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STATEMENTS MADE AFTER DEFENDANT ASSERTED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, BUT THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS; CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS A CONTINUING CRIME AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED AS A SINGLE COUNT, NOT FOUR COUNTS; AN OBJECTION OR A MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE AN ERROR AFTER A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN GIVEN (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined statements made after defendant unequivocally asserted his right to remain silent should have been suppressed, but the error was harmless. In addition the Fourth Department dismissed three counts of criminal possession of a weapon because all four counts related to the uninterrupted possession of a single weapon at different times. The court also noted that if the trial court gives a curative instruction after an objection, another objection or a motion for a mistrial is necessary to preserve the issue for appeal:

… [D]efendant told the police three times that he did not wish to speak to them. We conclude that the court’s determination that defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent is supported by the record with respect to the first such instance, because in that instance he “did not clearly communicate a desire to cease all questioning indefinitely” … , “especially in light of his continued participation in the conversation” … . We further conclude, however, that the remainder of the court’s determination is not supported by the record, inasmuch as, twice more during the questioning, “defendant said that he did not want to talk about [the crimes], thus unequivocally invoking his right to remain silent” … . Consequently, the court was required to suppress the statements that defendant made after invoking his right to remain silent for the second time. * * *

Defendant … contends in his main brief that the court erred in refusing to dismiss various counts of the indictment charging criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under Penal Law § 265.03 (3) inasmuch as the indictment charged him with multiple counts of that crime based on his commission of a singular continuing offense. We agree. “An indictment cannot charge a defendant with more than one count of a crime that can be characterized as a continuing offense unless there has been an interruption in the course of conduct” … . Here, the indictment charged defendant with four separate counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under Penal Law § 265.03 (3) for the uninterrupted possession of a single weapon at different times. We conclude that such possession “constituted a single offense for which he could be prosecuted only once” … . Consequently, we affirm that part of the judgment convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under Penal Law § 265.03 (3) in count 17 of the indictment, and we modify the judgment by reversing those parts convicting him of that crime under counts 8, 11, and 16 of the indictment and dismissing those counts of the indictment. People v Johnston, 2021 NY Slip Op 01632, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

 

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THE CONTEMPT APPLICATIONS IN THIS NEGLECT/CUSTODY PROCEEDING WERE JURISDICTIONALLY... THE THREE-STEP BATSON PROCEDURE WAS NOT FOLLOWED WHEN THE DEFENDANT OBJECTED...