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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE APPLICATION FOR AN ADJOURNMENT IN CONTEMPLATION OF DISMISSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Family Court should have granted the application for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal in this juvenile delinquency proceeding:

” The Family Court has broad discretion in determining whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal'” … . Factors that are relevant to a court’s discretionary determination of whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal include a respondent’s criminal and disciplinary history, history of drug or alcohol use, academic and school attendance record, association with gang activity, acceptance of responsibility for his or her actions, the nature of the underlying incident, recommendations made in a probation or mental health report, the degree to which the respondent’s parent or guardian is involved in the respondent’s home and academic life, and the ability of the parent or guardian to provide adequate supervision … .

Here, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s application pursuant to Family Court Act § 315.3 for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. Under the circumstances here, including the fact that this proceeding constituted the appellant’s first contact with the court system, he took responsibility for his actions and expressed remorse, he voluntarily participated in counseling during the pendency of the proceeding, and he maintained a strong academic and school attendance record, an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal was warranted … . Matter of Maximo M., 2020 NY Slip Op 03428, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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