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THE DISCONTINUANCE OF THE 2008 FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DE-ACCELERATE THE DEBT SO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS KEPT RUNNING, RENDERING THE INSTANT ACTION UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action should have been dismissed as untimely. The debt was accelerated with the first foreclosure action was commenced in 2008, starting the running of the six-year statute of limitations. The discontinuing of the that action did not revoke the acceleration:

“[A] lender’s mere act of discontinuing an action, without more, does not constitute, in and of itself, an affirmative act revoking an earlier acceleration of the debt” … .

None of the other facts relied upon by the plaintiff establish that the 2008 acceleration of the loan balance was affirmatively revoked. “[D]e-acceleration notices must . . . be clear and unambiguous to be valid and enforceable” … . While the plaintiff points to the fact that the defendant purportedly received billing statements after the first action was discontinued and that the second complaint alleged a different date of default, these facts do not establish that a clear and unambiguous notice of revocation of the acceleration was given to the defendant. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Islam, 2020 NY Slip Op 06823, Second Dept 11-18-20

 

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