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TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE THE TOWN DEFENDANTS NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE EITHER THAT THEY WERE NOT NEGLIGENT OR THAT THEIR NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; BY FOCUSING ONLY ON PROXIMATE CAUSE, THE TOWN DEFENDANTS EFFECTIVELY ASSUMED THEY WERE NEGLIGENT; THE EVIDENCE THE DRIVER OF THE TOWN DUMP TRUCK WAS TRAVELING TOO FAST FOR THE CONDITIONS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE TOWN’S FAVOR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case should not have been granted. The town’s dump truck collied with a car which failed to yield the right–of-way at an intersection, veered into plaintiff’s decedent’s lane and collided with plaintiff’s decedent’s car. The town focused its argument on proximate cause, contending that the car which failed to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident. But, to be entitled to summary judgment in this context, the defendant must demonstrate it was not negligent. By focusing on proximate case, the town defendants “must assume, arguendo, that they were negligent:”

The Town defendants’ submissions established that LaRocca, who was driving a dump truck containing 10 tons of asphalt, did not adhere to an advisory traffic sign recommending that speed be reduced to 35 miles per hour prior to entering the intersection and further established that the tree line limited his view of cross traffic at the intersection. If a trier of fact were to determine that LaRocca’s speed was unreasonable under the existing conditions, the trier of fact could also conclude that LaRocca’s own unreasonable speed was what deprived him of sufficient time to avoid the collision … . * * *

By focusing on “sole proximate cause” in this common-law negligence action, the Town defendants overlook the fact that their burden on their motion was to establish “as a matter of law that [they were] not negligent or that, even if [they were] negligent, [their] negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident” … . In other words, when moving for summary judgment in the negligence context and addressing only the issue of proximate cause, the Town defendants must effectively assume, arguendo, that they were negligent … . Inasmuch as the Town defendants did not do that here, we need not address their proximate cause argument. Gates v Simpson, 2025 NY Slip Op 04313, Fourth Dept 7-25-24

Practice Point: A defendant in a traffic accident case is entitled to summary judgment (1) if defendant was not negligent; or (2) even if defendant was negligent, defendant was not a proximate cause of the accident. In making a motion for summary judgment, if a defendant does not address defendant’s own negligence and focuses only on proximate cause, the defendant is “assuming” defendant was negligent.

 

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