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CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AND PLANNING OF THE MURDER OF DEFENDANT’S WIFE AND MOTHER-IN-LAW DID NOT CONSTITUTE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ATTEMPTED MURDER (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, over a three-judge dissent, determined the evidence of attempted first and second degree murder was legally insufficient. Defendant’s conversations and planning with a feigned confederate did not constitute an “actual step” toward killing his wife and mother-in-law:

… [T]he only conduct to be considered is defendant’s own acts because his purported accomplice [MS], who was working with the authorities, did not take any steps toward furthering the planned murders other than listening to defendant’s scheme. MS did not, for example, acquire the instrumentality for the crimes (such as drugs or poison), verify the existence of the keys and obtain them from the stated location, or stake out the address supplied by defendant to make sure that the wife and mother-in-law were present at the location specified. Nevertheless, the People, mostly by parsing defendant’s communications with MS, argue that defendant engaged in sufficient conduct by: (1) promising to provide a house to MS; (2) giving MS the purported address of the targets; (3) instructing MS when to carry out the murders; (4) providing MS with a hand-drawn map of the location of the third party’s house, where MS was to drop off the children after the murders; (5) handing MS a detailed plan of how to carry out the murders; (6) telling MS the location of the keys to the house; (7) calling MS’s girlfriend to arrange for MS to visit the jail; (8) writing a fake suicide note; (9) showing MS the suicide note; and (10) creating a prearranged code to discuss the postmortem over the recorded jail phone.

Not only are these acts “preparatory in a dictionary sense” … , they are also limited to the planning stages of committing the offense: they specify the who, what, where, when, and how of defendant’s murder plans. Notably absent are any acts that can be deemed to bring the crimes dangerously close to completion. People v Lendof-Gonzalez, 2020 NY Slip Op 06940, CtApp 11-24-20

 

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