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AN ATTORNEY IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY AN AGENT FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF PROCESS; HERE DEFENDANTS’ FORMER ATTORNEY WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE ON DEFENDANTS’ BEHALF; PERSONAL JURISDICTION WAS NOT OBTAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendants’ former attorney did not have authority to accept service on defendants’ behalf. Personal jurisdiction over defendants was therefore never attained:

​”Service of process must be made in strict compliance with statutory methods for effecting personal service upon a natural person pursuant to CPLR 308″ … . CPLR 308(3) permits service upon an individual to be made “by delivering the summons within the state to the agent for service of the person to be served designated under rule 318” … . “An attorney is not automatically considered the agent of his client for the purposes of the service of process” … . “[A]n attorney who agrees to accept service on behalf of individual defendants does not automatically become an agent for the acceptance of process, in the absence of proof that his clients actually knew of that representation” … . Here, the plaintiff served the summons and complaint upon the defendant’s former attorney, who lacked authority to accept service on behalf of the defendant. Thus, personal jurisdiction over the defendant was never obtained. Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Klamm, 2026 NY Slip Op 02661, Second Dept 4-29-26

Practice Point: An attorney is not automatically an agent of his client for service of process. Here defendants’ former counsel was not authorized to accept service on their behalf.

 

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