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DEFENDANT OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE LEASE DID NOT OBLIGATE THE LANDLORD TO MAINTAIN THE AREA AND NO STATUTORY VIOLATION WAS ALLEGED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant out-of-possession landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Plaintiff allegedly slipped on ice which formed from a leak in a pipe in a walk-in freezer. The lease did not require the landlord to maintain the freezer. No statutory violation was alleged:

“An out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries that occur on its premises unless the landlord has retained control over the premises and has a duty imposed by statute or assumed by contract or a course of conduct'” … . Here, where the complaint sounds in common-law negligence and the plaintiff does not allege the violation of a statute, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that they were an out-of-possession landlord that was not bound by contract or course of conduct to repair the allegedly dangerous condition … . The lease in this case specified that the “Landlord’s Obligations do not include the performance nor the payment of the costs for . . . the maintenance, repair and/or replacement of Freezer System or the replacement of the Refrigeration System at any time.” Mallet v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 03220, Second Dept 6-10-20

 

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