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THERE IS NO BRIGHT-LINE MINIMUM HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL FOR AN ELEVATION HAZARD PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 240(1); HERE A FALL OF 10.5 TO 20 INCHES FROM A STACK OF PALLETS WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action based upon a fall from a height of 10.5 to 20 inches. The court noted that, despite caselaw holding that a fall of 12 inches did not trigger the statute, there is no bright-line minimum height differential for an elevation hazard. Plaintiff was standing on a stack of pallets to operate a masonry saw when a plank broke and he fell:

The fact that plaintiff fell from a height of approximately 10 ½ to 20 inches is not a bar to summary judgment because the height differential is not, as a matter of law, de minimis. While this Court has previously held that a height differential of at most 12 inches above the floor was insufficient to find an elevation-related risk … , the jurisprudence of this Court has since evolved, recently reiterating that “[t]here is no bright-line minimum height differential that determines whether an elevation hazard exists” … . We have repeatedly found violations of Labor Law § 240(1) predicated upon falls from similar heights as the one at bar (see Ferguson v Durst Pyramid, LLC, 178 AD3d 634, 635 [1st Dept 2019] [fall from inverted bucket]; see also Megna, 306 AD2d at 164 [fall from temporary two-step wooden staircase]; Brown, 137 AD3d at 703-704 [fall through an opening in latticework rebar deck to plywood 12 to 18 inches below]; Arrasti, 60 AD3d at 583 [fall from ramp to the floor 18 inches below]; Haskins, 227 AD3d at 409 [fall into hole 2 to 2 ½ feet deep]). Furthermore, here, the senior superintendent of defendant Tishman Construction Corporation of New York admitted that the makeshift pallet structure was an “improper work platform” that was “against the most basic safety rules.” Palumbo v Citigroup Tech., Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04298, First Dept 7-24-25

Practice Point: There is no bright-line minimum height differential for an elevation hazard which will trigger liability under Labor Law 240(1). Here a fall of between 10.5 and 20 inches from a stack of pallets warranted summary judgment.

 

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