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AN UNPAID PENALTY ASSESSED FOR DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COVERAGE WAS ENTERED AS A SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT BY THE COUNTY CLERK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW; BY THE TERMS OF THE STATUTE, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND DEFENDANT COULD NOT MOVE TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined a judgment entered in Supreme Court by the county clerk pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law 26  is not reviewable by Supreme Court. The Workers’ Compensation Board assessed a penalty against defendant for failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage. When the penalty was not paid the judgment was entered by the county clerk as a ministerial act which cannot be addressed by a motion in Supreme Court to vacate a default judgment:

Defendants … ignore the peculiar statutory scheme by which only this Court may review a final determination by plaintiff with respect to, among other things, assessments ordered pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 52 (5) up until the time that a judgment against an employer is entered. At that point, no appeal is permitted … .

Workers’ Compensation Law § 26 provides that where an employer fails to pay an assessment imposed pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 52 (5) within 20 days after it is due, plaintiff’s chair may file a certified copy of the order imposing such assessment with the county clerk where the employer’s principal place of business is maintained. “[T]hereupon[,] judgment must be entered in the [S]upreme [C]ourt, by the clerk of such county in conformity therewith immediately upon such filing. . . . Such judgment shall be entered in the same manner, have the same effect and be subject to the same proceedings as though rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by the [S]upreme [C]ourt, except that no appeal may be taken therefrom” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 26 …). The entry of such judgment is “merely a ministerial act” made pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 26 … . Indeed, the statute provides that the court shall “vacate or modify” the judgment only “to conform to any later award or decision of [plaintiff]” and “[t]he award may be so compromised [only] by [plaintiff and] in the discretion of [plaintiff]” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 26). Inasmuch as the entry of plaintiff’s order here by the County Clerk was “merely a ministerial act” … , Supreme Court lacked the authority to vacate the judgment because the underlying order was not issued by the court … . …

To allow defendants to petition a different court to vacate its default after judgment has been entered would undermine this statutory scheme by allowing a court other than this one to, in effect, review a final decision of plaintiff. Workers’ Compensation Bd. of the State of N.Y. v Williams Auto Parts Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 05261, Third Dept 10-1-20

 

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