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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE TRIGGERING EVENT FOR INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ASBESTOS-INJURY IS THE FIRST EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS AS OPPOSED TO EXPOSURE TO A CERTAIN LEVEL OF ASBESTOS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this asbestos exposure case, held it should not have been determined as a matter of law that insurance coverage is triggered by the first exposure to asbestos, as opposed after exposure to a certain level of asbestos:

The parties do not dispute that the applicable test in determining what event constitutes personal injury sufficient to trigger coverage is injury-in-fact, “which rests on when the injury, sickness, disease or disability actually began” … . Rather, the parties dispute when an asbestos-related injury actually begins: plaintiffs assert that injury-in-fact occurs upon first exposure to asbestos, while defendant denies that assertion and instead maintains that injury-in-fact occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that injury-in-fact occurs upon first exposure to asbestos. … [T]he court erred in that regard, and we therefore modify the judgment by denying the subject motion for partial summary judgment and vacating the declaration with respect to that motion. Carrier Corp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 05620, Fourth Dept 10-9-20

 

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