You are here: / / PLAINTIFF BROUGHT A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION AFTER FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY...
, ,

PLAINTIFF BROUGHT A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION AFTER FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY AND BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE WAS FULLY ADMINISTERED BUT DID NOT DISCLOSE THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO ASSERT THE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE IN AN AMENDED ANSWER AND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in a personal injury action should have been allowed to amend its answer to assert judicial estoppel and should have been granted summary judgment on the ground the plaintiff did not disclose the cause of action in the bankruptcy proceeding:

On July 6, 2012, the plaintiff filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition … in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey … . … On September 3, 2014, the plaintiff allegedly was injured due to the defendant’s negligence. Thereafter, on July 2, 2015, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for his injuries. … On December 4, 2017, a final decree was entered declaring the bankruptcy estate fully administered, and the bankruptcy case was closed. …

… [T]he plaintiff is judicially estopped from pursuing this action because he failed to disclose its existence to the bankruptcy court during the pendency of the chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding … . The plaintiff had a continuing obligation to update his asset schedules throughout the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding … . Flanders v E. W. Howell Co., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 02276, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

You might also like
Board of Commissioner’s Rejection of Hearing Officer’s Award of Supplemental Benefits Was Supported by Substantial Evidence—“Substantial Evidence” Defined and Review Criteria Explained
Criteria for 1983 Action Against Municipality Based On Policy or Custom
PROOF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE VICTIM’S EYE INJURY ROSE TO THE LEVEL OF ‘SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY;’ BASED UPON A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, ASSAULT FIRST REDUCED TO ASSAULT SECOND (SECOND DEPT).
General Permit for Municipal Storm Water Discharge Does Not Violate Federal or State Law
Expert Testimony Should Not Have Been Precluded Based Upon the Timing of the Disclosure—Short Adjournment Would Have Eliminated Prejudice—New Trial Ordered
THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE A VERMONT OFFENSE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY OFFENSE; THEREFORE THE PERSISTENT VIOLENT FELONY ADJUDICATION WAS VACATED (SECOND DEPT).
Plaintiff Entitled to Damages from the City—Plaintiff Had a “Special Relationship” with the City and Was Injured When a City Employee, Performing Ministerial Functions, Directed Plaintiff to Perform a Dangerous Task—“Special Relationship,” Which Gave Rise to a Duty Owed by the City to the Plaintiff, Defined
A SELLER OF REAL PROPERTY CAN REMAIN SILENT ABOUT DEFECTS IN THE PROPERTY BUT CANNOT TAKE STEPS TO THWART A BUYER’S DISCOVERY OF DEFECTS; HERE IT WAS ALLEGED THE SELLERS COVERED WATER DAMAGED WOOD WITH NEW PLYWOOD (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE POLICE OFFICERS’ DECIDING NOT TO ARREST PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S... PLAINTIFF IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION WAS ENTITLED TO A NEW HEARING ON WHETHER THE...