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You are here: Home1 / Evidence2 / THE REFEREE RELIED ON HEARSAY TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OWED IN THIS FORECLOSURE...
Evidence, Foreclosure

THE REFEREE RELIED ON HEARSAY TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OWED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONFIRMED THE REFEREE’S REPORT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence relied upon by the referee to determine the amount owed to plaintiff bank in this foreclosure action did not meet the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The bank’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

With respect to the amount due to the plaintiff, the referee based his findings on an affidavit of Jillian Thrasher, a vice president of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (hereinafter Ocwen), the servicer of the subject loan. …

“A proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker’s business practices and procedures” … . Here, Thrasher’s affidavit was insufficient to establish a proper foundation for the admission of a business record pursuant to CPLR 4518(a), because she failed to attest that she was personally familiar with the record-keeping practices and procedures of her employer, Ocwen, the entity that generated the subject business records. Accordingly, she failed to demonstrate that the records relied upon in her affidavit were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule … . Thus, Thrasher’s affidavit, upon which the referee relied, “constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value” on the issue of the amount due and owing to the plaintiff, including the amount of interest due for the relevant period … , and the Supreme Court erred in confirming the report. The error in relying on hearsay evidence was not harmless, as the referee’s determination is not substantially supported by other evidence in the record … . IndyMac Fed. Bank, FSB v Vantassell, 2020 NY Slip Op 05495, Second Dept 10-7-20

 

October 7, 2020
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-10-07 12:37:352020-10-08 12:50:20THE REFEREE RELIED ON HEARSAY TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OWED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONFIRMED THE REFEREE’S REPORT (SECOND DEPT).
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