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THE FOURTH TRIAL, AT WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER AND WEAPON POSSESSION, TOOK PLACE THREE YEARS AFTER THE LAST OF THREE MISTRIALS; DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; CHARGES DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, dismissing defendant’s murder and weapon possession charges, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over the three-judge dissent, determined that the three-year delay between the third mistrial and the fourth trial violated defendant’s right to a speedy trial:

… [W]e conclude that the three-year delay to retry defendant a fourth time was unjustified and violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. … “[W]hile the greater the delay, the more likely the harm to the defendant, there is no specific length of time that automatically results in a due process violation … . Here, the delay was lengthy—more than three years and one month between the third and fourth trials, and 36 months between the third trial and when the prosecution declared readiness for the fourth trial. … The delay is even more stark when compared to the dramatically shorter time between the prior trials: six months between the first and second trials and eleven months between the second and third trials.

The “reason for the delay” factor is critical. Thus, in cases involving post-indictment delays, the prosecution’s “good faith will not insulate their decision to delay trial from judicial review on constitutional speedy trial grounds” … . “[O]nce having instituted the prosecution . . ., [the prosecution has] the obligation of advancing it unless there is a reasonable ground for delay” … . By the time of the delay preceding the fourth trial, defendant had already been indicted and tried three times. That indictment remained pending throughout the three-year delay. Accordingly, the prosecution had the obligation of advancing its case in the absence of a reasonable justification … .

A lengthy delay “demands close scrutiny of the other factors, especially the question of why the delay occurred” … . Here, the prosecution’s justifications for the delay lack record support and in any case are not persuasive. The prosecution’s claim that the delay was attributable to its consideration of defense counsel’s request for dismissal after three mistrials cannot, without more, account for the three-year delay. The prosecution did not provide any particular reasons for why its deliberations of whether to retry defendant took so long given its failure to obtain a conviction three times in a row on the murder and weapon possession charges. Nor did the prosecution assert that an internal “changing of the guard” impacted its ability to render a decision on whether to retry the case. People v Woods, 2026 NY Slip Op 02364, CtApp 4-22-26

Practice Point: Here defendant was convicted of murder and weapon possession at his fourth trial, There was a three-year delay between the last mistrial and the fourth trial. The delay violated defendant’s speedy trial rights. The charges were dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

 

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