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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS ON A LADDER WHEN INJURED, THE INJURY WAS NOT CAUSED BY GRAVITY, LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER THE INJURY-PRODUCING WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) and 200 causes of action were properly dismissed. Plaintiff was on a ladder bolting an elevated steel beam when a forklift struck another (connected) beam pinning plaintiff’s arm between the beam he was working on and the wall. The injury was deemed unrelated to the force of gravity. In addition the court found that defendant did not exercise sufficient control over the injury-producing work to be liable under Labor Law 200. However, certain Labor Law 241 (6) causes of action, alleging the injury was linked to violations of the industrial code, should not have been dismissed:

Labor Law § 240(1) ” was designed to provide exceptional protection for workers against the special hazards which stem from a work site that is either elevated or positioned below the level where materials are hoisted or secured'” … . Its purpose is “to protect construction workers not from routine workplace risks, but from the pronounced risks arising from construction work site elevation differentials” … . Merely because “a worker is injured while working above ground does not ipso facto mean that the injury resulted from an elevation-related risk contemplated by Section 240(1) of the Labor Law” … . * * *

To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have the authority to exercise supervision and control over the work … . ” A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed'” … . ” [T]he right to generally supervise the work, stop the contractor’s work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations and contract specifications is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence'”… . Guallpa v Canarsie Plaza, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08046, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS ON A LADDER WHEN INJURED, THE INJURY WAS NOT CAUSED BY GRAVITY, LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER THE INJURY-PRODUCING WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)

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