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BOTH A FEDERAL HOBBS ACT ROBBERY CONVICTION AND A NORTH CAROLINA BREAKING AND ENTERING CONVICTION ARE EQUIVALENT TO NEW YORK FELONIES; DEFENDANT PROPERLY SENTENCED AS A SECOND FELONY DRUG OFFENDER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in detailed analyses, determined a federal Hobbs Act robbery conviction, as well as a North Carolina breaking and entering conviction, constituted equivalents of New York felonies and therefore supported defendant’s status as a second felony drug offender:

As this Court held in People v Robles, (115 AD3d 420, 421 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1066 [2014]), a Hobbs Act robbery is equivalent to the crime of larceny by extortion in New York (Penal Law 155.05), and a Hobbs Act robbery does not encompass a broader range of behavior than larceny by extortion. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the intent elements of each crime require proof that a defendant intended to commit a larceny, but do not require a specific intent that defendant intended to instill fear in order to extort; it is sufficient to show that the actus reus occurred in tandem with a defendant’s intent to commit a larceny … . …

The North Carolina statute, entitled “Breaking or Entering Buildings Generally,” independently qualifies as a predicate felony offense to justify enhanced sentencing in New York because it is equivalent to third-degree burglary. The North Carolina statute provides that a person is guilty of this crime when he “breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein” (see N.C.G.S.A. § 14-54[a]). New York’s third-degree burglary statute provides that a person is guilty of a class D felony if a person “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime” (PL 140.20). “A person . . . remains unlawfully in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so” (PL 140.00[5]). People v Sylvester,2020 NY Slip Op 05702, First Dept 10-13-20

 

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