You are here: / / CVS, A DEFENDANT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, HAD BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY...
, , ,

CVS, A DEFENDANT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, HAD BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL; DEFENDANT DOCTORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT CVS’S PROVIDING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WITH THE WRONG DOSAGE OF MEDICINE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial in this medical malpractice case, determined the jury should not have heard evidence that CVS mistakenly gave plaintiff a double dose of a drug. CVS was a defendant but successfully moved for summary judgment prior to the trial:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in permitting the jury to hear evidence that CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (hereinafter CVS), mistakenly gave the decedent a double dose of digoxin, and testimony from [defendant] Manvar that the double dose of digoxin predisposed the decedent to an arrhythmia that caused his cardiac arrest. CVS, a defendant in this action, was awarded summary judgment based on its argument that its error in giving the decedent a double dose of digoxin was not a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s cardiac arrest. As summary judgment is the “functional equivalent” of a trial, the court should have precluded [defendants] Huppert and Manvar from presenting evidence at trial that CVS’s negligence may have been a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s cardiac arrest … . Raineri v Lalani, 2021 NY Slip Op 00890, Second Dept 2-10-21

 

You might also like
IT WAS ALLEGED ONE MAN INTENDED TO DOUSE ANOTHER WITH LIQUID IN A CUP BUT UNINTENTIONALLY THREW THE CUP ITSELF CAUSING INJURY; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INJURY WAS CAUSED BY INTENTIONAL CONDUCT OR AN ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER TENANT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR TRADE FIXTURES ON PROPERTY TO WHICH VILLAGE ACQUIRED TITLE BY EMINENT DOMAIN.
THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFINITION OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY IS NOT THE STANDARD FOR ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT, THE STANDARD IS ‘CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SERIOUS INJURY’ (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS SPEEDING AT THE TIME HE LOST CONTROL OF THE CAR, WENT DOWN AN EMBANKMENT AND STRUCK A TREE, KILLING A PASSENGER, THE EVIDENCE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE “DANGEROUS SPEEDING;” THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE AND RECKLESS DRIVING CHARGES; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT). ​
Lawsuit Prohibited by Unambiguous Release
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL PRECLUDED THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S INDEMNIFICATION ACTION AGAINST A SUBCONTRACTOR BECAUSE THE SUBCONTRACTOR HAD BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE UNDERLYING PERSONAL INJURY ACTION BROUGHT BY THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT).
THE COUNTY CHARTER, WHICH PURPORTED TO ELIMINATE THE CONSTRUCTIVE-NOTICE THEORY OF LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO A BICYCLIST BY A DANGEROUS CONDITION IN A COUNTY ROAD, DID NOT SUPERSEDE THE HIGHWAY LAW; TO STATE A PRIMA FACIE CASE IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COUNTY MUST DEMONSTRATE BOTH A LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE AND A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).
BANK WHICH ISSUED A MORTGAGE TO A THIRD PARTY THAT WAS USED BY THE THIRD PARTY TO PAY OFF PLAINTIFF’S MORTGAGE IN VIOLATION OF THE REAL PROPERTY LAW WAS ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE LIEN AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF THE ORIGINAL MORTGAGE.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO DRIVING WHILE IMPAIRED BY DRUGS, NOT ALCOHOL; DIRECTION... FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE IN THE ANSWER IS NO LONGER DEEMED...