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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER, PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE SCHOOL PROPERLY SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS, BUT THE DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE DIOCESE DID NOT; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over a dissent, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, over a dissenting opinion, affirmed the denial of the school’s and the Episcopal Diocese’s motions to dismiss the complaint in this Child Victims Act action stemming from the alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff-student by a teacher (Mr. Bravo). The majority affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the request for punitive damages against the school but dismissed the demand for punitive damages against the Diocese. The dissent argued the demand for punitive damages against the school should also have been dismissed:

Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages against the School was … properly sustained at this prediscovery stage of the litigation … . Contrary to the dissent’s position, this Court has found claims for punitive damages may be appropriate in certain negligence cases … . Specifically,”[p]unitive damages in actions involving negligent hiring, retention, or supervision generally require conduct evincing a high degree of moral culpability, so flagrant as to transcend simple carelessness, or which constitutes willful or wanton negligence or recklessness so as to evince a conscious disregard for the rights of others” … . A “conscious disregard” requires knowledge, or actual notice, of the potential of harm to others … . The complaint alleges that the School was given actual notice that Mr. Bravo was sexually abusing plaintiff and then failed to adequately investigate the allegations to such an extent that suggests ulterior motives. Further, the dissent is mistaken in its belief that plaintiff’s denial of the abuse during a meeting with school administrators negates the actual notice received by the School from the parents of her friends and a therapist, which, by itself, triggered a statutorily required response that the School did not fully implement … . * * *

Given that punitive damages are “awarded only in ‘singularly rare cases,'” they are appropriately reserved for those cases which allege that the defendants, despite having actual knowledge of the perpetrator’s propensity for the sexual abuse of children, concealed that knowledge or otherwise knowingly underresponded to that information so as to suggest that they dismissed all concern for the rights of others in favor of their own self-interest … . As plaintiff here has not alleged the knowledge required to infer any improper state of mind on behalf of the Episcopal Diocese, her demand for punitive damages against the Episcopal Diocese should be dismissed … . C.R. v Episcopal Diocese of N.Y., 2025 NY Slip Op 05144, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a discussion of the allegations in a Child Victims Act complaint which will support the denial of a motion to dismiss a request for punitive damages.

 

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