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TO DEFEAT A CPLR 3215(C) MOTION TO DISMISS AN ACTION AS ABANDONED, “SUFFICIENT CAUSE” FOR A DELAY IN MAKING A MOTION FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED, NOT THE CASE HERE; THE DISSENTERS ARGUED PARTICIPATION IN THE LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO OTHER PARTIES DEMONSTRATED THERE WAS NO INTENT TO ABANDON THE ACTION; THE MAJORITY REJECTED THE DISSENTERS’ ARGUMENT, IN PART BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development’s (HPD’s) motion to dismiss the action against it by defendant Cliffcrest as abandoned should have been granted. The two dissenters relied on an argument not raised in Supreme Court:

The motion court should have granted HPD’s motion to dismiss the action against it as abandoned under CPLR 3215(c) … . The record does not support a finding that Cliffcrest “[took] proceedings” for entry of a judgment within one year of HPD’s default within the meaning of CPLR 3215(c) and Cliffcrest fails to provide sufficient cause for the delay, as required by the rule. Cliffcrest waited over five years to seek a default judgment against HPD. None of the “proceedings” it cites — Cliffcrest’s responding to discovery requests, engaging in motion practice, and participating in settlement negotiations — was directed at, or pertinent to, the entry of a default judgment against HPD. Nor does Cliffcrest show that it took any relevant proceedings within one year after HPD defaulted.

The dissent relies on an argument not raised. Specifically, Cliffcrest does not contend that it demonstrated “sufficient cause . . . why the complaint should not be dismissed” (CPLR 3215[c]). Instead, Cliffcrest emphasizes that the proceedings demonstrated a lack of intent to abandon its claims. CPLR 3215(c)’s reference to “abandon[ment],” however, is merely descriptive of the statute’s purpose (see id. [“dismiss[al] of the complaint as abandoned”]). Cliffcrest’s general showing of lack of abandonment is therefore insufficient to prevent dismissal when not tethered to the “sufficient cause” provision as a source of authority. Otherwise, and as noted, Cliffcrest unpersuasively argues that the general litigation activities qualified as “proceedings for the entry of judgment” even though none of the proceedings identified occurred within one year of HPD’s default and none were directed at a default judgment’s entry. 938 St. Nicholas Ave. Lender LLC v 936-938 Cliffcrest Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 05052, First Dept 9-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a discussion of the evidence required to defeat a motion to dismiss an action as abandoned.

 

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