RE: RES JUDICATA; A SECOND DISCONTINUANCE WHICH IS NOT ON NOTICE IS NOT A DISCONTINUANCE WITH PREJUDICE RE: CPLR 3217 (C) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that a foreclosure action dismissed for lack of standing is not a dismissal on the merits. The court further noted that a second discontinuance is not with prejudice, i.e., on the merits, unless it is on notice:

“‘Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final disposition on the merits bars litigation between the same parties of all other claims arising out of the same transaction or out of the same or related facts, even if based upon a different theory involving materially different elements of proof'” … . However, “a dismissal premised on lack of standing is not a dismissal on the merits for res judicata purposes” … .. Here, the instant action was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the 2014 action was dismissed for, inter alia, lack of standing, and that does not qualify as a dismissal on the merits for res judicata purposes … .

CPLR 3217(c) provides that “[u]nless otherwise stated in the notice, stipulation or order of discontinuance, the discontinuance is without prejudice, except that a discontinuance by means of notice operates as an adjudication on the merits if the party has once before discontinued by any method an action based on or including the same cause of action.” The dismissal of the second action after a previous discontinuance only operates as an adjudication on the merits if that second discontinuance is achieved by means of notice … . Here, after the 2010 action was discontinued by means of notice, the 2014 action was dismissed after the defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted. Since the 2014 action was not discontinued by means of notice, CPLR 3217(c) is inapplicable to this instant action. US Bank Trust, N.A. v Loring, 2021 NY Slip Op 02559, Second Dept 4-28-21

 

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